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# INHERENCY & SOLVENCY – NEG ANSWERS

## vs. Inherency

### 1NC Frontline

#### Bilateral Investment Treaty’s inevitable in the status quo.

#### Tiezzi ‘16

Shannon Tiezzi is Editor at The Diplomat. Shannon’s main focus is on China, and Shannon writes on China’s foreign relations, domestic politics, and economy. Shannon previously served as a research associate at the U.S.-China Policy Foundation and received an A.M. from Harvard University and a B.A. from The College of William and Mary. Shannon has also studied at Tsinghua University in Beijing. “Are China and the US Close to Sealing an Investment Treaty?” – The Diplomat – March 24nd - http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/are-china-and-the-us-close-to-sealing-an-investment-treaty/

China and the United States are almost finished with negotiations over a key investment treaty, former Chinese Commerce Minister Chen Deming said on Wednesday. If successfully concluded, the bilateral investment treaty (BIT) could substantially increase Chinese and U.S. investments in each other’s markets. A BIT between China and the United States has been in the works for eight years. In 2013, the two sides announced that they were finally ready to enter “substantive BIT negotiations” after nine rounds of talks on technical issues. Now, according to Chen, the two sides are almost finished. Xinhua cited the former commerce minister, who was speaking at the Boao Forum for Asia, as saying that most of the key issues in BIT negotiations have been resolved. Chen mentioned that both sides have agreed, for example, to handle disputes between the host country and investors via third-party arbitration at the World Bank.

#### CFIUS doesn’t deter investment – has only blocked one project.

Miner ‘15

et al; SEAN MINER is China program manager and research associate at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. The Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE; Peterson Institute) is a private and non-profit think tank focused on international economics, based in Washington, D.C. According to the 2014 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report (Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, University of Pennsylvania), Peterson is number 15 (of 150) in the "Top Think Tanks Worldwide" - From the Chapter “COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UN AND THE US-CHINA BILATERAL INVESTMENTTREA" CHALLENGES IN MEETING CHINA'S DEMANDS” – From the paper “TOWARD A US-CHINA INVESTMENT TREATY” - PIIE Briefing 15-1 - February 2015 –Modified for potentially objectionable language - https://piie.com/publications/briefings/piieb15-1.pdf

A closer look at how CFIUS operates and initiates its investigations reveals that notices to CFIUS have increased substantially and so have the percentage of cleared investments. Since 2008, any entity controlled by a foreign government must notify CFIUS of an intended acquisition. This is not the case for private companies, although it is generally a good idea for them to do so. Clearance by a CFIUS review can help shield the foreign firm from congressional or public criticism. From 2008 through 2012, foreign firms filed 538 notices of transactions with CFIUS. Of these, 6 percent of the firms (32 cases) withdrew from the review process before it was finished, 31 percent (168 cases) went through an investigation, and 7 percent (38 cases) withdrew during the investigation. CFIUS recommended divestiture in just 1 case in those five years, where a presidential decision was made to force Ralls Corporation to sells its American assets. The other 44 percent (238 cases) were cleared during the review process without the need for an investigation. This means CFIUS deemed nearly 87 percent (468 out of 538) of the notices as not a threat to US national security, a very high rate. However, some firms were subject to mitigating measures (8 percent of cases from 2010 through 2012). Mitigating measures ranged from allowing only US citizens to handle certain products and services to termination or sale of specific US business activities.

## vs. Solvency

### 1NC Frontline

#### No negotiation breakthroughs on BIT – China won’t change their stance due to export pricing policies.

Wilson ‘16

William T. Wilson is a senior research fellow in The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center. Wilson holds M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in economics from Purdue University. He earned his bachelor’s in finance and economics from Towson State University. “China Unlikely to Live Up to Its Economic Promises” – Daily Signal - June 15, 2016 - http://dailysignal.com/2016/06/15/china-unlikely-to-live-up-to-its-economic-promises/

This struggle between the West and China was made clear at the 8th annual US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, which was held last week. The U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue is a high-level dialogue between the U.S. and China to discuss a wide range of bilateral, regional, and global economic and strategic issues. It was established in 2009 by President Barack Obama and former Chinese President Hu Jintao, as follow-on to the economic-focused Strategic Economic Dialogue established during the George W. Bush administration. Some observers have hailed this latest round in Beijing as the most productive conference to date. The reality, however, is that on substantial issues, there was little or no progress (for good reason). There are a multitude of big picture issues that block progress on bilateral economic issues between the world’s two largest economies. Notably, China is currently suffering enormous excess industrial capacity in most of its critical manufacturing sectors. In May, the U.S. Commerce Department paved the way to levy a 522 percent anti-dumping import duty on Chinese cold-rolled flat steel. While the Chinese made a commitment to reduce excess capacity, this may not materialize anytime soon. The Chinese are likely to continue to price exports well below marginal cost as long as economic growth continues slumping. This also, unfortunately, kills near-term prospects for a bilateral investment treaty with the United States.

#### US Senate must ratify a BIT – they won’t do so

Lam ‘15

Tina Lam is an Associate at Ferguson, Frost, Moore & Young, LLP. “THE LEGAL HURDLES PREVENTING A U.S.-CHINA BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY: PROBLEMS WITH NATIONAL SECURITY, ENVIRONMENTAL AND LABOR STANDARDS, AND INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS” - Florida Coastal Law Review - Spring, 2015 – available via: lexis; lawrev

Due to current contrasting styles that the United States and China typically use in BIT negotiations, with the United States traditionally adopting a more demanding, "liberalizing" approach and China adopting a more "protectionist" approach, the BIT negotiations will be difficult for both countries. n316 In the current political environment, it will likely be difficult for the United States and China to overcome the legal hurdles of national security concerns, environmental and labor provisions, and investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms during BIT negotiations. n317 Even if a successful U.S.-China BIT could be negotiated, the BIT would require ratification by the U.S. Senate, which may prove to be difficult because of the general distrust some U.S. senators feel towards the Chinese government. n318 Furthermore, because China can take advantage of the sound economic, political, and legal systems in the United States, signing a BIT with the United States may not be necessary for China. n319 Consequently, it is unlikely that a successful U.S.-China BIT will result from the fifth S&ED. n320

### Extensions – No negotiation breakthroughs on BIT

#### BIT won’t be actualized - no Breakthrough in US-Sino Negotiations

Snelder ‘16

Julian Snelder has worked for eight years at McKinsey & Company, and then eight years at Morgan Stanley where he ran the high-technology investment banking unit. Since 2005 he has been a partner in a global investments fund. He holds a bachelors’ degree in economics from Trinity College, Cambridge. “China's march up the manufacturing value chain causing angst aplenty” – The Interpreter - June 16th, 2016 - http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2016/06/16/Chinas-march-up-the-manufacturing-value-chain-causing-angst-aplenty.aspx

The China-US Strategic & Economic Dialogue ground through last week with the usual (ie. high) levels of acrimony. Some baby steps forward were achieved, but expectations for major breakthroughs on major initiatives like the Bilateral Investment Treaty are now so low that simply agreeing to continue negotiations generates relief. US Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew complained about the 'corrosive' impact of Chinese overcapacity in steel and aluminium. China's multi-pronged retort, well honed by now, is that it is trying its best, overcapacity exists worldwide, consumers like cheap Chinese products, and American protectionist instincts are 'hyping' the issue. These arguments all have justification, as do two points made by Beijing's finance minister Lou Jiwei: China is no longer a 'planned economy' and can't order its many private mills and smelters to shut, and his nation is now unfairly criticised for the investment binge that 'saved the world' (and his own nation’s economy) in 2009. Back then, Lou reminds us, the Chinese worker was nominated for Time's Person of the Year. The problem is that their bosses kept those Chinese workers busy building even more new factories. In the short term this boosted global demand, but more recently the results have manifested in ever-greater supply. China’s smelting capacity in some metals has doubled since 2009. In macroeconomic terms, China's savings ratio hardly fell. Instead, to reduce its current account balance, it piled on domestic investment. Some observers, like the IMF, warned that China's vast structural trade surplus was just hidden temporarily, and would bounce back. Today that prophesy is coming true. In the meantime, China has made extraordinarily impressive progress up the value chain. The impact on world trade patterns will be very different from a decade ago. Two unrelated events on the other side of the world last week prove the point. In Germany, sportswear maker Adidas announced it was bringing home an athletic shoe factory from China and elsewhere by using robots. Meanwhile, a Chinese appliance maker has moved to increase its shareholding in German robot supplier KUKA from 15% to 30%; possibly enough to secure management control and KUKA's valuable portfolio of intellectual property (it is one of four firms along with ABB, FANUC and Yaskawa dominating industrial robot technology). Beijing has a powerful policy imperative to move into automation, a key element of the emerging 'Fourth Industrial Revolution.' The government has encouraged a highly exuberant program that looks like it could become a 'robot bubble'. China's ambition has moved from making shoes, to investing in robots to make shoes, to making robots. This progression is natural; in fact there is some evidence that China has been relatively slow to upgrade (actually it has held its competitive edge in textiles, apparel and footwear longer than expected). It is the sheer scale of China's economy that is significant. According to Deutsche Bank, China has become a bigger export market for Asian countries than the US and EU combined. This has obvious regional geopolitical implications. There's more to this story than China's heft. Naturally, as it gets better, it would need to less imports in order to generate exports (ie., its domestic value added will rise). China's real import volumes (after adjusting for the fall in oil prices and other commodities) have slowed dramatically from almost 20% to just 4% annually in the last two years. The IMF is especially concerned about the ramifications for global growth. Chinese 'rebalancing' could make the country a less enthusiastic importer and an even more awesome exporter. This is bad news for its regional partners. Obviously some countries will do better than others in China's future economy (those selling cheese or healthcare to China might do better than capital goods or iron). A separate analysis from Goldman Sachs calculates that the Asian GDP 'trade multiplier' ratio to China's growth has fallen drastically, from 3.5 to 1.0 since 2009, as China substitutes high-tech components from Japan and Korea with domestic ones. Again, look for geopolitical consequences here. The Germans too are rethinking their stakes in China's industrial upgrading. Its Mittelstand machinery firms have long been welcoming to Chinese acquirers and Germany has promoted a grand technical partnership, with Beijing noticeably friendlier than the Sino-American confab. Every week, on average, sees one new Chinese bid for German machinery companies. Now German owners, managers and unions are questioning this arrangement:'We completely open our markets, but the Chinese don't open theirs to us'. As Washington has learned, China has no intention to offer reciprocity in investment treaties.

### Extensions – US Senate must ratify

#### Senate won’t ratify a BIT – too many obstacles

Gantz ‘14

David A. Gantz - Samuel M. Fegtly Professor of Law and Director, International Trade and Business Law Program, University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law. “CHALLENGES FOR THE UNITED STATES IN NEGOTIATING A BIT WITH CHINA: RECONCILING RECIPROCAL INVESTMENT PROTECTION WITH POLICY CONCERNS” - Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law - Summer, 2014 – available via lexis

The U.S.-China BIT negotiations are taking place at a time of political friction between the United States and China that is unprecedented in recent years. The Chinese hacking of both commercial and governmental websites in the United States has become a serious national security issue, and U.S. authorities are increasingly direct in accusing the Chinese government of stealing military and other technology. n19 With the Edward Snowden disclosures, Chinese authorities have a reciprocal argument to make. Smoldering Chinese territorial disputes over islands in the East and South China Seas with Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Vietnam threaten to embroil the United States in the event that any of the directly involved nations overreacts. n20 Nor, in the view of the United States, has the Chinese government done enough to quell the aggressiveness of its client state, North Korea. n21 In the past five years, the United States has initiated more than ninety antidumping and countervailing duty investigations against a variety of Chinese products, including various iron and steel goods, solar panels, wind towers, shrimp, and citric acid. n22 These unfair trade actions are viewed by China, rightly or wrongly, as having political as well as economic motivations. Also, China clearly perceives the TPP as an economic and political threat, n23 an important part of the Obama Administration's "pivot" toward a more aggressive role in Asia n24 undeniably designed in significant part to counter-balance Chinese hegemony in the region. These conflicts make Chinese citizens suspicious of the United States and undermine respect for China among many Americans. China is regularly (if today less accurately than in the past) accused of undervaluing its currency, n25 and many, both in Congress and elsewhere, oppose Chinese investment in the United States because of concerns that the enterprises so established, for example in telecommunications, will be used for spying or other forms of espionage. n26 Even those proposed investments that are totally innocuous from a national security point of view, such as the recent purchase of the Smithfield Ham group by Chinese interests, engender objections by some in Congress. n27 U.S. interests worry that serious air quality problems in China, with Chinese-sourced particulate pollution already affecting California, will carry over to the United States should the Chinese invest in resource development in the United States. n28 Other Americans are simply concerned with abysmal working conditions in the electronics industry or in textiles and clothing, n29 or less specific fears of China's overtaking the United States as the world's leading economic power n30 and that nation's emergence as a growing security threat. n31 Further, concerns have been raised regarding the competitive advantage subsidized state-owned Chinese enterprises (SOEs) have over private enterprises in the West when it comes to seeking technology and investments in other countries, n32 as well as within China. Even if the U.S. negotiators are successful in concluding the BIT, they will have to convince U.S. stakeholders, the Senate, and civil society that facilitating Chinese investment in the United States is in the national interest.

#### BIT requires a step after negotiation – Senate must ratify. Two-thirds threshold for approval is very steep.

US-China Business Council ‘14

The US-China Business Council (USCBC) is a private, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization of roughly 220 American companies that do business with China. “Bilateral Investment Treaties: What They Are and Why They Matter” - https://www.uschina.org/reports/bilateral-investment-treaties-what-they-are-and-why-they-matter

What is the process for approving a BIT in the United States? At the time of writing, the United States and China are in the early stages of negotiating the BIT. When the BIT text is final and ready for government consideration, the treaty will be submitted to the Senate and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. Once considered, the Committee may report the treaty to the full Senate favorably, unfavorably, give no recommendation, or choose not to act it at all. When a treaty has been reported to the Senate, it will be added to the Executive Calendar and considered in executive session. Two-thirds of the Senate must vote in favor of the BIT, via a resolution of ratification, in order for it to pass.

# US-CHINA RELATIONS – NEG (defense)

## vs. the mechanics of the advantage

### 1NC frontline

#### Economic Ties aren’t key – must also boost defense and social ties.

Florick ‘15

et al; Davis Florick is a master's candidate in East-West Studies at Creighton University. His areas of concentration include, but are not limited to. East Asia and former Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union states. He was recently interviewed, in print, by Voice of America regarding North Korean tunnels under the Demilitarized Zone and. on television, with Consider This... where he discussed the recent upheaval in Ukraine. He has also been published in International Affairs Forum, the World Business Institute. and previously in International Affairs Review. “Remapping U.S.-China Relations: A Holistic Approach to Building Long-Term Confidence and Transparency” – International Affairs Review - Volume XXIII, Number 3 • Summer 2015 – available at: http://www.iar-gwu.org/sites/default/files/articlepdfs/China%20Special%20Issue%20DOC%20C%20-%2002%20Remapping%20US-China%20Relations%20-%20Florick%20and%20Cronkleton.pdf

The United States and China have a number of ongoing activities to promote bilateral relations. While each of these programs has been met with some success, many have shown little progress. Although forums like the U.S.-Chinese Economic and Strategic Dialogue can tout a number of deliverables, the policies, processes, and procedures within the bilateral relationship are not without their flaws. Today the challenge is two-fold. First, the relationship has deficiencies from a holistic perspective. Successful economic endeavors best characterize the partnership, but gains in defense and social cooperation have been limited. While the emphasis on economic engagement has been pragmatic in the short term, it has limited benefits in the long term. This focus on economics will need to transform into a more diversified effort including defense and social mechanisms to preserve the long-term health of the relationship. Second, the relationship lacks a long-term, strategic focus. Identifying short-, mid-, and long-term goals could help outline a comprehensive plan for developing U.S.-Chinese relations. Growing the partnership will take time and energy, but it will be critical to preserving strategic stability between both states and in the region more generally.

#### US-Sino ties resilient – neither side will go too far *because they’d damage themselves*.

Shuli ‘16

Hu Shuli is the editor-in-chief of Caixin Media. She was Knight Journalism Fellow at Stanford in 1994. She was awarded the 2003 International Editor of the Year by the World Press Review and the 2007 Louis Lyons Award for Conscience and Integrity in Journalism by the Nieman Foundation at Harvard University. She is also the professor of the School of Communication and Design at Sun Yat-sen University. She was also once an international editor and chief reporter at China Business Times. Caixin Online - “China-U.S. Relations: Hostage to None” – June 8th - http://english.caixin.com/2016-06-08/100952795.html

Friction points shadowing the recent U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue won't damage this crucial relationship The eighth session of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in Beijing on June 6 and 7 received more than the usual attention amid signs of increased tension between the two countries. In addition to tensions over disputed islands and reefs in the South China Sea, friction has been generated in recent months by China's attempt to be recognized as a "market economy" and America's plan to deploy an anti-missile system in South Korea. Anti-China rhetoric spilling over from the U.S. presidential campaign has also fueled tension. The China-U.S. bilateral relationship has matured to a point where neither country can hurt the other without inflicting damage on itself. The line between cooperation and conflict, however, is constantly adjusting to reflect the dynamics of a fast-changing external environment and domestic politics. Regardless of how the line changes, though, each government has agreed – and should maintain this key position – that strengthening cooperation yields more benefits for all than does dwelling on diversions and friction points.

(Note: The Bilateral Investment Treaty was discussed as part of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue)

#### Alt cause - US “Pivot” policy hampers US-Sino ties

Zhu ‘15

Zhiqun Zhu is Director of the China Institute and an Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Bucknell University. He is the author and editor of 7 books including China's New Diplomacy: Rationale, Strategies and Significance (Ashgate, 2013); and U.S.-China Relations in the 21st Century: Power Transition and Peace (Routledge, 2006). He was a visiting senior research fellow at East Asian Institute of National University of Singapore, and a POSCO fellow at the East-West Center in Hawaii, hi the early 1990s, he was Chief Assistant to the Public Affairs Officer at the U.S. Consulate General in Shanghai. From the article: “Dispel Distrust: Start from North Korea” ” – International Affairs Review - Volume XXIII, Number 3 • Summer 2015 – available at: http://iar-gwu.org/sites/default/files/articlepdfs/China%20Special%20Issue%20DOC%20C%20-%2006%20Dispel%20Distrust%20-%20Zhu.pdf

While U.S. allies and most countries in Asia support the United States' "rebalance" or "pivot" to Asia in the context of China's rapid resurgence, China remains suspicious of U.S. intentions. The key components of this pivot include strengthening U.S. ties with Asian allies, deepening the United States' working relationships with emerging powers, engaging with regional multilateral institutions, expanding trade and investment, forging a broad-based military presence, and advancing democracy and human rights. Though Obama administration officials have reiterated that the United States does not and will not contain China, many believe that the pivot strategy was at least partially designed to counter China's growing power.2 Chinese leaders feel deeply uncomfortable that the United States has strengthened ties with most of China's neighbors, especially those that have territorial disputes with China; that the United States has begun shifting more naval and air forces to Asia even though it already has forward troops in Japan and South Korea; and that the United States has claimed that the U.S.-Japan mutual defense treaty covers the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands without maintaining a position regarding sovereignty over the islands. Chinese leaders also fear that these U.S. policies are emboldening and encouraging the adventurist behaviors of some politicians in Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam as evidenced by these politicians' confrontational approaches towards China. The Chinese leadership wonders what Washington has done to improve U.S.-China relations while consolidating the United States' presence in the Asia-Pacific region. These concerns may not sound interesting or sensible in Washington, but they are real and serious for many Chinese analysts and policymakers. The bottom line is the distrust between the United States and China has not declined as a result of the pivot.

#### BIT won’t solve relations – won’t increase US access to Chinese markets.

Denecker ‘15

Internally quoting Tim Stratford, a former Assistant U.S. Trade Representative and managing partner at Covington and Burling, - Sander Denecker holds a Master's degree in Chinese Political Economy from Shanghai Jiaotong University - “The US-China BIT – Opportunities and Challenges” – Insight - July 8, 2015 - http://insight.amcham-shanghai.org/the-us-china-bit-opportunities-and-challenges/

Will the BIT ensure market access? Based on a study by Covington for the Directorate-General Trade of the European Commission, Stratford predicts that even if the U.S. and China reach an agreement on the BIT there will still be obstacles keeping U.S. companies from receiving national treatment. He asserts that even if an investment is not blocked by the negative list or on the grounds of “essential national security,” its market access can still be curtailed by the types of approvals needed, by the approval criteria set forth by laws and regulations and by administrative discretion.

Interdependence fails to deter US China conflict

Friedberg ‘11,

(Aaron L., Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, *A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia*, pg. 46-47)

Trade may continue to dampen any tendencies toward conflict and perhaps in time could help to draw the United States and China closer than they are today. **But there are grounds for skepticism.** Unfortunately, **there is little reason in theory or historical experience to believe that economic links alone are** sufficientto create lasting stability, still less perpetual peace.^ Even if interdependence helps suppress mutual hostility, **it will not necessarily constrain nations from engaging in various forms of competitive behavior**, including arms races and the construction of opposing alliances. **Such geopolitical maneuvering can lead to escalatory spirals of mistrust, a breakdown in political and economic relations, and even** open conflict. It is also sadly the case that governments are not always deterred by the prospect of economic loss. Leaders often underestimate the costs of their decisions, whether because they do not recognize that a certain course of action will lead to conflict or because they assume, mistakenly, that whatever trouble results will be short and minimally disruptive. Even if it means knowingly damaging the livelihood of powerful interest groups, or of an entire nation, rulers sometimes choose to put reasons of state **above concerns for material well-being**. One does not have to go very far afield to find potential illustrations of this point. China is bound even more tightly by economic ties to Taiwan than it is to the United States. Yet few observers doubt that Beijing would use force to prevent moves toward independence, despite the enormous direct costs of doing so, to say nothing of the possibility of economic sanctions, limited conventional conflict, and perhaps even a nuclear exchange with the United States.

### Extensions – Economic Ties aren’t key to overall US-Sino relations

#### Economic Ties - US-Sino ties *require* an all-encompassing approach.

Florick ‘15

et al; Davis Florick is a master's candidate in East-West Studies at Creighton University. His areas of concentration include, but are not limited to. East Asia and former Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union states. He was recently interviewed, in print, by Voice of America regarding North Korean tunnels under the Demilitarized Zone and. on television, with Consider This... where he discussed the recent upheaval in Ukraine. He has also been published in International Affairs Forum, the World Business Institute. and previously in International Affairs Review. “Remapping U.S.-China Relations: A Holistic Approach to Building Long-Term Confidence and Transparency” – International Affairs Review - Volume XXIII, Number 3 • Summer 2015 – available at: http://www.iar-gwu.org/sites/default/files/articlepdfs/China%20Special%20Issue%20DOC%20C%20-%2002%20Remapping%20US-China%20Relations%20-%20Florick%20and%20Cronkleton.pdf

Enhancing the U.S.-China bilateral relationship must be a pivotal focus for Washington policymakers moving forward. Both sides have interests that can motivate and encourage cooperation; however, one party must take the lead and fully engage the other side in partnering. Furthermore, both sides can leverage current engagements and, in some cases, incorporate them into this broader approach. An accord that lists options in the short, mid-, and long term would be pivotal in mapping out a successful engagement concept. Most importantly though, developing an all-encompassing approach that includes defensive, economic, and social options is vital for placing the U.S.-China relationship on the best path. Beijing and Washington have a tremendous opportunity to reshape the strategic landscape through their bilateral partnership. The challenge will be outlining a strategy for cooperation and being fully committed to it for the duration.

### Extensions – BIT won’t solve US-Sino relations

#### BIT’s won’t solve relations - aren’t proven to boost investment flows

Zeng ‘16

et al; Ka Zeng is Professor of Political Science and Director of Asian Studies at the University of Arkansas. From the article: “Variation in Bilateral Investment Treaty Provisions and Foreign Direct Investment Flows to China, 1997–2011” – From the Journal: International Interactions - Published online: March 22nd, 2016 – Taylor and Francis Database – available via http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03050629.2016.1164460

Overall, the evolution of China’s approach toward BITs in favor of a more liberal one reflects the country’s growing international economic interdependence and the rising importance of not only IFDI but also OFDI to the Chinese economy. The growing importance of BITs as an instrument for China’s FDI governance thus provides us with rich empirical data for analyzing the effect of the design of bilateral investment agreements on their ability to stimulate investment flows between the signatories. This section derives the article’s main hypotheses through an examination of the existing literature on the role of BITs in promoting foreign direct investment, the factors that influence the institutional variation across these agreements, and the differential effects of BITs with varying levels of stringency in stimulating FDI. An increasingly large body of literature addresses the ability of BITs to increase investment flows either between signatories or on a global level, and the evidence so far remains mixed. While many studies (Egger and Merlo 2007; Egger and Pfaffermayr 2004; Kerner 2009; Neumayer and Spess 2005) conclude that signing more investment treaties increases a country’s overall FDI flows, there is far less overwhelming evidence suggesting that signing a BIT with a specific country will lead to greater FDI inflows from that country (Hallward-Driemeyer 2003; Peinhardt and Allee 2012; Rose-Ackerman and Tobin 2005).3

#### BIT does not solve economic relations – it doesn’t cover financial assets

Kong ‘10

Kong Qingjiang is Professor of Law of Zhejiang Gongshang University, China. “US-CHINA BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY NEGOTIATIONS” – February 25th, 2010 http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/publications/files/BB507.pdf

The BIT, if concluded based on the US model to address the concerns raised by the US, will certainly be among the most liberalized bilateral investment pact. 4.2 Still, it will not be able to address all the issues facing the bilateral economic relation. An important issue is China’s gigantic financial assets in the US, valued around US$1.5 trillion. China is concerned with the safety of the financial assets that are in principle under the whims of the US financial authorities, particularly at a time of financial crisis. 16 Unfortunately, since the BIT does not extend to portfolio investment, it will not safeguard the Chinese government from any US act that will threaten the safety of China’s financial assets in the U.S.

### Extensions – Interdependence doesn’t check war

Commercial interests fail

Goldstein ‘13

David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations, Director of the Center for the Study of Contemporary China, and Associate Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania, (Avery, “First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Spring 2013), pp. 49–89)

Beijing would, in its view, be defending China’s sovereign territorial and maritime interests in nearby seas. Even though such crises would also engage U.S. interests, these would differ in two respects. First, the United States would be seeking to preserve a regional interest in upholding its reputation as a resolute ally that cannot be intimidated, even by a determined and increasingly potent (if still relatively weak) Chinese military, as well as a global interest in upholding the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas. Although not inherently less important than China’s concerns, the U.S. stake reflects **extrinsic interests** in reputation and principle, whereas China’s stake reflects **intrinsic interests in the territory** and waters themselves.71 Second, because the theaters in which these crises would play out are much closer to China than to the United States, geography makes it likely that Beijing could more readily claim that its stakes touch on vital interests. A comparably credible American claim would depend on the persuasiveness of the United States’ explanation about the nature and importance of its interests in this distant region.72 These fundamental distinctions suggest why China could believe, even if incorrectly, that it values its stakes in Asia-Pacific maritime disputes more than the United States does—a belief that would **increase the temptation during a crisis for the weaker Chinese side to resort to force while it still has forces it can use.**73 It could expect that a demonstration of its willingness to run risks over the stakes it treasures so dearly would convince the U.S. government to cut a deal rather than to escalate to a more serious military conflict— one that the United States could clearly win, but only by accepting the costs of fighting over stakes that Beijing believes Washington values less.74 If, however, China were incorrect in its assessment of the American understanding of the U.S. stakes, Washington would be tempted to preempt China’s use of force by tapping the United States’ superior military capabilities and targeting intelligence, whose reliability would be at its peak early in the crisis.

Interdependence is not a silver bullet – it causes miscalculation that can escalate conflict

Wright, fellow with the Managing Global Order project at the Brookings Institution, ‘13

(Thomas, “Sifting through Interdependence,” The Washington Quarterly, 36:4 pp. 7–23)

Thus, the U.S.–China relationship is best understood as one of **interdependent competition.** **It is unique** in modern history. We have to look back to the period before World War I for cases of such levels of interdependence between great power competitors. The Western world was largely independent of the Soviet bloc during the Cold War, and interwar Europe was much less interdependent than it was a quarter of a century earlier.11 The apparent tradeoff between the common interests generated by interdependence and the tensions stoked by geopolitical competition make it difficult to predict where U.S.–China relations are headed. Even if interdependence continues to grow, it will not remove the causes of U.S.– China security competition. Each side is more likely to believe that **the other will compromise** on issues where they differ, **but they will be unwilling to compromise themselves.**12 Take Taiwan as an illustration: it is inconceivable that either China or the United States would abandon their respective positions and accede to the will of the other for the sake of economic inducements. In fact, in practical terms, it is hard to imagine any controversial area where a U.S. president would back down from a formal commitment for economic reasons. **Rather, the danger is that Washington and Beijing could** miscalculate **by assuming that the other side is more commercially minded** than they are. So, **interdependence and geopolitical competition will continue to exist.** When the two come into conflict, geopolitical calculations will be uppermost in policymakers’ minds. The question that they are coming to grips with is: what impact will interdependence have? Does it always help the cause of peace, or are there occasions when it will hurt? The key to understanding the strategic effects of interdependence on the bilateral relationship **is to understand that** it is not a monolithic force. Some types of interdependence will encourage cooperation and decrease tensions. **Others will have the opposite effect, increasing tensions and friction**. How can we tell the difference between the two? The positive type of interdependence is one where the benefits are shared and it is difficult for either side to turn it into leverage that can be used to inflict disproportionate damage on the other. To use the language of international relations theory, there is symmetric vulnerability. The negative type of interdependence is one where one side gains disproportionate leverage over the other and could seek to use this leverage as an economic weapon at a time of crisis. If one side has an asymmetric vulnerability that the other side tries to exploit, **it might also retaliate in another area**— horizontal escalation—in which it holds an asymmetric superiority. This increases the risk of miscalculation and a spiraling crisis.

## vs. the South China Sea module

### 1NC Frontline

#### No SCS war coming in the squo.

Ignatius ‘14

David Ignatius is an associate editor and columnist for the Washington Post. He is a former Adjunct Lecturer at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and currently Senior Fellow to the Future of Diplomacy Program. “A U.S.-China ‘reset’?” – Washington Post – December 16th - https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatius-a-us-china-reset/2014/12/16/981db07e-855f-11e4-b9b7-b8632ae73d25\_story.html

This year began with some Chinese and American foreign-policy analysts looking back a century to World War I and wondering if confrontation was inevitable between a rising power and a dominant one. But now there has been progress on climate, trade and security issues and what seems a modest “reset” of the Sino-American relationship. Future disagreements between the United States and China are inevitable. But the surprise of a high-level dialogue here last weekend was the interest by both sides in exploring what the Chinese like to call “win-win” cooperation. “I don’t believe there will be a military confrontation between the two countries,” insisted one of China’s top American experts, who not long ago was warning about strains in the relationship. Recent disputes over maritime boundaries in the East and South China seas are “not particularly dangerous,” said another prominent Chinese scholar.

SCS tensions won’t escalate

Li ’15

(Xue, Director of the Department of International Strategy at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, “The US and China Won't See Military Conflict Over the South China Sea”, The Diplomat, 6/19/15 - )

In a recent piece on the South China Sea disputes, I argued that “the ASEAN claimants are largely staying behind the scenes while external powers take center stage.” Based on recent developments on the South China Sea issue, it seems the U.S. will not only be a ‘director’ but an actor. We saw this clearly on May 20, when the U.S. military sent surveillance aircraft over three islands controlled by Beijing.

However, **this does not necessary mean the** South China Sea **will spark a U.S.-China military conflict**.

As a global hegemon, the United States’ main interest lies in maintaining the current international order as well as peace and stability. Regarding the South China Sea, U.S. interests include ensuring peace and stability, freedom of commercial navigation, and military activities in exclusive economic zones. Maintaining the current balance of power is considered to be a key condition for securing these interests—and a rising China determined to strengthen its hold on South China Sea territory is viewed as a threat to the current balance of power. In response, the U.S. launched its “rebalance to Asia” strategy. In practice, the U.S. has on the one hand strengthened its military presence in Asia-Pacific, while on the other hand supporting ASEAN countries, particularly ASEAN claimants to South China Sea territories.

This position has included high-profile rhetoric by U.S. officials. In 2010, then-U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton spoke at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi about the South China Sea, remarks that aligned the U.S. with Southeast Asia’s approach to the disputes. At the 2012 Shangri-La Dialogue, then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta explained how the United States will rebalance its force posture as part of playing a “deeper and more enduring partnership role” in the Asia-Pacific region. In 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel called out China’s “destabilizing, unilateral activities asserting its claims in the South China Sea.” His remarks also came at the Shangri-La dialogue, while China’s HY-981 oil rig was deployed in the waters around the Paracel Islands. In 2015, U.S. officials have openly pressured China to scale back its construction work in the Spratly islands and have sent aircraft to patrol over islands in the Spratly that are controlled by China. These measures have brought global attention to the South China Sea.

However, if we look at the practical significance of the remarks, there are several limiting factors. The interests at stake in the South China Sea are **not core national interests for the** United States. Meanwhile, the U.S.-Philippine alliance is not as important as the U.S.-Japan alliance, and U.S. ties with other ASEAN countries are even weaker. Given **U.S.-China mutual economic dependence** and China’s comprehensive national strength, **the** United States **is unlikely to go so far as having a military confrontation with China** over the South China Sea. Barack Obama, the ‘peace president’ who withdrew the U.S. military from Iraq and Afghanistan, is even less likely to fight with China for the South China Sea.

As for the U.S. interests in the region, Washington is surely aware that China has not affected the freedom of commercial navigation in these waters so far. And as I noted in my earlier piece, Beijing is developing its stance and could eventually recognize the legality of military activities in another country’s EEZ (see, for example, the China-Russia joint military exercise in the Mediterranean).

Yet when it comes to China’s large-scale land reclamation in the Spratly Islands (and on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands), Washington worries that Beijing will conduct a series of activities to strengthen its claims on the South China Sea, such as establishing an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) or advocating that others respect a 200-nautical mile (370 km) EEZ from its islands. Meanwhile, the 2014 oil rig incident taught Washington that ASEAN claimants and even ASEAN as a whole could hardly play any effective role in dealing with China’s land reclamation. Hence, the U.S. has no better choice than to become directly involved in this issue.

At the beginning, the United States tried to stop China through private diplomatic mediation, yet it soon realized that this approach was not effective in persuading China. So Washington started to tackle the issue in a more aggressive way, such as encouraging India, Japan, ASEAN, the G7, and the European Union to pressure Beijing internationally. Domestically, U.S. officials from different departments and different levels have opposed China’s ‘changing the status quo’ in this area.

Since 2015, Washington has increased its pressure on China. It sent the USS Fort Worth, a littoral combat ship, to sail in waters near the Spratly area controlled by Vietnam in early May. U.S. official are also considering sending naval and air patrols within 12 nautical miles of the Spratly Islands controlled by China.

Washington has recognized that it could hardly stop China’s construction in Spratly Islands. Therefore, it has opted to portray Beijing as a challenger to the status quo, at the same time moving to prevent China from establishing a South China Sea ADIZ and an EEZ of 200 nautical miles around its artificial islands. This was the logic behind the U.S. sending a P-8A surveillance plane with reporters on board to approach three artificial island built by China. China issued eight warnings to the plane; the U.S. responded by saying the plane was flying through international airspace.

Afterwards, U.S. Defense Department spokesman, Army Col. Steve Warren, said there could be a potential “freedom of navigation” exercise within 12 nautical miles of the artificial islands. If this approach were adopted, it would back China into a corner; hence it’s a unlikely the Obama administration will make that move.

As the U.S. involvement in the South China Sea becomes more aggressive and high-profile, the dynamic relationship between China and the United States comes to affect other layers of the dispute (for example, relations between China and ASEAN claimants or China and ASEAN in general). To some extent, the South China Sea dispute has developed into a balance of power tug-of-war between the U.S. and China, **yet both sides will not take the risk of military confrontation**. As Foreign Minister Wang Yi put it in a recent meeting with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, “as for the differences, our attitude is it is okay to have differences as long as we could avoid misunderstanding, and even more importantly, avoid miscalculation.”

For its part, China is determined to build artificial islands and several airstrips in the Spratlys, which I argue would help promote the resolution of SCS disputes. But it’s worth noting that if China establishes an ADIZ and advocates a 200 nautical miles EEZ (as the U.S. fears), it would push ASEAN claimants and even non-claimants to stand by the United States. Obviously, the potential consequences contradict with China’s “One Belt, One Road” strategy.

In February 2014, in response to reports by Japan’s Asahi Shimbun that a South China Sea ADIZ was imminent, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs hinted that China would not necessarily impose an ADIZ. “The Chinese side has yet to feel any air security threat from the ASEAN countries and is optimistic about its relations with the neighboring countries and the general situation in the South China Sea region,” a spokesperson said.

Since the “Belt and Road” is Beijing’s primary strategic agenda for the coming years, it is crucial for China to strengthen its economic relationship with ASEAN on the one hand while reducing ASEAN claimants’ security concerns on the other hand. As a result, it should accelerate the adjustment of its South China Sea policy; clarify China’s stand on the issue, and propose China’s blueprint for resolving the disputes.

The South China Sea dispute has developed a seasonal pattern, where the first half of the year is focused on conflicts, and the second half tends to emphasize **cooperation**. Considering its timing at the peak of ‘conflict season,’ the Shangri-La Dialogue serves as a hot spot. Since 2012, the Shangri-La Dialogue has become a platform for the U.S. and China to tussle on the South China Sea, with the U.S. being proactive and China reactive. (Incidentally, this partly explains why China is upgrading Xiangshan Forum as an alternative dialogue platform). This year was no exception, as the U.S. worked hard to draw the world’s attention to the Shangri-La Dialogue this year.

But audiences should be aware that aggressive statements at the Shangri-La Dialogue are not totally representative of U.S.-China relations. After all, these statements are made by military rather than political elites. Cooperation will be the key when the U.S. and China have their Strategic and Economic Dialogue in late June, with the ASEAN Regional Forum and other meetings following later this summer.

### Extensions – SCS war unlikely

**SCS war unlikely**

Brendan Taylor 14, Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian and PhD – National Australian University, “The South China Sea is Not a Flashpoint,” The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2014, Volume 34, Issue 1, Taylor & Francis

Unlike its recent behavior in the East China Sea, Beijing’s approach toward the South China Sea disputes has traditionally been one of conflict deescalation. Beijing’s clear preference has been to manage such tensions **bilaterally**. Following a period where an increase in Chinese maritime patrols led to a rise in the number of clashes with Vietnamese (and Philippine) vessels, for instance, Beijing and Hanoi reached agreement in October 2011 on principles for **settling maritime disputes**. Likewise in June 2013, China and Vietnam agreed to establish new hotlines to assist with managing incidents at sea and dealing with fishing disputes.32 Beijing has also shown some **willingness to take the multilateral route**. Most famously, China signed a non-binding “Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” with ASEAN in November 2002. While protracted progress continues, the official position of both China and ASEAN remains to establish **a legally binding code of conduct** in the South China Sea intended to incorporate mechanisms for **avoiding incidents at sea, crisis management, confidence building measures, and joint development**.33 Beijing has certainly not shown similar flexibility in relation to any of its other publicly-declared “core interests.” At China’s insistence, for example, discussion of Taiwan is strictly off limits in Asia’s multilateral forums.

China backs off

Brendan Taylor 14, Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian and PhD – National Australian University, “The South China Sea is Not a Flashpoint,” The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2014, Volume 34, Issue 1, Taylor & Francis

But **doubts remain** over whether Beijing truly regards the South China Sea as a “core interest.” Michael Swaine reports that his investigation of Chinese official sources “**failed to unearth a single example** of a PRC official or an official PRC document or media source that publicly and explicitly identifies the South China Sea as a PRC ‘core interest.’”25 By contrast, Chinese officials have not exhibited such reticence when referring publicly to Taiwan or Tibet in such terms. Nor has Beijing shown any reluctance to threaten or to actually use military force in relation to these. During the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Crisis, Beijing twice fired ballistic missiles into waters off Taiwan in an effort to intimidate voters in advance of the island’s first democratic presidential election.26 China went further in March 2005 when the National People’s Congress passed an “anti-secession law” requiring the use of “non-peaceful means” against Taiwan in the event its leaders sought to establish formal independence from the mainland.27

Explicit threats and promises of this nature **are absent** in official Chinese statements on the South China Sea even when, as in May 2012, the normally smooth-talking Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying ambiguously warned the Philippines “not to misjudge the situation” and not to “escalate tensions without considering consequences” at the height of the Scarborough Shoal standoff.28 Indeed, although Beijing appears eager to demonstrate its growing naval capabilities by conducting military exercises in the South China Sea—as in March 2013 when it controversially conducted exercises within 50 miles of the Malaysian coastline—it is striking that Chinese efforts to actually exercise jurisdiction in this region **continue to be confined**, by and large, **to the use of civil maritime law enforcement vessels**.29

### Extensions – SCS war won’t escalate

**SCS tensions won’t escalate**

Xue Li and Xu Yanzhuo, June 19, 2015 – \*director of the Department of International Strategy at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences \*\*received her doctorate from Durham University (UK) in December 2014 and studies international responsibility, South China Sea disputes, and Chinese foreign policy, "The US and China Won't See Military Conflict Over the South China Sea", thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-us-and-china-wont-see-military-conflict-over-the-south-china-sea/

In [a recent piece](http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/china-should-adjust-its-south-china-sea-policy/) on the South China Sea disputes, I argued that “the ASEAN claimants are largely staying behind the scenes while external powers take center stage.” Based on recent developments on the South China Sea issue, it seems the U.S. will not only be a ‘director’ but an actor. We saw this clearly on May 20, [when the U.S. military sent surveillance aircraft over three islands controlled by Beijing](http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/china-issues-8-warnings-to-us-surveillance-plane-in-south-china-sea/). However, this does not necessary mean the South China Sea will spark a U.S.-China military conflict. As a global hegemon, **the United States’ main interest lies in** maintaining the current **international order** as well as peace and stability. Regarding the South China Sea, U.S. interests include ensuring peace and stability, freedom of commercial navigation, and military activities in exclusive economic zones. Maintaining the current balance of power is considered to be a key condition for securing these interests—and a rising China determined to strengthen its hold on South China Sea territory is viewed as a threat to the current balance of power. In response, the U.S. launched its “rebalance to Asia” strategy. In practice, the U.S. has on the one hand strengthened its military presence in Asia-Pacific, while on the other hand supporting ASEAN countries, particularly ASEAN claimants to South China Sea territories. This position has included high-profile rhetoric by U.S. officials. In 2010, then-U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton spoke at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi about the South China Sea, remarks that aligned the U.S. with Southeast Asia’s approach to the disputes. At the [2012 Shangri-La Dialogue](http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1681), then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta explained how the United States will rebalance its force posture as part of playing a “deeper and more enduring partnership role” in the Asia-Pacific region. In 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel[called out](https://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/2014-c20c/plenary-1-d1ba/chuck-hagel-a9cb) China’s “destabilizing, unilateral activities asserting its claims in the South China Sea.” His remarks also came at the Shangri-La dialogue, [while China’s HY-981 oil rig was deployed in the waters around the Paracel Islands](http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/1-year-later-reflections-on-chinas-oil-rig-sovereignty-making-in-the-south-china-sea/). In 2015, U.S. officials have openly pressured China to scale back its construction work in the Spratly islands and have sent aircraft to patrol over islands in the Spratly that are controlled by China. These measures have brought global attention to the South China Sea. However, if we look at the practical significance of the remarks, there are several limiting factors. The interests at stake in the South China Sea are not core national interests for the United States. Meanwhile, the U.S.-Philippine alliance is not as important as the U.S.-Japan alliance, and U.S. ties with other ASEAN countries are even weaker. **Given U.S.-China mutual economic dependence** **and** **China’s** comprehensive **national strength**, **the** United States **is unlikely to** go so far as **hav**ing **a military confrontation with China** over the South China Sea. Barack Obama, the ‘peace president’ who withdrew the U.S. military from Iraq and Afghanistan, is even less likely to fight with China for the South China Sea.

## vs. the East China Sea module

### 1NC Frontline

#### No ECS war coming in the squo.

Ignatius ‘14

David Ignatius is an associate editor and columnist for the Washington Post. He is a former Adjunct Lecturer at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and currently Senior Fellow to the Future of Diplomacy Program. “A U.S.-China ‘reset’?” – Washington Post – December 16th - https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/david-ignatius-a-us-china-reset/2014/12/16/981db07e-855f-11e4-b9b7-b8632ae73d25\_story.html

This year began with some Chinese and American foreign-policy analysts looking back a century to World War I and wondering if confrontation was inevitable between a rising power and a dominant one. But now there has been progress on climate, trade and security issues and what seems a modest “reset” of the Sino-American relationship. Future disagreements between the United States and China are inevitable. But the surprise of a high-level dialogue here last weekend was the interest by both sides in exploring what the Chinese like to call “win-win” cooperation. “I don’t believe there will be a military confrontation between the two countries,” insisted one of China’s top American experts, who not long ago was warning about strains in the relationship. Recent disputes over maritime boundaries in the East and South China seas are “not particularly dangerous,” said another prominent Chinese scholar.

Both sides will back down

Beauchamp, 14

(Zach, M.Sc IR – LSE, writer – ThinkProgress, former GDS debater, 2/7/14 –“ Why Everyone Needs To Stop Freaking Out About War With China,” ThinkProgress)

To some observers, the risk that these nationalist impulses pressure leaders into military escalation during a crisis is the greatest risk of war. The “toxic mix of two rising nationalisms and unresolved mutual resentments” makes “the risks of an accidental conflict becomes uncomfortably real,” Isabel Hilton writes in The Guardian. Time’s Michael Crowley agrees, writing that “national pride and historical grievance” threaten “to drag in the U.S.” into a Pacific war. But the importance of nationalism as a driving force on both the Chinese and Japanese side has been overblown. In fact, a deeper look at the prevailing ideological winds in both China and Japan suggest much more pacific forces are likely to carry the day. First, while it’s easy to see China as an aggressive expansionist power bent on retaking its “rightful place” in East Asia by force, that’s simply inconsistent with China’s track record to date. In an influential 2003 article, Iain Alasdair Johnston, a professor of “China in World Affairs” at Harvard, argued that there’s overwhelming evidence China is more-or-less happy with the current international order. Johnston tested various measures of Chinese interest in upending the global order — like its willingness to work inside the U.N. and internal dialogues within PRC strategists about overtaking the United States — and found very little evidence of China seeking to overturn the global structure, including the U.S.–Japan–Korea alliance system that sets the terms in East Asia. “The regime appears to be unwilling,” according to Johnston, “to bear the economic and social costs of mobilizing the economy and militarizing society to balance seriously against American power and influence in the region, let alone globally.” The Chinese leadership’s ideology is better understood, in Johnston’s view, as centering on expanding China’s power inside the international order rather than overturning through gambles like military aggression in the Senkaku/Diaoyu chain. In the face of 2013′s flurry of headlines about a newly aggressive China, Johnston revisited his thesis. He found basically no evidence that the Chinese leadership had changed its tune. Panicked writers, in Johnston’s analysis, were focusing on minor changes in Chinese policy to the exclusion of major continuities (like continued and deepening economic ties with the United States). They were also consistently misinterpreting Beijing’s thinking during major so-called aggressive moves. Take the 2010 Senkaku-Diaoyu flareup, after a Chinese trawler tried to ram some Japanese coast guard ships near the islands. Johnston found no evidence of serious Chinese escalation — the most serious such step reported, an embargo on shipping “rare earth” metals to Japan, was either very weakly enforced or never happened. Moreover, Beijing took explicit steps to tamp down anti-Japanese nationalism, placing anti-war editorials in major party outlets and shutting up the most anti-Japanese voices on the Chinese web during the most diplomatically sensitive time in the dispute. In short, China’s track record in the past ten years suggests the government doesn’t share the hardline nationalist sentiment it occasionally indulges in. Rather, the Chinese government is interested in very moderate regional advances that stop well short of war, and is capable of shutting down the sort of nationalist outburst from its population that might goad the government into war well before such protests might start affecting policy. What about Japan? It’s true that Abe himself holds some fairly hardline nationalist views. For instance, he won’t admit that Japan waged an aggressive war during World War II, which is a pretty gobsmacking bit of revisionism if you think about it. In December, Abe visited a shrine that honors (among others) Japanese war criminals from that era, a move that contributed to the recent bout of nationalistic strife. But there are a number of reasons to think that the resurgent Japanese nationalism Abe represents isn’t going to force war during a crisis. For one thing, his government’s coalition partners would do their damndest to block escalation. New Komeito, whose support keeps Abe and his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in power, is an odd duck: pacifict Buddhist libertarians is way oversimplified, but it gets the point across. Regardless, they are extremely serious about their pacifism — it’s at the core of their political identity, and it inclines them towards a more generous stance towards Beijing. They’d exert a calming pressure in any crisis.

### Extensions – NO ECS war coming now

#### China-Japan war very unlikely

Beauchamp, 14

(Zach, M.Sc IR – LSE, writer – ThinkProgress, former GDS debater, 2/7/“Why Everyone Needs To Stop Freaking Out About War With China,” ThinkProgress)

This is all dramatically overblown. War between China and Japan is more than unlikely: it would fly in the face of most of what we know about the two countries, and international relations more broadly. It’s not that a replay of 1914 is impossible. It’s just deeply, vanishingly unlikely. Power One of the easiest ways to evaluate the risks of Sino-Japanese war is by reference to three of the most important factors that shape a government’s decision to go to war: the balance of power, economic incentives, and ideology. These categories roughly correspond to the three dominant theories in modern international relations (realism, liberalism, and constructivism), and there’s solid statistical evidence that each of them can play a significant role in how governments think about their decisions to use military force. So let’s take them in turn. The main source of tension is an East China Sea island chain, called the Senkakus in Japan and Diaoyus in China. While there are other potential flashpoints, the current heightened tensions are centered on the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. Japan currently controls the islands, but China claims them, and the Chinese military has made increasingly aggressive noises about the islands of late. But there’s one big factor shaping the balance of power in East Asia that means the talk is likely to remain just that: nuclear weapons. The tagline for World War I in 1914 — “The War To End All Wars” — would have a decidedly different meaning in 2014, as war’s end would be accomplished by the world’s end. So whereas, in 1914, all of the European powers thought they could win the war decisively, East Asia’s great powers recognize the risk of a nuclear exchange between the United States and China to be catastrophic. Carleton University’s Stephen Saideman calls this the end of the “preemption temptation;” nobody thinks they can win by striking first anymore. Indeed, despite the words of some of its military leaders, China (at least nominally) has a no-clash-with-Japan policy in place over the islands. That also helps explain why the most commonly-cited Senkaku/Diaoyu spark, accidental escalation, isn’t as likely as many suggest. When The Wall Street Journal’s Andrew Browne writes that there’s a “real risk of an accident leading to a standoff from which leaders in both countries would find it hard to back down in the face of popular nationalist pressure,” he’s not wrong. But it won’t happen just because two planes happen across each other in the sky. In 2013, with tensions running high the whole year, Japan scrambled fighters against Chinese aircraft 433 times. Indeed, tensions have flared up a number of times throughout the years (often sparked by nationalist activists on side of the other) without managing to bleed over into war. That’s because, as MIT East Asia expert M. Taylor Fravel argues, there are deep strategic reasons why each side is, broadly speaking, OK with the status quo over and above nuclear deterrence. China has an interest in not seeming like an aggressor state in the region, as that’s historically caused other regional powers to put away their differences and line up against it. Japan currently has control over the islands, which would make any strong moves by China seem like an attempt to overthrow the status quo power balance. The United States also has a habit of constructive involvement, subtly reminding both sides when tensions are spiking that the United States — and its rather powerful navy — would prefer that there be no fighting between the two states. Moreover, the whole idea of “accidental war” is also a little bit confusing . Militaries don’t just start shooting each other by mistake and then decide it’s time to have a war. Rather, an incident that’s truly accidental — say, a Japanese plane firing on a Chinese aircraft in one of the places where their Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZs) overlap — changes the incentives to go to war, as the governments start to think (perhaps wrongly) that war is inevitable and the only way to win it is to escalate. It’s hard to envision this kind of shift in calculation in East Asia, for all of the aforementioned reasons.

## vs. the Taiwan Module

### 1NC Frontline

#### Status quo ties check Taiwan conflict

Krever ‘14

(Mick, Correspondent – CNN, Citing Kurt Campbell, Former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “Decoding two sets of surprising Asia peace talks”, CNN, 2014, http://amanpour.blogs.cnn.com/2014/02/11/kurt-campbell-north-korea-south-korea-taiwan-china-talks/)

Suddenly peace, or at least peace talks, are breaking out in the most unlikely places. In Asia, entrenched enemies – China and Taiwan, North and South Korea – have agreed to sit down at the table. In an effort to decode the surprising developments, CNN’s Christiane Amanpour spoke on Tuesday with Kurt Campbell, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, who is widely credited with being the key architect of America’s “Pivot to Asia.” China and Taiwan are holding their **first-ever** official face-to-face talks since Mao Zedong’s communists won their civil war in 1949 – a **“quite significant”** turn of events, Campbell said. “Over the course of the last 30 years, people thought that the most tense situation in Asia was between China and Taiwan, but in recent years the relationship has **improved substantially** – commercially, economically, and now politically.” What both sides are getting out of the talks, he told Amanpour, is “a greater sense of predictability.” China does not recognize the independence of Taiwan, and Taiwan is not a U.N. member state, but the island is self governing and generally conducts itself in terms of bilateral relations as an independent country. Over the years, Taiwan and China have built a thriving commercial relationship, with hundreds of billions of dollars in trade.

Aggression over Taiwan won’t escalate

Eugene K. Chow, January 1, 2014 – former executive editor of Homeland Security NewsWire. Previously, he was a research assistant at the Center for A New American Security, "What would a U.S.-China war look like?", theweek.com/articles/453983/what-uschina-war-look-like

Imagine this: In the early morning, a barrage of more than 1,000 Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles bombard Taiwanese civilian and military targets. As the U.S. Air Force stationed in Okinawa prepares to rush to the aid of its sworn ally, Chinese cyber attacks wreak havoc on America's air defense and targeting systems. A second volley of ballistic missiles detonates in space, destroying critical military satellites, while a third rains down on the base, damaging jets and leaving runways unusable. Meanwhile, a U.S. carrier strike group led by the USS George Washingtonhas launched from Japan and is steaming towards the Taiwan Strait. Without the advanced warning and additional data supplied by satellites, the group's missile defense systems are at a disadvantage against the Chinese "carrier killer" missiles that are streaking towards them. Defense systems do their best, but a few missiles still hit their mark, leaving the USSGeorge Washington's flight deck unusable. America's awesome air and sea power has been sidelined. While far from a complete picture, **this hypothetical scenario is the U.S. military's worst nightmare**. Now, of course, despite recent shows of force over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the occasional blustery threat to Taiwan, **war will almost** certainly not break out between the U.S. and China. But **it is this scenario's potential to be realized that helps keep war at bay**. To be clear: The United States military remains the world's most fearsome fighting force, unbeatable on a one-on-one basis. Yet it would find a protracted war that could end in nuclear Armageddon too costly. China is keenly aware of that fact. So rather than orienting itself towards a total war it cannot win, **China's military strategy serves a smaller, but** shrewder purpose — pushing the United States out of China's backyard.

### Extensions – Taiwan War is unlikely

Won’t go nuclear—the CCP won’t gamble their economy over Taiwan

Cole, former analyst at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, senior non-resident fellow at the China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham, 5/7/’15

(J. Michael, “If the Unthinkable Occurred: America Should Stand Up to China over Taiwan”, The National Interest)

Another flaw in White’s argument is that it only provides binary options—capitulation, or the descent into major (perhaps nuclear) war and the collapse of the global economy. He leaves no room for other (and in my opinion, far more plausible) scenarios. The key to the continued existence of Taiwan (or the Republic of China) as a free, democratic and independent state lies not in the ability of the island and its security guarantors to defeat China in a major war, but rather in the strength of its deterrent, a concept that is inexplicably ignored by White. Everybody agrees that major war in the Taiwan Strait, especially one that drags the United States and perhaps Japan into hostilities, would be as devastating as it is undesirable. But the answer to that reality isn’t the abandonment of one’s principles (not to mention that of 23 million people), but instead a firm commitment to war avoidance. As I argued in a previous article, a multifaceted deterrent strategy involving both military and nonmilitary components (sanctions, naval embargo and so on), combined with clear red lines based upon international law, would lower the risk that China—export reliant and beholden to foreign energy sources—would miscalculate and choose the military option to resolve the Taiwan “issue” once and for all.

Ironically, White seems almost convinced that China would be willing to engage in nuclear war over Taiwan, **an assumption that is both** untested **and portrays the leadership in Beijing as a** bunch of deranged nihilists. For all its faults, and despite the official rhetoric depicting Taiwan as a “core issue,” **it is** in my view **unlikely that the** Chinese Communist Party **would unleash its nuclear arsenal over** the matter of **Taiwan**; in fact, I would advance that **it is probably unwilling to** gamble China’s economy **over Taiwan by launching major military operations**—all the more so if there is a promise that such a course of action would result in a concerted response on the part of the international community. The logic of deterrence is that it diminishes the likelihood that the international community would be faced with the maximalist options given us by White. (The bluster only works if we believe it—and Beijing wants us to believe it just like the good professor seems to do—as winning without a fight is a foundational element of Chinese military strategy.)

### Extensions – War over Taiwan won’t escalate

Mutually assured destruction

Eugene K. Chow, January 1, 2014 – former executive editor of Homeland Security NewsWire. Previously, he was a research assistant at the Center for A New American Security, "What would a U.S.-China war look like?", theweek.com/articles/453983/what-uschina-war-look-like

Countering A2/AD In the theoretical war against China, **the arms race is** already on. As China develops asymmetrical weapons to minimize American advantages, the Pentagon is also at work on technologies to overcome those counter-technologies. "Part of what keeps the **probability of war** so small **is that the U.S. and Taiwan have taken steps to make sure it would be** painful for China,"[David Shlapak, a senior international policy analyst at the Rand Corporation, told Popular Mechanics in 2010](http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military/navy-ships/what-a-war-between-china-and-the-us-would-look-like-3). In reality, many of the weapons systems under development will never see actual combat, but the hypothetical arms race is critical as researchers on both sides seek to tip the scales in their favor and change the calculus for military strategists. According to Admiral Patrick Walsh, the commander of the U.S. Navy's Pacific Fleet until last year, **there is** no reason to fear **China's military buildup as long as U.S. capabilities keep pace**. "When we look at these sorts of developments, such as the ASBM [anti-ship ballistic missile], they are technological developments that we respect, **but do not necessarily fear**," [Admiral Walsh told Popular Mechanics](http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military/navy-ships/what-a-war-between-china-and-the-us-would-look-like-3). "The key element in any sort of deterrent strategy is to make it clear to those who would use a given piece of technology that we have the means to counter it, and to maintain a technological edge." Even with the U.S. military's technological advantages, China's explosive military growth has guaranteed that even a small conflict with the United States would prove deadlier than anything the nation has witnessed in decades — **which is exactly why it won't happen**.

## vs. the Living Standards module

### 1NC Frontline

#### Chinese growth isn’t the elixir – China massively exaggerates its Poverty reduction stats.

Tatlow ‘14

Didi Kirsten Tatlow – the author is a Correspondent and News Columnist the International Herald Tribune and was formerly a China Features Writer for The South China Morning Post. The author holds a B.A. in Chinese and Politics from the University of London – “Despite Poverty Efforts, China Still Faces Income Gap” – Sinosphere - October 17, 2014 - http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/10/17/despite-poverty-efforts-china-still-faces-wealth-gap/?\_r=0

The “China Miracle” has been to lift 660 million people out of poverty over the past 30-plus years, Chinese state news media said Friday, the country’s first “Poverty Alleviation Day.” In fact, since it began to overhaul its economy over 30 years ago, China has overseen “the biggest poverty relief in the history of human society,” Xinhua, the state news agency, said. More than 90 percent of global poverty relief in that time occurred in China, it said. By commemorating the day, the country was adopting international practice: Oct. 17 is the United Nations’ “International Day for the Eradication of Poverty.” Yet there was ambiguity about the true number of poor people in China. Xinhua said the 660 million figure was based on international poverty standards, which, according to the World Bank, is defined by living on less than $1.25 a day. According to Chinese standards, 250 million people had been lifted out of poverty in the over 30-year time frame. China’s poverty level is now set at 2,300 renminbi a year, or a little over $1 a day. It did not specify what its previous poverty standards were. In a speech in June, Prime Minister Li Keqiang said that 200 million people remained in poverty in China, though the Xinhua report put the figure at 80 million.

#### Global Poverty is rapidly decreasing

Wolf ‘3

(Martin, Associate Editor and Chief Economics Commentator – Financial Times “Are Global Poverty and Inequality Getting Worse?”, Prospect Magazine, March, http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article\_details.php?i d=4982)

All data on incomes and income distribution are questionable, above all those generated in developing countries. But, contrary to what you say, World Bank researchers have calculated the numbers in extreme poverty-less than $1 a day-on a consistent basis, in recent studies. The data shows a decline since 1980 of 200m people in the category of the absolutely poor. This is a fall from 31 per cent of the world's population to 20 per cent (not 24 per cent, which is the proportion in developing countries alone). That is a spectacularly rapid fall in poverty by historical standards. It makes a nonsense of the idea that poverty alleviation has been blighted by globalisation. Now turn to the even murkier area of inequality. Here you argue that if we exclude China and India, there is no obvious trend in inequality. But why would one want to exclude two countries that contained about 60 per cent of the world's poorest people two decades ago and still contain almost 40 per cent of the world's population today? To fail to give these giants their due weight in a discussion ofglobal poverty alleviation or income distribution would be Hamlet without the prince. You then write that changes in relative average incomes across countries are not what we are really interested in, "which is the income distribution among all the world's people or households." This is wrong in itself. If a country's average income rises rapidly, it does also possess greater means for improving the lot of the poor. Maybe the government refuses to use the opportunity, but a successor government could. In any case, we do possess data on relative household incomes. In a Foreign Affairs article, David Dollar and Aart Kraay of the World Bank report a big decline in world-wide income inequality since its peak in about 1970. The study builds on work that goes back to 1820. The underlying method is to calculate the percentage gap between a randomly selected individual and the world average. The more unequal the distribution of world income, the bigger that gap becomes. They report that this gap peaked at 88 per cent of world average income in 1970, before falling to 78 per cent in 1995, roughly where it was in 1950. The chief driver of changes in inequality among households is changes between countries, not within them. This was also the finding of Branko Milanovic's study of global household income distribution between 1988 and 1993, which you cite approvingly. You rely on this study to support the thesis of rising household inequality. But it contains at least four defects. First, there are well-known inconsistencies between data on household expenditures and national accounts. Second, the methods used generate no increase in rural real incomes in China, which is inconsistent with most views of what actually happened. Third, the period of five years is very short. Fourth and most important, this was an atypical period, because India had an economic upheaval in 1991, while China's growth was temporarily slowed by the Tiananmen crisis. My conclusion is that the last two decades saw a decline not just in absolute poverty but also in world-wide inequality among households. The chief explanation for this was the fast growth of China and, to a lesser extent, of India. This progress was not offset by rising inequality within them. In the case of India there was no such rise. In China there has been a rise in inequality in the more recent period of its growth, largely because of controls on the movement of people from the hinterland to the coastal regions.

#### Low interest rates insufficient to solve. Lower rates wouldn’t solve disparate racial treatment in the form of *loan characteristics* or *mortgage rejections*.

Pager ‘8

et al; Devah Pager is an American sociologist best known for her research on racial discrimination in employment and the American criminal justice system. She is currently Professor of Sociology and Public Policy at Harvard University. From the article: “The Sociology of Discrimination: Racial Discrimination in Employment, Housing, Credit, and Consumer Markets” - Published in final edited form as: Annual review of sociology, 2008 Jan 1; 34: 18 - http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2915460/

Available evidence suggests that blacks and Hispanics face higher rejection rates and less favorable terms in securing mortgages than do whites with similar credit characteristics (Ross & Yinger 1999). Oliver & Shapiro (1997, p. 142) report that blacks pay more than 0.5% higher interest rates on home mortgages than do whites and that this difference persists with controls for income level, date of purchase, and age of buyer. The most prominent study of the effect of race on rejection rates for mortgage loans is by Munnell et al. (1996), which uses 1991 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data supplemented by data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, including individual applicants’ financial, employment, and property background variables that lenders use to calculate the applicants’ probability of default. Accounting for a range of variables linked to risk of default, cost of default, loan characteristics, and personal and neighborhood characteristics, they find that black and Hispanic applications were 82% more likely to be rejected than were those from similar whites. Critics argued that the study was flawed on the basis of the quality of the data collected (Horne 1994), model specification problems (Glennon & Stengel 1994), omitted variables (Zandi 1993, Liebowitz 1993, Horne 1994, Day & Liebowitz 1996), and endogenous explanatory variables (see Ross & Yinger 1999 for a full explication of the opposition), although rejoinders suggest that the race results are affected little by these modifications (Ross & Yinger 1999; S.L. Ross & G.M.B. Tootell, unpublished manuscript).

#### Free trade won’t solve global poverty – their statistics falsely assume trade will successfully benefit African markets.

Fletcher ‘11

Economist Ian Fletcher, author of the book Free Trade Doesn't Work, is one of America's foremost experts on the problems of free trade. From 2010 to 2012, he was Senior Economist of the Coalition for a Prosperous America, a nationwide grass-roots organization dedicated to fixing America’s trade policies and comprising representatives from business, agriculture, and labor. Before that, he was Research Fellow at the U.S. Business and Industry Council and before that, an economist in private practice serving mainly hedge funds and private equity firms. Educated at Columbia and the University of Chicago, he lives in San Francisco. “Free Trade Isn’t Helping World Poverty” – Huffington Post – March 18th - http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ian-fletcher/free-trade-isnt-helping-w\_b\_837893.html

The propaganda for free trade tells us that not only is it the master key to our own prosperity, but also the master key to lifting the world’s poor out of poverty. So if we don’t support free trade, we’re in for a guilt trip like the one that used to make us stick quarters into UNICEF boxes. Unfortunately, free trade just doesn’t work as a global anti-poverty strategy. The spreading Third World affluence one sees in TV commercials only means that the thin upper crust of Western-style consumers is now more widespread than ever before. But having more affluent people in the Third World is not the same as the Third World as a whole nearing the living standards of the First. This is actually not a terribly big secret, and is fairly well known to the people who promote free trade. For a start, the World Bank standard for poverty is $2 a day, so “moving people out of poverty” can merely consist in moving people from $1.99 a day to $2.01 a day. In one major study, there were only two nations in which the average beneficiary jumped from less than $1.88 to more than $2.13: Pakistan and Thailand. Every other nation was making minor jumps in between. The developing world’s gains from trade liberalization (insofar as there are any) are concentrated in a relatively small group of nations, due to the fact that only a few developing nations have economies that are actually capable of taking advantage of freer trade to any meaningful extent. Although it depends a bit on the model, China, India, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Vietnam, and Turkey generally take the lion’s share. This list sounds impressive, but it actually leaves out most Third World nations. Dirt-poor nations like Haiti aren’t even on the radar. Even nations one notch up the scale, like Bolivia, barely figure. So forget helping starving children in Africa this way. They’re not even in the game of international trade—let alone winners of it. Like it or not, this is perfectly logical, as increased access to the ruthlessly competitive global marketplace (which is all free trade provides) benefits only nations whose industries have something to sell which foreign trade barriers are currently keeping out. Their industries must both be strong enough to be globally competitive and have pent-up potential due to trade barriers abroad, a fairly rare combination.

### Extensions – Free trade won’t solve

#### Increased trade won’t solve for global poverty.

Byers ‘3

Stephen Byers is a former trade and industry secretary in the UK and also served a cabinet member – From the article: “I was wrong. Free market trade policies hurt the poor” – The Guardian – May 19th - http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/may/19/globalisation.politics

In order to achieve this, I believed that developing countries would need to embrace trade liberalisation. This would mean opening up their own domestic markets to international competition. The thinking behind this approach being that the discipline of the market would resolve problems of underperformance, a strong economy would emerge and that, as a result, the poor would benefit. This still remains the position of major international bodies like the IMF and World Bank and is reflected in the system of incentives and penalties which they incorporate in their loan agreements with developing countries. But my mind has changed. I now believe that this approach is wrong and misguided. Since leaving the cabinet a year ago, I've had the opportunity to see at first hand the consequences of trade policy. No longer sitting in the air-conditioned offices of fellow government ministers I have, instead, been meeting farmers and communities at the sharp end. It is this experience that has led me to the conclusion that full trade liberalisation is not the way forward. A different approach is needed: one which recognises the importance of managing trade with the objective of achieving development goals. No one should doubt the hugely significant role that international trade could play in tackling poverty. In terms of income, trade has the potential to be far more important than aid or debt relief for developing countries. For example, an increase in Africa's share of world exports by just 1% could generate around £43bn - five times the total amount of aid received by African countries. This has led President Museveni of Uganda to say: "Africa does need development assistance, just as it needs debt relief from its crushing international debt burden. But aid and debt relief can only go so far. We are asking for the opportunity to compete, to sell our goods in western markets. In short, we want to trade our way out of poverty." The World Bank estimates that reform of the international trade rules could take 300 million people out of poverty. Reform is essential because, to put it bluntly, the rules of international trade are rigged against the poorest countries. Rich nations may be pre pared to open up their own markets, but still keep in place massive subsidies. The quid pro quo for doing this is that developing countries open up their domestic markets. These are then vulnerable to heavily subsidised exports from the developed world. The course of international trade since 1945 shows that an unfettered global market can fail the poor and that full trade liberalisation brings huge risks and rarely provides the desired outcome. It is more often the case that developing countries which have successfully expanded their economies are those that have been prepared to put in place measures to protect industries while they gain strength and give communities the time to diversify into new areas.

### Extension - Low interest rates insufficient to solve

#### Lowering interest rates won’t solve – mortgages will still be unfair.

Love ‘16

David Love – author for Atlanta Black Star – internally quoting a paper published for the National Bureau of Economic Research and written by economists Patrick Bayer, Fernando Ferreira and Stephen L. Ross - “Studies Find that Blacks are 105% More Likely to Have High-Cost Mortgages, Whites in California are a Minority Yet Have 72% of the Mortgages” – The Greenlining Institute - February 26, 2016 - http://greenlining.org/issues/2016/studies-find-that-blacks-are-105-more-likely-to-have-high-cost-mortgages-whites-in-california-are-a-minority-yet-have-72-of-the-mortgages/

A paper published for the National Bureau of Economic Research examined racial and ethnic differences in mortgage lending in seven metropolitan areas. The authors — economists Patrick Bayer, Fernando Ferreira and Stephen L. Ross — found that even after accounting for credit scores and other risk-related factors, African-Americans are 105 percent more likely to have high-cost mortgages, and Latinos are 78 percent more likely. According to the report, 60 to 65 percent of this difference is attributable to sorting across lenders, or differential access to lenders, meaning that Blacks and Latinos only have access to high-risk lenders in their community. These lenders aggressively target communities of color with pricier mortgages. Meanwhile, 35 to 40 percent of the higher interest rates are due to disparate treatment of equally qualified borrowers by mortgage lenders. “Taken as a whole, the results of our analysis imply that the substantial market-wide racial and ethnic differences in the incidence of high-cost mortgages arise because African-American and Hispanic borrowers tend to be more concentrated at high-risk lenders,” the report said. “Strikingly, this pattern holds for all borrowers, even those with relatively unblemished credit records and low-risk loans. High-risk lenders are not only more likely to provide high-cost loans overall, but are especially likely to do so for African-American and Hispanic borrowers,” the study added. “In fact, these lenders are largely responsible for the differential treatment of equally qualified borrowers; minimal racial and ethnic differences exist among lenders that serve less-risky segments of the market.”

## vs. the Climate Module

### 1NC Frontline

#### ( ) Warming not real- recent temperatures show no increase

Happer ‘12

(William is a professor of physics at Princeton. “Global Warming Models Are Wrong Again”, Wall Street Journal, 3/27/12, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304636404577291352882984274.html>)

What is happening to global temperatures in reality? The answer is: almost nothing for more than 10 years. Monthly values of the global temperature anomaly of the lower atmosphere, compiled at the University of Alabama from NASA satellite data, can be found at the website http://www.drroyspencer.com/latest-global-temperatures/. The latest (February 2012) monthly global temperature anomaly for the lower atmosphere was minus 0.12 degrees Celsius, slightly less than the average since the satellite record of temperatures began in 1979

#### Climate impact exaggerated ---mitigation and adaptation will solve

Mendelsohn ‘9

(Robert O. Mendelsohn, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: <http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf>)

These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.

#### ( ) Warming evidence skewed – urban heat island

Evans ‘12

(David has a PhD in electrical engineering, worked from 1999 to 2006 for the Australian Greenhouse Office, an agency of the Australian government, designing a carbon accounting system- Financial Post, "Global Warming Theory Is Based on False Science.", 7 Apr. 2011, infotrac)

There are now several independent pieces of evidence showing that the earth responds to the warming due to extra carbon dioxide by dampening the warming. Every long-lived natural system behaves this way, counteracting any disturbance. Otherwise the system would be unstable. The climate system is no exception, and now we can prove it. But the alarmists say the exact opposite, that the climate system amplifies any warming due to extra carbon dioxide, and is potentially unstable. It is no surprise that their predictions of planetary temperature made in 1988 to the U.S. Congress, and again in 1990, 1995, and 2001, have all proved much higher than reality. They keep lowering the temperature increases they expect, from 0.30C per decade in 1990, to 0.20C per decade in 2001, and now 0.15C per decade—yet they have the gall to tell us "it's worse than expected." These people are not scientists. They overestimate the temperature increases due to carbon dioxide, selectively deny evidence, and now they conceal the truth. One way they conceal is in the way they measure temperature. The official thermometers are often located in the warm exhaust of air conditioning outlets, over hot tarmac at airports where they get blasts of hot air from jet engines, at waste-water plants where they get warmth from decomposing sewage, or in hot cities choked with cars and buildings. Global warming is measured in 10ths of a degree, so any extra heating nudge is important. In the United States, nearly 90% of official thermometers surveyed by volunteers violate official siting requirements that they not be too close to an artificial heating source. Global temperature is also measured by satellites, which measure nearly the whole planet 24/7 without bias. The satellites say the hottest recent year was 1998, and that since 2001 the global temperature has levelled off. Why does official science track only the surface thermometer results and not mention the satellite results?

#### ( ) Not anthropogenic – multiple warrants

Spencer ‘12

(Roy, former NASA climatologist and author, “Ten Years After the Warming,” 2/26, <http://www.drroyspencer.com/2012/02/>)

As can be seen, in the last 10 years the estimated forcing has been the strongest. Yet, most if not all temperature datasets show little or no global-average warming recently, either in the atmosphere, at the surface, or in the upper 700 meters of the ocean. For example, here are the tropospheric temperatures up though a few days ago: So what is happening? You cannot simply say a lack of warming in 10 years is not that unusual, and that there have been previous 10-year periods without warming, too. No, we are supposedly in uncharted territory with a maximum in radiative forcing of the climate system. One cannot compare on an equal basis the last 10 years with any previous decades without warming. There are 5 possibilities for the recent cessation of warming which are most discussed: 1) cooling from anthropogenic aerosols has been cancelling out warming from more greenhouse gases 2) natural cooling from internal climate fluctuations or the sun is cancelling out the GHG warming 3) increased ocean mixing is causing the extra energy to be distributed into the deep ocean 4) the temperature ’sensitivity’ of the climate system is not as large as the IPCC assumes. 5) there is something fundamentally wrong with the GHG warming theory itself Of course, some combination of the above 5 explanations is also possible. The 1st possibility (aerosol cooling is cancelling out GHG forcing) is one of the more popular explanations with the climate modelers, and especially with NASA’s James Hansen. The uncertain strength (and even sign) of aerosol forcing allows the climate modelers to use aerosols as a tuning knob (aka fudge factor) in making their models produce warming more-or-less consistent with past observations. Using an assumed large aerosol cooling to cancel out the GHG warming allows the modelers to retain high climate sensitivity, and thus the fear of strong future warming if those aerosols ever dissipate. The 2nd possibility (natural cooling) is a much less desirable explanation for the IPCC crowd because it opens the door to Mother Nature having as much or more influence on the climate system than do humans. We can’t have that, you know. Then you would have to consider the possibility that most of the warming in the last 50 years was natural, too. Goodbye, AGW funding. The 3rd possibility (increased ocean mixing) is one of the more legitimate possibilities, at least theoretically. It’s popular with NCAR’s Kevin Trenberth. But one would need more observational evidence this is happening before embracing the idea. Unfortunately, how vertical mixing in the ocean naturally varies over time is poorly understood; the different IPCC models have widely varying strengths of mixing, and so ocean mixing is a huge wild card in the global warming debate, as is aerosol cooling. I believe much of past climate change on time scales of decades to many centuries might be due to such variations in ocean mixing, along with their likely influence on global cloud cover changing the amount of solar input into the climate system. The 4th possibility (the climate system is relatively insensitive to forcing) is the top contender in the opinion of myself, Dick Lindzen, and a few other climate researchers who work in this field. The 5th possibility (increasing GHGs don’t really cause warming) is total anathema to the IPCC. Without GHG warming, the whole AGW movement collapses. This kind of scientific finding would normally be Nobel Prize territory…except that the Nobel Prize has become more of a socio-political award in recent years, with only politically correct recipients. The self-flagellating elites don’t like the idea humans might not be destroying the Earth. The longer we go without significant warming, the more obvious it will become that there is something seriously wrong with current AGW theory. I don’t think there is a certain number of years – 5, 10, 20, etc. – which will disprove the science of AGW….unless the climate system cools for the next 10 years. Eek! But I personally doubt that will happen.

#### ( ) Feedbacks are net negative

Spencer ‘8

(Roy W. Ph.D., climatologist, author, former NASA scientist, “Satellite and Climate Model Evidence Against Substantial Manmade Climate Change (supercedes “Has the Climate Sensitivity Holy Grail Been Found?”)”, Roy W. Spencer, 12/27/08, <http://www.drroyspencer.com/research-articles/satellite-and-climate-model-evidence/>)

The comparisons modelers make between their models and satellite data are typically rather crude and cursory. They are not sufficiently detailed to really say anything of substance about feedbacks — in either the models or the satellite data – and yet it is the feedbacks that will determine how serious the manmade global warming problem will be. And as I have tried to demonstrate here, the main reason for the current inadequacy of such methods of comparison between models and observations is the contaminating effect of clouds causing temperatures to change (forcing) when trying to estimate how temperatures cause clouds to change (feedback). This not a new issue, as it has been addressed by Forster and Gregory (2006, applied to satellite measurements) and Forster and Taylor (2006, applied to climate model output). I have merely demonstrated that the same contamination occurs from internal fluctuations in clouds in the climate system. The bottom line from the model and observational evidence presented here is that: Net feedbacks in the real climate system — on both short and long time scales — are probably negative. A misinterpretation of cloud behavior has led climate modelers to build models in which cloud feedbacks are instead positive, which has led the models to predict too much global warming in response to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.

### Extensions – No Warming

#### ( ) No warming – models are wrong, feedbacks are negative and its cyclical

Evans ‘11

(David, doctor in electrical engineering, worked from 1999 to 2006 for the Australian Greenhouse Office, an agency of the Australian government, designing a carbon accounting system, “Climate models are fundamentally flawed as they greatly overestimate the temperature increases due to carbon dioxide,” 3/23, <http://www.ted.com/conversations/2533/climate_models_are_fundamental.html>)

The core idea of every official climate model: for each bit of warming due to carbon dioxide, it ends up causing three bits of warming due to the extra moist air. The climate models amplify the carbon dioxide warming by a factor of three – so two thirds of their projected warming is due to extra moist air (and other factors), only one third is due to extra carbon dioxide. This is the core of the issue. All the disagreements spring from this. The alarmist case is based on this guess about moisture in the atmosphere. There is simply no evidence for the amplification that is at the core of their alarmism. Weather balloons had been measuring the atmosphere since the 1960’s. The climate models all predict that as the planet warms, a hot-spot of moist air will develop over the tropics about 10km up. Weather balloons have found no hot-spot. Not even a small one. This evidence proves the climate models are fundamentally flawed and they greatly overestimate the temperature increases due to carbon dioxide. There are now several independent pieces of evidence showing that the earth responds to the warming due to extra carbon dioxide by dampening the warming. In the US, nearly 90% of official thermometers surveyed by volunteers violate official siting requirements that they not be too close to an artificial heating source. Global temperature is also measured by satellites, which measure nearly the whole planet 24/7 without bias. The satellites say the hottest recent year was 1998, and that since 2001 the global temperature has leveled off. So what is really going on with the climate? The earth has been in a warming trend since the Little Ice Age around 1680. The Pacific Decadal Oscillation causes alternating global warming and cooling for 25 – 30 years at a go in each direction. Having just finished a warming phase, expect mild global cooling for the next two decades.

#### ( ) Aerosols block warming now

Biello ‘11

(David Biello- award-winning online associate editor for environment and energy for Scientific American- Stratospheric Pollution Helps Slow Global Warming-July 11 2011- [http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=stratospheric-pollution-helps-slow-global-warming](http://www.drroyspencer.com/research-articles/satellite-and-climate-model-evidence/?id=stratospheric-pollution-helps-slow-global-warming))

Now, research suggests that for the past decade, such stratospheric aerosols—injected into the atmosphere by either recent volcanic eruptions or human activities such as coal burning—are slowing down [global warming](http://wattsupwiththat.com/2012/01/08/new-paper-agw-may-save-us-from-the-next-ice-age/?id=global-warming-and-climate-change). "Aerosols acted to keep warming from being as big as it would have been," says atmospheric scientist John Daniel of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) Earth System Research Laboratory, who helped lead the [research published online in *Science*](http://www.popsci.com/science/article/2012-01/human-co2-emissions-could-avert-next-ice-age-study-says) on July 21. "It's still warming, it's just not warming as much as it would have been." Essentially, sulfur dioxide gets emitted near the surface, either by a coal-fired power plant's smokestack or a volcano. If that SO2 makes it to the stratosphere—the middle layer of the atmosphere 10 kilometers up—it forms droplets of diluted sulfuric acid, known as [aerosols](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aerosol). These aerosols reflect sunlight away from the planet, shading the surface and cooling temperatures. And some can persist for a few years, prolonging that cooling. By analyzing satellite data and other measures, Daniel and his colleagues found that such aerosols have been on the rise in Earth's atmosphere in the past decade, nearly doubling in concentration. That concentration has reflected roughly 0.1 watts per meter squared of sunlight away from the planet, enough to o/ffset roughly one-third of the 0.28 watts per meter squared of extra heat trapped by [rising atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases](http://www.scientificamerican.com/blog/post.cfm?id=a-24-degree-c-rise-by-2020-probably-2011-01-20) such as carbon dioxide. The researchers calculate that the aerosols prevented 0.07 degrees Celsius of warming in average temperatures since 2000.

#### ( ) Temperatures this decade have balanced out- no changes

Totty ‘9

Michael Totty, 2009 news editor in the WSJ's San Francisco bureau. reporter, editor and podcaster ([http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703819904574551303527570212](http://standeyo.com/Reports/Ice_age/050614.ice.age.html).html) Wall Street Journal, “What Global Warming?”, December 6, 2009)

But this isn't evidence of a cooling planet. Partly, it's a result of picking an exceptionally hot year—1998—as a starting point. That year experienced an unusually strong El Niño, a natural and periodic warming of the Pacific Ocean that can have powerful effects on global climate. The long-term trend since the mid-1970s shows warming per decade of about 0.18 degree Celsius (about 0.32 degree Fahrenheit). That temperatures this decade have hardly increased demonstrates how natural year-to-year variations in climate can either add to or subtract from the long-term warming trend caused by the increase in greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The '00s still have been exceptionally warm: The 12 years from 1997 through 2008 were among the 15 warmest on record, and the decade itself was hotter than any previous 10-year period. While 2008 was the coolest year since 2000—a result of the cooling counterpart of El Niño—it was still the 11th-warmest year on record. And 2009 is on track to be among the five warmest.

### Extensions – Not Anthropogenic

#### ( ) Sunspots cause warming – new isotope records prove

Watts ‘11

(Anthony, Meteorologist and president of IntelliWeather Inc., citing “A new approach to the long-term reconstruction of the solar irradiance leads to large historical solar forcing,” a study conducted by the World Radiation Center in Switzerland, “New solar reconstruction paper suggests 6x greater solar forcing change than cited by the IPCC,” 5/10, <http://wattsupwiththat.com/2011/05/10/new-solar-reconstruction-paper-suggests-6x-tsi-change-than-cited-by-the-ipcc/>)

This is interesting. This recent paper published in the journal Astronomy & Astrophysics here has done a reconstruction of TSI using Beryllium 10 isotope records combined with sunspot records. The paper suggests that the Total Solar Irradiance (TSI) has increased since the end of the Little Ice Age (around 1850) by up to 6 x more than cited by the IPCC. Here is how they did it:

For the reconstruction to the past this amplitude is scaled with proxies for solar activity. Two proxies are available for the reconstruction: Group sunspot number, which is available from the present to 1610 AD, and the solar modulation potential extending back to circa 7300 BC. The latter is a measure of the heliospheric shielding from cosmic rays derived from the analysis of cosmogenic isotope abundances in tree rings or ice cores, and is available with a time resolution of 2-3 solar cycles (Steinhilber et al. 2008). Although sunspot number dropped to zero for a long time during the Maunder minimum, the solar cycle was uninterrupted (Beer et al. 1998; Usoskin et al. 2001) and the modulation potential did not fall to zero. Hence, a reconstruction based solely on sunspot number may underestimate the solar activity during theMaunderminimum. Therefore in our reconstruction we used the solar modulation potential to calculate the long-term variations and sunspot number to superpose them with the 11-year cycle variations (see the Online Section 6.2). The modulation potential used in the calculations is based on the composite of data determined from the cosmogenic isotope records of 10Be and neutronmonitor. 10Be data are available up to about 1970 (McCracken et al. 2004) and neutron monitor data, which are used to calculate the current solar modulation potential, are available since the 1950s.

#### ( ) Prefer our methodology – cites ice cores and monitoring

Shapiro et al. ‘11

(A. I. Shapiro, W. Schmutz, E. Rozanov, M. Schoell, M. Haberreiter, A. V. Shapiro and S. Nyeki, researchers for the World Radiation Center, Switzerland and Institute for Atmospheric and Climate science ETH, Switzerland, “A new approach to the long-term reconstruction of the solar irradiance leads to large historical solar forcing,” 2/22, <http://wattsupwiththat.com/2011/05/10/new-solar-reconstruction-paper-suggests-6x-tsi-change-than-cited-by-the-ipcc/>)

The variable Sun is the most likely candidate for the natural forcing of past climate changes on time scales of 50 to 1000 years. Evidence for this understanding is that the terrestrial climate correlates positively with the solar activity. During the past 10 000 years, the Sun has experienced the substantial variations in activity and there have been numerous attempts to reconstruct solar irradiance. While there is general agreement on how solar forcing varied during the last several hundred years – all reconstructions are proportional to the solar activity – there is scientific controversy on the magnitude of solar forcing. Aims. We present a reconstruction of the total and spectral solar irradiance covering 130 nm–10 μm from 1610 to the present with an annual resolution and for the Holocene with a 22-year resolution. Methods. We assume that the minimum state of the quiet Sun in time corresponds to the observed quietest area on the present Sun. Then we use available long-term proxies of the solar activity, which are 10Be isotope concentrations in ice cores and 22-year smoothed neutron monitor data, to interpolate between the present quiet Sun and the minimum state of the quiet Sun. This determines the long-term trend in the solar variability, which is then superposed with the 11-year activity cycle calculated from the sunspot number. The time-dependent solar spectral irradiance from about 7000 BC to the present is then derived using a state-of-the-art radiation code.

Conclusions

We present a new technique to reconstruct total and spectral solar irradiance over the Holocene. We obtained a large historical solar forcing between the Maunder minimum and the present, as well as a significant increase in solar irradiance in the first half of the twentieth-century. Our value of the historical solar forcing is remarkably larger than other estimations published in the recent literature.

### Extensions – Feedbacks are Negative

#### ( ) Positive feedback models wrong, their impacts exaggerated

Happer ‘12

(William is a professor of physics at Princeton. “Global Warming Models Are Wrong Again”, Wall Street Journal, 3/27/12, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304636404577291352882984274.html>)

The direct warming due to doubling CO2 levels in the atmosphere can be calculated to cause a warming of about one degree Celsius. The IPCC computer models predict a much larger warming, three degrees Celsius or even more, because they assume changes in water vapor or clouds that supposedly amplify the direct warming from CO2. Many lines of observational evidence suggest that this "positive feedback" also has been greatly exaggerated. There has indeed been some warming, perhaps about 0.8 degrees Celsius, since the end of the so-called Little Ice Age in the early 1800s. Some of that warming has probably come from increased amounts of CO2, but the timing of the warming—much of it before CO2 levels had increased appreciably—suggests that a substantial fraction of the warming is from natural causes that have nothing to do with mankind.

#### ( ) Empirics proves feedbacks are negative

Worstall ‘12

(Tim, writer for Forbes, “If the MWP Was Global What Does That Tell Us About Climate Change Now?” <http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/03/23/if-the-mwp-was-global-what-does-that-tell-us-about-climate-change-now/>)

That the Earth has temperature cycles isn’t a surprise, we all know there were Ice Ages. So that we had a time when temperatures were higher than now and everything was just dandy doesn’t mean that it will all remain dandy if we carry on in our current manner. However, the great unknown of climate change science is “climate sensitivity”. This is how much temperature will rise given a doubling of atmospheric CO2 (technically, CO2-equivalent, converting all the methane etc to one handy unit). We know how much will come directly: 0.7 of a degree. That isn’t something to worry overmuch about. The question then becomes, well, what happens then: when the ice melts and albedo lowers, when warmer weather and higher CO2 increase plant growth, what happens to clouds and so on through a list of hundreds of possible feedbacks. We don’t even know if some of these will be positive or negative, will further increase temperatures or reduce them and we certainly don’t know what the cumulative effect will be. Currently the best guesses are in the 2 to 4.5 degree range but these are indeed guesses. Well informed guesses, being done with a variety of methods by very good scientists trying to get at the truth but they are guesses. And the most important information underlying them is, well, what happened previous times the Earth got warmer? Did it carry on doing so? Or did it get so far and stop or even retreat? Which is where the MWP comes in. If it was a truly global phenomenon then we’ve more evidence (only more evidence, nothing conclusive at all) that rises in temperature similar to what we’re seeing don’t, always, carry on. Sometimes at least they stop of their own accord: could be solar action, could be feedbacks. From which the takeaway point is that perhaps climate sensitivity is lower than currently thought and thus climate change is less dangerous than currently thought.

\*Note: MWP = Medieval Warming Period

#### ( ) Err neg – if feedbacks are somewhere in the middle adaptation solves

Ridley ‘12

(Matt, writer for Wired Magazine, “Apocalypse Not: Here’s Why You Shouldn’t Worry About End Times,” 8/17, <http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2012/08/ff_apocalypsenot/all>)

So, should we worry or not about the warming climate? It is far too binary a question. The lesson of failed past predictions of ecological apocalypse is not that nothing was happening but that the middle-ground possibilities were too frequently excluded from consideration. In the climate debate, we hear a lot from those who think disaster is inexorable if not inevitable, and a lot from those who think it is all a hoax. We hardly ever allow the moderate “lukewarmers” a voice: those who suspect that the net positive feedbacks from water vapor in the atmosphere are low, so that we face only 1 to 2 degrees Celsius of warming this century; that the Greenland ice sheet may melt but no faster than its current rate of less than 1 percent per century; that net increases in rainfall (and carbon dioxide concentration) may improve agricultural productivity; that ecosystems have survived sudden temperature lurches before; and that adaptation to gradual change may be both cheaper and less ecologically damaging than a rapid and brutal decision to give up fossil fuels cold turkey. We’ve already seen some evidence that humans can forestall warming-related catastrophes. A good example is malaria, which was once widely predicted to get worse as a result of climate change. Yet in the 20th century, malaria retreated from large parts of the world, including North America and Russia, even as the world warmed. Malaria-specific mortality plummeted in the first decade of the current century by an astonishing 25 percent. The weather may well have grown more hospitable to mosquitoes during that time. But any effects of warming were more than counteracted by pesticides, new antimalarial drugs, better drainage, and economic development. Experts such as Peter Gething at Oxford argue that these trends will continue, whatever the weather. Just as policy can make the climate crisis worse—mandating biofuels has not only encouraged rain forest destruction, releasing carbon, but driven millions into poverty and hunger—technology can make it better. If plant breeders boost rice yields, then people may get richer and afford better protection against extreme weather. If nuclear engineers make fusion (or thorium fission) cost-effective, then carbon emissions may suddenly fall. If gas replaces coal because of horizontal drilling, then carbon emissions may rise more slowly. Humanity is a fast-moving target. We will combat our ecological threats in the future by innovating to meet them as they arise, not through the mass fear stoked by worst-case scenarios.

### Extensions – Models Fail

#### ( ) Observational evidence disproves climate models

Evans ‘12

(David has a PhD in electrical engineering, worked from 1999 to 2006 for the Australian Greenhouse Office, an agency of the Australian government, designing a carbon accounting system, Financial Post, "Global Warming Theory Is Based on False Science.",7 Apr. 2011)

The planet reacts to that extra carbon dioxide, which changes everything. Most critically, the extra warmth causes more water to evaporate from the oceans. But does the water hang around and increase the height of moist air in the atmosphere, or does it simply create more clouds and rain? Back in 1980, when the carbon dioxide theory started, no one knew. The alarmists guessed that it would increase the height of moist air around the planet, which would warm the planet even further, because the moist air is also a greenhouse gas. This is the core idea of every official climate model: For each bit of warming due to carbon dioxide, they claim it ends up causing three bits of warming due to the extra moist air. The climate models amplify the carbon dioxide warming by a factor of three—so two-thirds of their projected warming is due to extra moist air (and other factors); only one-third is due to extra carbon dioxide. That's the core of the issue. All the disagreements and misunderstandings spring from this. The alarmist case is based on this guess about moisture in the atmosphere, and there is simply no evidence for the amplification that is at the core of their alarmism. Weather balloons had been measuring the atmosphere since the 1960s, many thousands of them every year. The climate models all predict that as the planet warms, a hot spot of moist air will develop over the tropics about 10 kilometres up, as the layer of moist air expands upwards into the cool dry air above. During the warming of the late 1970s, '80s and '90s, the weather balloons found no hot spot. None at all. Not even a small one. This evidence proves that the climate models are fundamentally flawed, that they greatly overestimate the temperature increases due to carbon dioxide. This evidence first became clear around the mid-1990s.

#### ( ) Models aren’t detailed enough – prefer observational evidence

Spencer ‘8

(Roy W. Ph.D., climatologist, author, former NASA scientist, “Satellite and Climate Model Evidence Against Substantial Manmade Climate Change (supercedes “Has the Climate Sensitivity Holy Grail Been Found?”)”, Roy W. Spencer, 12/27/08, [http://www.drroyspencer.com/research-articles/satellite-and-climate-model-evidence/](http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/06/14/ice_age/))

What I have presented here is, as far as I know, the most detailed attempt to reconcile satellite observations of the climate system with the behavior of climate models in the context of feedbacks. Instead of the currently popular practice of building immensely complex and expensive climate models and then making only simple comparisons to satellite data, I have done just the opposite: Examine the satellite data in great detail, and then build the simplest model that can explain the observed behavior of the climate system. The resulting picture that emerges is of an IN-sensitive climate system, dominated by negative feedback. And it appears that the reason why most climate models are instead VERY sensitive is due to the illusion of a sensitive climate system that can arise when one is not careful about the physical interpretation of how clouds operate in terms of cause and effect (forcing and feedback). Indeed, climate researchers seldom (if ever) dig into the archives of satellite data and ask the question, “What are the satellite data telling us about the real climate system?” Instead, most climate research money now is funneled into building expensive climate models which are then expected to provide a basis for formulating public policy. Given the immense effort that has been invested, one would think that those models would be more rigorously tested. There is nothing inherently wrong with a model-centric approach to climate research…as long as the modeler continues to use the observations to guide the model development over time. Unfortunately, as Richard Lindzen at MIT has pointed out, the fact that modelers use the term “model validation” rather than “model testing” belies their inherent preference of theory over observations. The allure of models is strong: they are clean, with well-defined equations and mathematical precision. Observations of the real climate system are dirty, incomplete, and prone to measurement error. The comparisons modelers make between their models and satellite data are typically rather crude and cursory. They are not sufficiently detailed to really say anything of substance about feedbacks — in either the models or the satellite data – and yet it is the feedbacks that will determine how serious the manmade global warming problem will be.

# US-CHINA RELATIONS ARE BAD– NEG (Offense)

## War Modules – US-Sino Relations = Bad

### War Module - 1nc

Closer relations create false confidence that fuels Chinese expansionism and freaks out allies – that makes regional war more likely

Erickson 14

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Ever since his February 2012 visit to Washington, Chinese President Xi Jinping has championed his vision for a “new type of great-power relations” between China and the United States. The Obama administration, in an apparent desire to avoid conflict with a rising China, seems to have embraced Xi’s formulation. In a major speech last November, U.S. National Security Adviser Susan Rice called on both sides to “operationalize” the concept. And during a March 2014 summit with Xi, U.S. President Barack Obama declared his commitment to “continuing to strengthen and build a new model of relations.” In uncritically signing on to the “new type of great-power relations” slogan at the Obama-Xi Sunnylands summit in June 2013, the Obama administration fell into a trap. It has what is most likely its last major chance to dig itself out when Obama visits Beijing next month for a follow-up summit. And he should make use of the opportunity. Although some U.S. officials dismiss rhetoric as insignificant and see this particular formulation as innocuous, Beijing understands things very differently. At best, U.S. acceptance of the “new type of great-power relations” concept offers ammunition for those in Beijing and beyond who promote a false narrative of the United States’ weakness and China’s inevitable rise. After all, the phrasing grants China great-power status without placing any conditions on its behavior -- behavior that has unnerved U.S. security allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific. At worst, the formulation risks setting U.S.-Chinese relations on a dangerous course: implicitly committing Washington to unilateral concessions that are anathema to vital and bipartisan U.S. foreign policy values, principles, and interests. Already troubling, each additional invocation of a “new type of great-power relations” grows more costly. Instead of reactively parroting this Chinese formulation, Washington must proactively shape the narrative. It should explicitly articulate and champion its own positive vision for U.S.-Chinese relations, which should accord China international status conditionally -- in return for Beijing abiding by twenty-first-century international norms, behaving responsibly toward its neighbors, and contributing positively to the very international order that has enabled China’s meteoric rise. THUCYDIDES TRAP The “new type of great-power relations” concept is appealing to so many policymakers and scholars in both countries because of a misplaced belief in the Thucydides Trap. This is a dangerous misconception that the rise of a new power inescapably leads to conflict with the established one. The Chinese side has exploited this oversimplified narrative to great effect: Xi himself has warned of such confrontation as “inevitable,” and leading Chinese international relations scholars claim that it is an “iron law of power transition.” Hillary Clinton, the former U.S. secretary of state, echoed the sentiment at the 2012 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue when she said that the United States and China’s efforts to avoid a catastrophic war are “historically unprecedented” and that both sides need to “write a new answer to the age-old question of what happens when an established power and a rising power meet.” A year later, at the Sunnylands summit, Tom Donilon, then the U.S. national security adviser, explained that efforts to reformulate the U.S.-Chinese relationship are “rooted in the observation … that a rising power and an existing power are in some manner destined for conflict.” Such sentiments are puzzling, especially coming from Americans. They deny human agency (and responsibility) for past -- and possibly future -- disasters. And they reject progress. Further, they are based on a selective reading of modern history, one that overlooks the powerful ways in which the norms that great powers have promoted through their own rhetoric and example have shaped the choices of contemporaneous rising powers, for better or for worse. Most problematic, the narrative of needing a “new model” to avoid otherwise inevitable conflict is a negative foundation, a dangerous platform on which to build the future of U.S.-Chinese relations. To be sure, Clinton, Donilon, and their successors might understand all this but are prepared to dismiss rhetoric and focus instead on action. This is surely what U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry had in mind at the 2014 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue when he noted that “a new model is not defined in words. It is defined in actions.” Even so, flirting with the Chinese-proposed slogan for bilateral relations, as the administration has done, while dismissing it in private is dangerous. Chinese leaders take such formulations extremely seriously: the phrase “new type of great-power relations” appears repeatedly in their speeches, and permeates Chinese media and public discourse on U.S.-Chinese relations. Uncritical embrace creates an unsustainable situation wherein each side mistakenly expects unrealistic things of the other, worsening the consequences when those expectations are ultimately dashed. Even worse: There doesn’t even seem to be a clear consensus within Washington about what exactly “new type of great-power relations” actually means. Interviews suggest that the administration’s definition hinges on two prongs: cooperation in areas where U.S. and Chinese interests overlap and constructive management of differences where they don’t. But Beijing could intend any number of things. A theoretically benign interpretation is reflected in former State Councilor Dai Bingguo’s remarks at the fourth U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue: “respect each other and treat each other as equals politically; carry out comprehensive, mutually beneficial and win-win cooperation economically; build up mutual trust and tolerance and share responsibilities in security matters; learn from and promote each other culturally; and seek common ground while reserving differences and live side by side in peace with each other ideologically.” For others, the dirty secret is that “new type of great-power relations” isn’t that new. It is disturbingly redolent of a very old type of values and order, in which spheres of interest, zero-sum gains, and great-power exceptionalism ruled the day. Indeed, Shi Yinhong, a leading Chinese IR scholar and counselor to China’s State Council, has characterized it as a call for America and China to “respect each other’s interests and dignity” as both a “nation-state in the traditional sense” and a “rare and special” great power. An even more cynical interpretation -- and one supported by interviews with current and former U.S. officials -- is that, under the new formulation, Xi expects the United States to make certain accommodations concerning China’s “core interests.” Indeed, in the February, 2012, speech in which Xi first introduced the concept, he explicitly identified “respect for each other’s core interests” as one of four areas constituting a “new type of great-power relations.” But no U.S. administration is likely interested in making such accommodations. And there is no evidence that Beijing would be willing to make meaningful concessions of its own; in a July 2012 paper, Cui Tiankai, China’s ambassador to the United States, claimed that “China has never done anything to undermine the US core interests” and that, even in its own neighborhood, China is merely a “victim on which harm has been imposed.” Whatever Chinese leaders’ intentions in promoting the concept actually are, in other words, they don’t look good. TROUBLING TERMINOLOGY The Obama administration’s continued flirtation with the “new type of great-power relations” concept appears to have been misunderstood in Beijing and beyond, and risks being misperceived as a precipitous change in U.S. power and policy. First, the terminology paints an absurd picture of a United States too feeble to articulate, much less defend, its own vision for promoting peace, stability, and prosperity in Asia -- only furthering perceptions of U.S. decline in China and its neighbors. The Obama administration’s rhetoric, however well intentioned, sometimes exacerbates this misperception. A case in point: Kerry’s statement to his Chinese counterparts at the 2014 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue that “there is no U.S. strategy to try to push back against or be in conflict with China.” The Obama administration is certainly right to try to allay concerns -- unfounded but extremely prevalent in China -- that the United States is attempting to “contain” China. But it is ill advised to do so in a manner so easily heard as an apology. Second, Beijing’s interpretation of “new type of great-power relations” appears to be linked to an assumption that China’s growing material power has made a power transition inevitable, compelling Washington to accommodate Beijing’s claims in the South and East China Seas now. Such arguments reveal ignorance, first, of fundamental changes to the international order since the days of might makes right and, second, of the manifold sources of U.S. power and preeminence. By allowing the terms “great-power relations” and “equality” to permeate official discourse on bilateral relations, Washington risks tacitly condoning such anachronistic views of international politics. Third, China’s economic growth is slowing, and the country’s future is ever more uncertain as various societal and other domestic headwinds strengthen. Decades of extraordinary economic and military growth make many Chinese assume that the rapid increases in material power will continue indefinitely. That is unlikely, but the consequences of such bullishness are real and unsettling: growing expectations within China for U.S. concessions and anachronistic calls for “equal” treatment and “space.” If that weren’t enough, the “new type of great-power relations” concept is also unnerving to U.S. allies and partners in the region. If fears of abandonment grow, some may seek other -- potentially more destabilizing -- options for deterring China. Such concerns are particularly intense in Japan -- arguably Washington’s closest ally and the best situated to stand up to China independently, if necessary. Xi has already attempted to exploit the Obama administration’s embrace of the “new type of great-power relations” concept to score a victory in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands dispute. During a September 2012 meeting with U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, Xi invoked the “important consensus” he claimed that the two had reached in defining their relationship and then pivoted immediately to the most critical flashpoint in Chinese-Japanese relations: “We hope that the U.S., from the point of view of regional peace and stability, will be cautious, will not get involved in the Diaoyu Islands sovereignty dispute, and will not do anything that might intensify contradictions and make the situation more complicated.” The record of China’s Japan policy during the past two years suggests the Xi administration is intent on isolating Japan -- bypassing Tokyo while engaging Washington -- and keeping the country relegated to a status inferior to China and the United States. Indeed, as Australian scholar Amy King argues, China’s conception of a “new type of great-power relations” leaves little room for Japan.

### Chinese nationalism scenario - 2nc

US-Sino ties boost Chinese nationalism

Li 14

Cheng Li, Director, John L. Thornton China Center @ Brookings, Brookings Institution, December 4, 2014, “Chinese Enthusiasm and American Cynicism Over the “New Type of Great Power Relations””, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/12/05-chinese-pessimism-american-cynicism-great-power-li-xu

The Chinese media avidly reporting on Obama and Xi’s joint endorsement of the concept suggests that there are also domestic reasons driving the “New Type of Great Power Relations.” Although the Chinese concept is an inherently U.S.-geared proposal, the domestic goals of such a concept should not be overlooked. From a Chinese perspective, the United States is the only superpower in today’s world that has the capacity to contain China’s rise. By strengthening China’s view of itself as a recognized and respected power, Xi Jinping is able to foster stronger nationalistic pride under CCP leadership and gain political capital to consolidate his own power at home.

Causes war over Taiwan

Manicom, 2007

James Manicom, Ph.D Research Fellow in the Asian Institute at the University of Toronto, February 2007, “Near-term Instability in the Taiwan Strait?” Security Challenges, Volume 3 Number 1, http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePDFs/vol3no1Manicom.pdf

This article illustrates how growing nationalist pressures in Chinese government and society could pressure governing elites into a demonstration of force in the Taiwan Strait in the near future. In doing so, it challenges the two prevailing orthodox assessments of cross-Strait security. The first views the cross-Strait relationship as tense but stable, the second views war between the US and China in the Strait as inevitable in the long term. In contrast, this article contends that a military crisis is possible in the short term as a result of internal domestic pressures on the leadership. In a crisis over Taiwan, Chinese leadership elites will be under pressure from three domestic sources that could inhibit their ability to pursue a conciliatory solution. These three sources are: hardline elements of the PLA, remaining Third Generation elites, and nationalist segments of the population. It concludes with an examination of the policy implications for all actors in the Strait. In short, it is imperative that the Fourth Generation’s Taiwan policy appears to be making progress towards reunification.

### Japan scenario – 2NC

Closer US-Sino relations sparks Japanese fears of abandonment

Li 14

Cheng Li, Director, John L. Thornton China Center @ Brookings, Brookings Institution, December 4, 2014, “Chinese Enthusiasm and American Cynicism Over the “New Type of Great Power Relations””, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/12/05-chinese-pessimism-american-cynicism-great-power-li-xu

However, the key barrier for the White House is its suspicions towards Chinese intentions. Washington is not fond of Chinese designs to obtain foreign recognition of its “core interests,” which the administration sees as a murky jumble of territorial demands. Cynics see it as China’s “trap” to gain official American recognition of its disputed territorial claims in the East China Sea and the South China Sea.

Moreover, the Pacific power is held back by how neighboring countries in the region would interpret its embracement of the concept. The “Great Powers” framework is inherently flawed, as it ignores key American allies and the important role they play for the United States in the region. From a Japanese perspective, a stronger U.S.-China relationship threatens their security alliance and exacerbates fears of abandonment. Other smaller countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam worry that the stronger partnership would only fuel Chinese expansionism. With such concerns from pivotal allies, the United States is reluctant to risk upsetting the regional security balance.

That triggers Japanese proliferation and war

Michael D. Swaine et al, 2013 - senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, doctorate in government from Harvard University", CHINA’S MILITARY & THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE IN 2030", carnegieendowment.org/files/net\_assessment\_full.pdf

The Nuclear Domain

Due in large part to deteriorating trends in the conventional balance described above, as well as its own doubts regarding the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, Japan could perceive an independent nuclear capability as a cost-effective means of preventing Chinese attack or coercion. Consequently, the nuclear domain would become a locus of destabilizing competition between China and Japan,with a far greater likelihood of outright confrontation than in any other scenario.

Japan would likely pursue a modest sea-based deterrent, most likely in the form of SSBNs, and would adopt a comparatively restrained nuclear posture that places an emphasis on retaliation against countervalue targets. But to maximize the deterrent potential of its arsenal, Japan could maintain some degree of ambiguity regarding the use of its nuclear weapons in very specific contingencies against overwhelming conventional threats.

Although news of such an effort would likely break out within a period of months, Japan would probably require a few years to field the full suite of compatible warheads, missiles, and delivery platforms necessary to ensure a second-strike capability.24 During this period, China could be tempted to launch some form of preventive attack in order to neutralize the emergence of an independent and, in Beijing’s view, unpredictable nuclear power on its periphery. Such temptations could grow in the event of a total disintegration of the United States–Japan alliance, although the overall possibility of such a destabilizing and catastrophic scenario would be low.

At a minimum, however, Japanese nuclearization and the open violation of nonproliferation taboos would most likely set off a regional arms race. Faced with a deteriorat-ing security environment, China could be prompted to shift toward a limited deterrence posture, with an emphasis on a larger nuclear force capable of early attacks against military targets. In this instance, pervasive strategic distrust between Tokyo and Beijing and regular incidents and crises arising from their geographically proximate forces would raise the possibility of brinkmanship and confrontation.

Nuclear war

Cimbala, 15

Stephen J. - Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Penn State Brandywine, “The New Nuclear Disorder: Challenges to Deterrence and Strategy”, p. 59

Although the construct or policy option of a preventive nuclear war became institutionally unthinkable in Washington and in Moscow, the possibility of inadvertent nuclear war or escalation to nuclear from conventional war was very real during the Cold War. This legacy has carried forward into the post-Cold War and twenty-first century world. The term “inadvertent” means something other than “accidental” war, such as the possibility of a test misfire or other technology failure that leads to a war. Inadvertent nuclear war is the result of an unforeseen combination of human and technical factors, pulling both sides in a nuclear crisis over the brink despite their shared interest in avoiding war. The likelihood of inadvertent nuclear war between two states is based on their political intentions, military capabilities, approaches to crisis management, the personalities of leaders, standard operating procedures for the management of nuclear forces during peacetime and in crisis, and other variables.16 A decision for nuclear preemption is so irrevocable that leaders will want as much intelligence as possible relative to the plans and actions of their opponent. Unfortunately, inside dope on the opponent’s political thinking and military planning may be hard to come by, under the exigent pressures of crisis. Therefore, states may infer the other side’s intentions from the disposition of its forces, from the behavior of its command, control, communications and intelligence systems, or from guesswork based on past experience. For example: during Able Archer 83, a NATO command and communications exercise testing procedures for the release of alliance nuclear weapons in November 1983, there was an apparent mind set among some Soviet intelligence officials that led them to conclude (temporarily) that the exercise might be the “real thing”: an actual set of preparatory moves for NATO nuclear release and a possible first strike against Soviet forces and installations in Europe.17 The pessimistic Soviet interpretations of Able Archer were not universally shared among their intelligence officers, but some of the alarmism arose from Soviet military doctrine that foresaw the conversion of an exercise simulating an attack into a real attack as one possible path to war.18 Another example of the difficulty of reading the other side’s intentions during a crisis occurred during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. A second letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy on October 27, more demanding in its terms for settlement compared to an earlier letter the previous day, caused some ExComm deliberators to wonder whether Khrushchev had been overruled by a hostile faction of the Soviet Presidium. Robert Kennedy noted that “The change in the language and tenor of the letters from Khrushchev indicated confusion within the Soviet Union, but there was confusion among us as well.”19 Fortunately, in both the NATO “Able Archer” exercise and in the Cuban crisis, the most pessimistic assumptions were proved incorrect before leaders could act on them. A post-Cold War example of a scenario for inadvertent nuclear war occurred in January 1995 during the launch of a Norwegian scientific rocket for the purpose of studying the Aurora borealis. The initial phase of the rocket’s trajectory resembled that of a ballistic missile launched from a nuclear submarine and possibly headed for Russian territory. Russian early warning systems detected the launch and passed the information to military headquarters. Russian President Boris Yeltsin, the defense minister and the chief of the Russian general staff were connected via their emergency communication network, and the Russian President for the first time opened his secure briefcase or “football” with nuclear codes for launch authorization. The crisis passed when the rocket trajectory eventually veered away from any possible threat to Russia. The operational misinterpretation of the Norwegian rocket launch was made possible by an earlier bureaucratic mistake. Norwegian officials had notified the Russian foreign ministry well in advance of the launch date that the rocket test was scheduled and of its mission. For unknown reasons, the Russian foreign ministry failed to pass that information to the defense ministry or other military headquarters in time to avoid confusion. The Future: Issues of Concern If the possibility existed of a mistaken preemption during and immediately after the Cold War, between the experienced nuclear forces and command systems of America and Russia, then it may be a matter of even more concern with regard to states with newer and more opaque forces and command systems. In addition, the Americans and Soviets (and then Russians) had a great deal of experience getting to know one another’s military operational proclivities and doctrinal idiosyncrasies: including those that might influence the decision for or against war. Another consideration, relative to nuclear stability in the present century, is that the Americans and their NATO allies shared with the Soviets and Russians a commonality of culture and historical experience. Future threats to American or Russian security from weapons of mass destruction may be presented by states or non-state actors motivated by cultural and social predispositions not easily understood by those in the West nor subject to favorable manipulation during a crisis. The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia (including those parts of the Middle East with geostrategic proximity or reach into Asia) presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this regard. States with nuclear forces of variable force structure, operational experience, and command-control systems will be thrown into a matrix of complex political, social and cultural cross-currents contributory to the possibility of war. In addition to the existing nuclear powers in Asia, others may seek nuclear weapons if they feel threatened by regional rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the present century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or risk aversion that marked the Cold War: in part, because the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold War superpowers no longer exists, but also because states in Asia have new aspirations for regional or global respect.20 The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclear capable delivery systems in Asia, or in the Middle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible adversaries live close together and are already engaged in ongoing disputes about territory or other issues. The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one another’s vitals. But short range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially “strategic” effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India and Pakistan; Russia, with China and North Korea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on. The short flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of contiguous states means that very little time will be available for warning and attack assessment by the defender. Conventionally armed missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighter-bombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also have first strike vulnerable forces and command-control systems that increase decision pressures for rapid, and possibly mistaken, retaliation. This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventional wisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policy makers and academic theorists. For policy makers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asia could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the twentieth century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).21 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the effect that wars of mass destruction are now passé, on account of the emergence of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” and its encouragement of information-based warfare.22 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that large scale war between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete.23 The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare.

### Japan scenario – Assurance is currently high

Reassurance sufficient but fragile

Brad Glosserman, March 23, 2015 – Panelists: \*James Miller is Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs in the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Ph.D. in public policy from Harvard Kennedy School, former deputy for National Security Council policy-making and crisis management, \*\*Brad Glosserman is executive director of the Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu, \*\*\*Catherine Kelleher is a professor of public policy at the University of Maryland, \*\*\*\*Kori Schake is a research fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, "REASSURANCE: WHAT SHOULD ALLIES EXPECT?", carnegieendowment.org/files/07-Reassurance230315wintro-formatted.pdf

On the operational level we’re seeing the training that’s moving forward. We’re stepping up the work with the Japanese and the South Koreans. We’re also seeing, I think, in response, for example, to demands, like Ambassador Ho-young this morning, the news today **that there’s a deployment of new army, artillery batteries that they’re sending out**, so we’re seeing **a stepping up of the presence**. It’s visible and I think there’s a sense that, again, in the United States we understand that **that’s what the** allies are looking for.

We get the fact that **there’s a demand for more**. I think that what we really should be expecting, and what our allies need to be expecting, is a demand for the United States for them to do more and I think that they’re getting it and, by and large, **the alliances are modernising in ways that demonstrate a responsiveness on both sides**, a receptiveness to the needs.

Finally, I think, we’re seeing in the context that we’re balancing and setting aside the debates about the legitimacy, the viability, the meaning of the rebalance, that you’ve got the leaning forward with political, economic dimensions of engagement in ways, I think, that reassure and provide a deeper strategic connection between the three countries.

### Japan scenario – china relations link

Plan’s outreach to China pushes Japanese fears over the brink

Sheila A. Smith and Richard N. Haas, March 12, 2015 – \*Senior Fellow for Japan Studies, CFR \*\*President, CFR, "How Japan Views China's Rise", Transcript, www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/japan-views-chinas-rise/p36272

HAASS:  You just mentioned the United States.  Let me run with that for a second.  This is a book about Japan and to a lesser extent China.  But that's the—their relationship's at the center of it.

But they're not operating in a vacuum.  **We're a big part of that**.  And so how do we—to what extent does the future of that relationship depend upon the future of the U.S. relationship with each country?

SMITH:  Absolutely fundamentally.  As you all know, we have a security treaty with Japan.  And the United States and Japan struck a strategic bargain in 1952.  And the basic fundamental terms of that strategic bargain still hold today.

And that is Japan will have a limited military capability and we will provide the external deterrent that will keep it from having to think about difficult questions such as nuclear weapons or offensive capability. So in terms of Japan's national security, **we are fundamentally critical to the way the Japanese approach** not only China but **the region** as well.

Beyond that, of course, I think it's a deeper question about how we see our priorities in the region.  And I think there's some delicate sentiment in Tokyo, put it that way, at the moment, **that we are a little bit more** focused on Beijing, a little less focused on our...

(CROSSTALK)

HAASS:  I thought you were going to say...

(CROSSTALK)

SMITH:  ... ally...

HAASS:  ... we're more focused on the Middle East.  I thought you were going...

SMITH:  Well there's also that.  So even just keeping it within Asia, this question of are we actually moving toward this new rising power?  Do we see our interests more associated with Beijing and China, and less so with perhaps a declining Japan?

But then there's the age-old question that you just raised, which is **can we stay focused on Asia long enough to continue to make a difference there**?

### Japan \*can\* proliferate weapons

Japan is restrained because of U.S. security – their authors are optimists who understate Japanese domestic shifts

Jonathan Hunt, August 5, 2015 – postdoctoral Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the nonprofit, nonpartisan Rand Corp, "Out of the Mushroom Cloud’s Shadow", foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/05/japans-nuclear-obsession-hiroshima-nagasaki/

With the [average age](http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201507020030) of the hibakusha now over 80, and Japanese society gradually leaving its pacifist and anti-nuclear roots behind, however, the security alliance with the United States and the nuclear umbrella that it affords are increasinglycrucial backstops for Japan’s commitmentsto nonproliferation and disarmament. Without them, a nuclear arms race could ensue in East Asia.

If Japan pursued nuclear weapons, it would upend efforts to restrict their spread, especially in East Asia. With the largest nuclear program of any state outside the 9-member nuclear club, Japan has long been a poster child for nonproliferation. Besides its NPT membership, it accepts the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency — the global nuclear watchdog — on activities ranging from uranium imports to plutonium reprocessing. In 1998, it was the first to [sign up](https://www.iaea.org/safeguards/safeguards-legal-framework/additional-protocol/status-of-additional-protocol) for the IAEA’s voluntary Additional Protocol, which mandated even more comprehensive and onerous inspections after the first Gulf War. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs [touts](http://www.mofa.go.jp/dns/ac_d/page24e_000080.html) nuclear disarmament, and officials of its Arms Control and Disarmament Division toil abroad in support of international efforts to manage and eventually eliminate weapons of mass destruction.

These attitudes and behaviors are [often](http://www.ugapress.org/index.php/books/nonproliferation_norms) ascribed to the bombs’ enduring impact on Japanese culture and politics. An [estimated](http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/MED/med_chp10.shtml) 66,000 people were killed and 69,000 injured in Hiroshima, and another 39,000 and 25,000 in Nagasaki — in all, 250,000 to 300,000 died within 13 years. During the 7-year U.S. occupation of Japan, U.S. authorities censored accounts of the bombings and its radioactive aftereffects on the cities’ populations. Anti-nuclear sentiment flared again after an American H-bomb test went awry in 1954, contaminating 7000 square miles of the South Pacific and irradiating 23 crew members of a Japanese fishing vessel — the Lucky Dragon — one of whom later died from radiation poisoning. The incident gave rise to public outcry and anti-nuclear protests in Japan and was featured in the godfather of all monster movies — Godzilla. One year later, Japan’s parliament, the Diet, restricted domestic nuclear activities to those with civilian uses, a norm which Prime Minister Eisaku Sato further reinforced in 1967, when he[introduced](https://books.google.com/books?id=BhLvr20u-PUC&pg=PA147&lpg=PA147&dq=three+principles:+non-possession,+non-manufacture,+and+non-introduction+of+nuclear+weapons.&source=bl&ots=alObSfhsR2&sig=-_TjQTUIKDMcYyQEkCOB6m863S8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CDIQ6AEwBGoVChMI896n8vOPxwIVkBuOCh3GRg6D#v=onepage&q=three%20principles%3A%20non-possession%2C%20non-manufacture%2C%20and%20non-introduction%20of%20nuclear%20weapons.&f=false) his Three Non-Nuclear Principles: non-possession, non-manufacture, and non-introduction of nuclear weapons.

Yet

Japanese leaders’ renunciation of nuclear weapons has never been absolute. In private remarks, many of Japan’s prime ministers in the 1950s and 1960s [asserted](http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=705) that the weapons would enhance their country’s national security and international standing. (This was partly a mark of the era, when President Dwight Eisenhower [insisted](http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10434) that he saw “no reason why [nuclear weapons] shouldn’t be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.”) After China’s first nuclear test in 1964, Sato [informed](https://books.google.com/books?id=Dg5nEk7YNscC&pg=PA222&lpg=PA222&dq=had+nuclear+weapons,+the+Japanese+should+have+them+sato&source=bl&ots=ixSyXhELxe&sig=3jPyk1vD4XbixGQUnh5r5nLI0Mw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CC0Q6AEwAmoVChMImvnM-oGLxwIVxo8NCh0kFgmD#v=onepage&q=had%20nuclear%20weapons%2C%20the%20Japanese%20should%20have%20them%20sato&f=false) U.S. President Lyndon Johnson “that if the [Chinese] had nuclear weapons, the Japanese also should have them.” He later [confided](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p2/d140) to the U.S. ambassador to Japan U. Alexis Johnson that the Three Non-Nuclear Principles were “nonsense.”

Why then did Japan not build atomic bombs in the 1960s? Mainly because the United States offered to share its own. Security treaties signed in 1952 and 1960 granted the U.S. military basing rights in exchange for protecting Japan. Those treaties were silent on nuclear threats, however, so after China’s nuclear test, Johnson and his foreign-policy team devised various schemes to make U.S. atom and hydrogen bombs available to Japan amid a crisis. In January 1965, Johnson [inaugurated](https://books.google.com/books?id=psarwscR_48C&pg=PA70&lpg=PA70&dq=if+Japan+needs+our+nuclear+deterrent+for+its+defense,+the+United+States+would+stand+by+its+commitments+and+provide+that+defense.%E2%80%9D&source=bl&ots=6zjs_hbXpy&sig=c0n-AnlNVoWJDDvWTeEdmkQNNTQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CB8Q6AEwAGoVChMI_o6LyIKLxwIVjNCACh2KzgLe#v=onepage&q=if%20Japan%20needs%20our%20nuclear%20deterrent%20for%20its%20defense%2C%20the%20United%20States%20would%20stand%20by%20its%20commitments%20and%20provide%20that%20defense.%E2%80%9D&f=false) a tradition of American presidents [vowing](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p2/d41) to Japanese prime ministers, “if Japan needs our nuclear deterrent for its defense, the United States would stand by its commitments and provide that defense.”

These reassurances seemed to have their intended effect. In 1967, Sato acknowledged the importance of extended nuclear deterrence in a meeting with Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara: “The Japanese were well-protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and Japan had no intention to make nuclear weapons,” he [told them](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p2/d104). Afterward, Sato announced that extended nuclear deterrence also formed a pillar of Japan’s nuclear posture. When Sato’s former Foreign Minister Takeo Miki became prime minister in 1974, he convinced the Diet to ratify Japan’s acceptance of the NPT, thanks to President Gerald Ford’s [reaffirmation](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve12/d203)that the U.S.-Japan security treaty encompassed nuclear threats and the establishment of the Subcommittee on U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, where the two countries’ foreign and defense ministers would thereafter meet to coordinate their common defense.

Optimists claim that [nuclear aversion](http://www.newsweek.com/why-japan-wont-acquire-nuclear-weapons-80299), [political checks](http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/veto_players.pdf), and [international commitments](http://press.princeton.edu/titles/8554.html) will prevent a Japanese nuclear breakout in the future. After all, Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida — who hails from Hiroshima —[renewed calls](http://www.mofa.go.jp/dns/ac_d/page24e_000080.html) to “accelerate nuclear disarmament” at the NPT Review Conference this April, inviting world leaders to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki in order to “witness with their own eyes the reality of atomic bombings.”

And yet, Japan is becoming increasingly ambivalent about its military restraint. Before his speech in New York, Kishida finalized new arrangements with the United States that encourage Japan to function “[more proactively](http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/01/18/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-to-play-more-active-security-role-kishida-tells-india/)” in East Asia. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is brushing aside widespread public resistance to a Diet resolution that would authorize the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to operate overseas for the first time since World War II. During his first administration, in the wake of the first North Korean nuclear test in 2006, Abe [declared](http://www.reuters.com/article/2006/11/14/us-japan-nuclear-idUST4792620061114) that a limited nuclear arsenal “would not necessarily violate” the pacifist constitution. Tokyo [affirmed](http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/18/world/asia/18cnd-korea.html?_r=0) its non-nuclear status in 2006, but with North Korea [testing](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26743197) medium-range ballistic missiles, and China enhancing its conventional and nuclear forces amid the contest of wills over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, another review seems inevitable. In 2011, Shintaro Ishihara, the then powerful governor of Tokyo, even [called for](http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/japan-must-develop-nuclear-weapons-warns-tokyo-governor-2235186.html) Japan to build its own nuclear arsenal.

## India Relations Module

### India Relations Module – 1NC

Close ties with China crush US-India cooperation

Kumar 6/6/16

Shivaji Kumar is assistant professor at the Centre for International Politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University’s School of International Studies, The National Interest, June 6, 2016, “How Obama Revived U.S.-Indian Relations”, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-obama-revived-us-indian-relations-16473?page=show

Finally, India is skeptical of the United States’ dependability. From the Indian perspective, American policies change at the whims of leaders who spend little time to understand the pressures and compulsions of the region. Take for example President Obama, who first courted China to manage Asian affairs in a G2 alliance, but later seemed to move toward a policy of containment. In this initial supposed G2 partnership, President Obama suggested that China take an active role in the management of South Asian affairs, including India and its traditional rival Pakistan. This approach revealed total ignorance of Indian foreign policy. China formed an “all-weather friendship” with Pakistan and has supported its about claims over Kashmir. President Obama, in India’s view, neglected India’s territorial disputes. According to one account, between 2012 and 2015, there were about six hundred Chinese military incursions into Indian territory. Moreover, the Indian navy reported no less than twenty-two troubling encounters with the Chinese navy in the Indian Ocean over a twelve-month period in 2015. These Chinese incursions into Indian territory have become commonplace. Washington’s restrained response to Chinese aggression in the South China Sea does not inspire confidence in Delhi. India sees U.S. involvement in the region as fundamentally self-serving and as a transactional arrangement.

IN SPITE of his initial reservations about closer relations with India, President Obama appears to be ending his second term on a high note. This dramatic shift in his foreign-policy priorities stems from the assessment of three components of American interests and India’s role in them. In Obama’s view, strong security and defense relations with India benefit the United States. Despite apprehension over sharing sensitive defense technologies and India’s own domestic constraints, the United States has made the greatest headway with India in this regard. Bilateral trade flows have also significantly increased under the Obama presidency, but U.S. exports to India leave much to be desired. As a result, America runs a growing trade deficit with India that undercuts an important element of President Obama’s goal of advancing American economic interests. However, the U.S. pivot to Asia strategy faces an India’s attitude that is, at best, ambivalent. This skepticism stems from India’s conflicting perception of a greater American commitment to the region on the one hand, and the U.S. failure to devote sufficient military resources on the other. India’s concern over China’s budding relationship with Pakistan only compounds its insecurities. Although the results of President Obama’s India policy are mixed, bilateral relations have an overall positive trajectory.

India relations key to the economy, Asia stability

Somers 14

Ron Somers is president of the U.S.-India Business Council, Roll Call, February 13, 2014, "Why It's Time to Deepen U.S.-India Ties", http://www.rollcall.com/news/why\_its\_time\_to\_deepen\_us\_india\_ties\_commentary-230866-1.html?pg=1

There are many reasons India should be a top priority for U.S. attention. India is the world’s third-largest economy, gaining traction in its economic recovery from the global recession, and hungry for American goods and services. India’s young population yearns for better governance and greater freedom. The Internet has connected our countries as never before and the new U.S.-India knowledge economy is reshaping the commercial as well as cultural landscape.

Already U.S. exports to India have grown 491 percent in value since 2000. Bilateral trade now exceeds $100 billion, up from $25 billion when President George W. Bush visited India in 2006. Bilateral investment and commercial ties are growing at double-digit rates. Ten of the top 15 IT companies operating in India are American. In fact, U.S and Indian companies have partnered on many of the most important advancements in business efficiency, innovation and expansion — building a knowledge-based economy and helping U.S. businesses lead the way out of the global recession. More and more American jobs can be traced to this growing trade and commercial relationship.

We also have strong political and strategic interests in India. While the U.S. is the world’s longest-standing democracy, India is the world’s largest. India’s national elections this year will attract a stunning 800 million citizens to the polls, a cohort larger than the combined populations of the United States and all the European Union! Truly this will be the largest democratic undertaking in human history.

Strategically, India is a stabilizing force in a region known to be a “tough neighborhood,” surrounded by Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Myanmar and China. Since 2005, U.S. defense sales to India have grown dramatically from nil to more than $12 billion; India now conducts more annual military training exercises with the U.S. than any other country, and high-level dialogues are under way on both national defense and homeland security issues. The growing strategic partnership between our two countries encompasses cooperation in cybersecurity, higher education, clean energy, health care, environment, scientific research, space, and many other areas of mutual interest and concern.

Asia war goes nuclear

Tan, Associate Professor, School of Social Sciences – University of New South Wales, ‘15

(Andrew T.H., “The prospects for conflict in East Asia”, *Security and Conflict in East Asia*, Routledge International Handbooks)

High tensions in East Asia

The high tensions in East Asia, the highest since the end of the Second World War, have led to fears of open conflict involving the states in the region as well as extra-regional powers, in particular the USA, By early 2013, tensions between North Korea on the one hand, and South Korea, the USA and Japan, on the other, had deteriorated to their worst level since the end of the Korean War in 1953, sparking fears of an **accidental war** due to North Korea’s brinkmanship and political miscalculation (ICG 2013a). Tensions between the People’s Republic of China and Japan were also at their highest since the end of the Second World War, due to their dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands (Hughes 2013). More seriously, China, the USA and North Korea possess nuclear weapons, and Japan has always been regarded as a threshold nuclear power, as it possesses plutonium stocks generated through its power industry, ballistic missile capability and the technology to rapidly transform itself into a significant nuclear weapons power should it choose to do so (Rublee 2010: 62-63). South Korea could also be forced to develop its own nuclear weapons if the threat from a hostile, aggressive and unpredictable North Korea continues to grow as it develops its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons capabilities, and uses them to coerce South Korea (New York Times 2013).

The impact of any regional conflict in East Asia will be **significant and global**. Any conflict in this region would involve not only states in the region and US allies from further afield, but also **quickly escalate into a** nuclear conflict, given the superiority that the USA enjoys in terms of conventional warfare capabilities over North Korea, and to a diminishing degree, China, thus forcing them to resort to non-conventional means, such as nuclear weapons, in any major conflict. Indeed, the US strategy of Air-Sea Battle, which involves attacking China’s surveillance, intelligence and command systems, are likely to be interpreted by China as attempts to disarm its nuclear strike capability and could thus lead to a quick arid unwanted escalation into a nuclear conflict (Schreer 2013).

Moreover, today the **centre of the global economy** no longer resides in Europe or North America but in Asia, in particular, East Asia. Indeed, three of the key actors in the region, namely the USA, China and Japan, are also the three largest economies in the world, with South Korea ranked 15th in global terms, according to the World Bank. Any conflict in East Asia will therefore have a **profound, global economic impact**. Furthermore, the fact that **any conflict could escalate into** a major war, including **nuclear war**, means that conflict in East Asia will have global implications as well as uncertain consequences for the international system.

Economic collapse goes nuclear

Martin Hutchinson, author, market analyst and a former business and economics editor at United Press International, “The chilling echoes of 1914, a century on,” ’14, http://blogs.reuters.com/breakingviews/2014/01/03/the-chilling-echoes-of-1914-a-century-on/

The years before 1914 saw the formation of **trade blocs** separated by **high tariff barriers**. Back then, the world was dominated by several roughly equivalent powers, albeit with different strengths and weaknesses. Today, the world is similarly multi-polar. The United States is in a position of clear leadership, but China is coming up fast. Europe is weaker than it was, but is still a force to be reckoned with. Japan, Russia, Brazil, India are also too powerful to ignore. A hundred years ago, big international infrastructure projects such as the Berlin-Baghdad Railway, and before it the Suez Canal, were built to protect favored trading. Today’s equivalent may be the bilateral mining partnerships forged between, for instance, China and mineral-rich African states. Today, the World Trade Organization offers some defence against tariffs. But protectionism could be become entrenched if **prolonged economic stagnation** leads countries to pursue their own narrow interests. Germany, Austria, Russia and France lost between 20 and 35 percent of national output between 1913 and 1918, according to Angus Maddison’s data used in Stephen Broadberry’s “The Economics of World War One: A Comparative Analysis”. British GDP declined in 1914 and 1915, but grew 15 percent over the four years, as did the U.S. economy. The 37 million military and civilian casualties may tell a more accurate story but if history were to repeat itself, the global conflict could be both **more universal** and **more destructive**. Nuclear weapons proliferate. Warped diplomatic anger could lead to the deployment of chemical and biological **devices**. **E**lectro**m**agnetic **p**ulse**s** **could** wipe out **our** fragile electronic networks**.** Like the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand that sparked World War One, the catalyst for cataclysm might be something quite surprising. A **global run on bank and other investment assets** or an outbreak of hyperinflation, maybe? These threats get more serious the more policymakers pump up equity, bond, property and banking **bubbles**. **If global wealth evaporates**, or is proven to be an illusion, today’s largely cordial global entente could be smashed with precipitous speed.

### 2nc uniqueness – relations high

US-India relations up

Curtis 16

Lisa Curtis is a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, The National Interest, April 13, 2016, “Get Ready, China: India Seems Set to Embrace U.S. Defense Ties”, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/get-ready-china-india-seems-set-embrace-us-defense-ties-15782

The announcement of the F-16 sale notwithstanding, there has been a qualitative improvement in U.S.-India relations under the Modi government, with most progress occurring on the defense front.

Carter has been a driving force behind this effort, especially through advancement of the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI) aimed at breaking down bureaucratic and other barriers to U.S.-India defense trade and cooperation.

The U.S. Congress also is pushing for stronger U.S.-India defense ties. In March U.S. Representative George Holding, R., N.C., introduced the U.S.-India Defense Technology and Partnership Act. The legislation lays out specific steps for enhancing defense ties between the two countries, including designating a point person to coordinate the interagency policy process regarding defense trade and technology transfer with India; facilitating the transfer of advanced technology for combined military planning; coordinating with India on contingency planning on mutual security threats; and amending the Arms Export Control Act to streamline the export control process for India, putting it on par with NATO countries and other key U.S. military allies.

Some U.S. strategists may be skeptical of the idea of treating India the same as a NATO partner or treaty ally, but Washington must increasingly factor in the evolving security situation with regard to China and the need for countries like India to play a key role in helping to maintain the balance of power in Asia. To fulfill this role, India needs adequate defense capabilities and access to advanced military technology.

Cooperation is strengthening – shared fear of China is key

Knodell 5/20/16

Kevin Knodell, senior news team member at Warisboring.com, National Interest, May 20, 2016, “China's Worst Nightmare: Is a U.S.- India Military Alliance Brewing?”, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/chinas-worst-nightmare-us-india-military-alliance-brewing-16301

Washington and New Delhi are getting a lot more serious about military-to-military ties. As the United States and India become more wary of an increasingly assertive China, the two countries are gradually edging closer together.

On May 16, American and Indian officials met for a “maritime security dialogue” in New Delhi. “The dialogue covered issues of mutual interest, including exchange of perspectives on maritime security development in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region as well as prospects for further strengthening cooperation between India and the United States in this regard,” stated an Indian Ministry of External Affairs press release.

Washington and New Delhi are also close to formalizing a historic military cooperation agreement hazily called the “Logistics Support Agreement” — or LSA. The agreement would allow the two militaries to use each other’s land, air and naval bases for resupplies, repairs and conducting operations.

American and Indian officials agreed to hold the summit during an April visit by U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter. Despite regular meetings and joint military training, the United States and India are not allies in any formal sense. India was officially unaligned in the Cold War but kept close relations with the Soviet Union — and the United States backed arch-rival Pakistan.

But there is a slow yet historic realignment underway. First of all, the United States and India are both growing warier of China’s rise as a major regional military power. Second, the U.S.-Pakistani relationship has deteriorated during the course of America’s decade-and-a-half-long war in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Pakistan is the world’s top recipient of Chinese weapons.

In an April profile in The Atlantic, Jeffrey Goldberg wrote that U.S. Pres. Barack Obama “privately questions why Pakistan, which he believes is a disastrously dysfunctional country, should be considered an ally of the U.S. at all.”

Then there’s the LSA, which — if signed — could enhance cooperation between the U.S. and Indian militaries to an unprecedented level.

Cooperation is increasing – China is the key factor

Carpenter 16

Ted Galen Carpenter, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, is the author of ten books and more than 600 articles on international issues, China US Focus, April 29, 2016, “Persistent Suitor: Washington Wants India as an Ally to Contain China”, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/persistent-suitor-washington-wants-india-as-an-ally-to-contain-china/

Even with that ~~handicap~~, strategic ties have gradually and substantially deepened. President Barack Obama has characterized the relationship between the United States and India as “a defining partnership of the 21st century, and India Prime Minister Narendra Modi has termed it “a natural alliance.” Perhaps more significant, India has contracted to receive some $14 billion in supposedly defensive military items from the United States in less than a decade. Washington has now edged out Moscow as India’s principal arms supplier.

Bilateral strategic ties received an additional boost in mid-April 2016 with the visit of U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter to Delhi. That trip generated considerable uneasiness in China, where opinion leaders noted not only was it Carter’s second trip to India during his relatively brief tenure as Pentagon chief, but that he cancelled a previously scheduled trip to Beijing so that he could make this latest journey. That move, they feared, suggested a rather unsubtle tilt against China in favor of one of its potential regional geostrategic competitors.

The agreement that came from Carter’s visit would do nothing to reassure the Chinese. Carter and his Indian counterpart, Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar, pledged to increase bilateral logistical cooperation in the military arena, especially maritime cooperation. Although that agreement is still a considerable distance away from constituting a full-fledged military alliance between the two nations, it continues a trend that has developed over the past decade. And mutual concerns about China’s ambitions appear to be the principal driving force in the bilateral relationship.

### 2nc link – relations trade off

Competition with China is key to US-India cooperation – the plan’s overture to China wrecks that

Madan 15

Tanvi Madan, Fellow, Foreign Policy, Director, The India Project, The Brookings Institution, January 2015, “The U.S.-India Relationship and China”, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/01/20-us-india-relationship-and-china-madan

Each also recognizes that China—especially uncertainty about its behavior—is partly what is driving the India-U.S. partnership. Arguably, there have been three imperatives in the U.S. for a more robust relationship with India and for supporting its rise: strategic interest, especially in the context of the rise of China; economic interest; and shared democratic values. Indian policymakers recognize that American concerns about the nature of China’s rise are responsible for some of the interest in India. New Delhi’s own China strategy involves strengthening India both security-wise and economically (internal balancing) and building a range of partnerships (external balancing)—and it envisions a key role for the U.S. in both. Some Indian policymakers highlight another benefit of the U.S. relationship: Beijing takes Delhi more seriously because Washington does.

But India and the U.S. also have concerns about the other when it comes to China. Both sides remain uncertain about the other’s willingness and capacity to play a role in the Asia-Pacific.

Additionally, Indian policymakers worry both about a China-U.S. condominium (or G-2) and a China-U.S. crisis or conflict. There is concern about the reliability of the U.S., with the sense that the U.S. will end up choosing China because of the more interdependent Sino-American economic relationship and/or leave India in the lurch.

Closer relations with China undermine relations with India

deLisle 11

Jacques deLisle is director of the Asia Program at FPRI and professor of law and political science at the University of Pennsylvania, Foreign Policy Research Institute, January 2011, “The Elephant in the Room: Summitry and China’s Challenging Relations with Great Powers in Asia”, http://www.fpri.org/article/2011/01/the-elephant-in-the-room-summitry-and-chinas-challenging-relations-with-great-powers-in-asia/

A new strategic alignment among the U.S., India and China that would parallel the former triangle among the U.S., China and the USSR is likely unachievable and undesirable. It does not follow, however, that the U.S. cannot, or should not, pursue closer cooperation with India and do so partly in furtherance of U.S. policies that respond to China’s rising power and assertiveness. The U.S’s and India’s shared liberal, democratic and rule of law values, broadly compatible foreign policy interests, and extensively overlapping agendas in relations with China provide relatively sturdy and likely enduring foundations on which to build. The George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations have taken sensible and substantial steps here, including reciprocal state visits, a defense framework agreement, a civilian nuclear cooperation accord, and support for India’s integration in international nuclear regulatory regimes and permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council.

Consolidating and extending these gains will require sustained effort and attention. Although the focus on fellow democracies in Obama’s Asia trip and his characterization of U.S.-India relations as a "defining partnership" were well-received, much of the significance of such gestures for India was their contribution to assuaging concerns that the U.S. administration regarded relations with other Asian states as secondary to the central, if troubled, U.S.-PRC relationship. Such sensitivities in New Delhi (and other Asian capitals) will remain chronic challenges for Washington so long as ideas of U.S.-China bipolarity (or the more farfetched "G2" duopoly) remain prominently in play and unfortunate incidents (such as U.S. airport security officers’ intrusive pat-down of India’s ambassador) can roil still-delicate relations.

Relations are a triangle – current US policy aligns with India

deLisle 11

Jacques deLisle is director of the Asia Program at FPRI and professor of law and political science at the University of Pennsylvania, Foreign Policy Research Institute, January 2011, “The Elephant in the Room: Summitry and China’s Challenging Relations with Great Powers in Asia”, http://www.fpri.org/article/2011/01/the-elephant-in-the-room-summitry-and-chinas-challenging-relations-with-great-powers-in-asia/

Moreover, in the U.S. and India (and many other places as well), concern about the implications of China’s fast-developing capacities has been compounded recently by rapidly deepening suspicions about Beijing’s intent. Increasingly, the PRC has been willing to sacrifice the "soft power" that it seemingly had so assiduously cultivated through much of the last decade and to sideline the "charm offensive" it appeared to have so ardently pursued in its own region, much of the developing world and beyond. Beijing has downgraded those once-central elements of its foreign policy in favor of more assertive, even aggressive, stances. Although far from a full reversal of what had long been a mixed practice, the center of gravity in Chinese statements and actions has shifted toward less accommodation and cooperation on issues ranging from North Korea (including the Six Party Talks and the response to the sinking of the South Korean naval ship Cheonan), to disputed islands and waters in the South China Sea and East China Sea (including the incident over the Japanese seizure of a Chinese fishing boat and renewed tensions over the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands), to U.S. military and naval reconnaissance operations in China’s EEZ, to Washington’s arms sales to Taiwan, to China’s test of a stealth fighter during what had been cast as a breach-patching pre-summit visit to Beijing by the U.S. Secretary of Defense.

This pattern in China’s handling of issues of great concern to the U.S. extends to issues of special importance to India. In the months and days before Wen’s visit, China had become more assertive in its claims to Arunachal Pradesh (the Indian-governed territory that Beijing labels Southern Tibet), shifted to a more pro-Pakistan position on Jammu and Kashmir (by stepping up China’s presence in what India describes as Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, denying a visa to the Indian general in charge of forces in the Indian-governed part of the disputed region, stapling-rather than following the ordinary practice of permanently affixing-Chinese visas to the passports of Indian nationals from the Indian-ruled contested area, and shortening the customarily referenced unsettled boundary between India and China so as to imply that the disputed territory could not be India’s), and completing a major, militarily useful transportation link between the Chinese heartland and the portion of the PRC’s Tibetan Autonomous Region abutting India (and doing so against the backdrop of a modest resurgence in Chinese sources of long-muted positive references to the 1962 Sino-Indian border war).

Beijing’s forceful, even strident, stands in these relatively specific contexts have accompanied a more assertive and less clearly status quo-accepting element in Chinese foreign policy more broadly. In security affairs, this has entailed emphasis on force-projection and access-denial capabilities, more far-flung foreign naval base access (especially along the Indian Ocean) and countering (and denouncing) perceived U.S.-led (and India-abetted) encirclement strategies that threaten a possibly expanding sphere of China’s self-defined "core interests." On economic issues, it has included pointed criticisms of U.S. failures as causes of the global economic crisis, Wen-visit-linked barbs noting the great challenges of development still facing India (before it can hope to be China’s peer), slow and limited Chinese responses to criticism from New Delhi, Washington and elsewhere of China’s currency and trade practices, and claiming a central role in the G20 process for China, and thus for China’s interests and agendas, alongside those of the U.S., India and other major economies.

These developments have spawned distrust and ill-will toward China. In many affected states, the response has been to rethink tendencies to accommodate or even bandwagon with Beijing. For almost all of them, the alternative has been to consider hedging or balancing strategies through increased alignment with the United States. Faced with a rising and worrisome China, small and medium powers in Asia lack other choices. The options are greater for regional great powers, specifically Japan and India. Japan, however, is behaving more like a lesser power amid: a widespread sense that Japan is in protracted relative decline; a half-century of a formal and formidable security alliance in which Japan has been junior partner to the United States; a lingering postwar discomfort in Asia of robust security roles for Japan; and a lack of domestic consensus on Japan’s foreign policy roles that has become more pronounced with the switch in ruling parties, the return of short-lived premierships and the increased prominence of views that Japan should not or cannot aspire to play the roles expected of a great power.

India does not have many-or arguably any-of these features and thus is positioned, with its growing material resources and its ongoing reassessment of its foreign policy interests, to act as a more conventional great power in the region. This makes China’s India problem more akin to China’s America problem. Recent moves in Indian foreign policy parallel the U.S.’s regional policy. Evocative of the Obama administration’s declarations that the U.S. is "back" in Asia and accompanying diplomatic and security efforts, India has pursued a "look East" policy (including prime ministerial visits to regional democracies Japan and South Korea), explored security cooperation with Vietnam, cultivated closer ties with other regional states, and paid special attention to U.S.-India ties, while continuing to insist that relations with China remain nearly uniquely important (and, indeed, are of global strategic significance).

Both the U.S. problem and the India problem are, in their current forms, relatively new challenges for Reform-Era China’s foreign policy. For the first decades of the post-Mao period, China could not-and, following Deng Xiaoping’s anciently rooted imperative of taoguang yanghui (literally, hide brightness and nourish obscurity or, as commonly rendered, bide time while building capacity), should not-aspire to be a regional rival to the United States or a challenger to a largely U.S.-created status quo. According to a view in recent Chinese commentaries, the Global Economic Crisis accelerated the timetable for China’s ascension, shortening it from five or ten years to one or two.

On the other hand, India was not until recently a state that Chinese foreign policy planners had to-or appeared to-take seriously as a regional great power. India’s China-like growth rates and, more recently, efforts to leverage its strength through improved ties with other Asian states and the United States have altered the regional environment facing Beijing. That simultaneously troubled relations with India and the U.S. are new and serious worries for Beijing is suggested by characterizations of Wen Jiabao’s pomp-laden and fence-mending trip to New Delhi as a highly important venture and a bid to secure a foreign policy legacy for Wen. Much the same is true for the soon-following state visit by Hu Jintao to Washington. The U.S. summit is no less a legacy issue for Hu (whose term in office coincides with Wen’s). Chinese media accounts and analysts’ assessments have cast this as an especially important summit, calling it a "bridge" to future relations, stressing the importance of the issues to be addressed and noting the significance of the flurry of reciprocal high-level visits preceding the summit. Given the limited prospects for progress on the many issues vexing bilateral relations, such expansive and expectation-raising language is not without risk and thus further suggests a relatively high level of concern in Beijing.

To the extent that China’s India problem and China’s America problem go beyond coexistence to coalescence, the challenges for PRC foreign policy intensify. Given the parallels in New Delhi’s and Washington’s concerns about Beijing’s agenda and actions, it is tempting to foresee ongoing, qualitative increases in India-U.S. cooperation. A more sweeping analogy has begun to seem plausible to some: a U.S.-China-India triangle might come to resemble the U.S.-Soviet Union-China triangle from the later decades of the Cold War. In some respects, a U.S.-India coalition to check China would seem to be more promising than did the U.S.-China collaboration to counter the USSR on the eve of its emergence. After all, independent India and the PRC have never had the ideological or strategic alliance that China’s communist leaders and the Soviet Union maintained (despite strains) from before the Chinese Revolution through the first years of the People’s Republic. Unlike the U.S. and China in the 1970s (and since), the U.S. and India share fundamental political values and many specific aims and issues in their relationships with the third member of the triangle. Power inequalities among the members (and especially the relative weakness of the third party) did not preclude the U.S.-USSR-PRC triangle and are not obviously qualitatively worse in a U.S.-China-India structure.

### A-to “Relations aren’t zero sum”

US relations with China and India are zero sum

Sidhu ‘3

Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, professor of IR at Delhi U and senior associate at Int’l Peace Academy, Jing-dong Yuan, senior research associate at Center for Nonprolif Studies at Monterey Institute of International Studies, China and India: Cooperation or Conflict?, 2003, Pg. 81

Clearly, even though both China and India share similar concerns and common interests at the global level, they remain reluctant to combine their efforts. For instance, while paying lip service to the principle of supporting the candidacy of developing countries to permanent membership of a reformed UN Security Council, Beijing has publicly offered its support to Germany but has shied away from giving similar support to India, with which it purportedly shares a similar global outlook. This is primarily because, despite the improvement in their relations. They still remain wary of the other's intentions. This is particularly true in the relations that Beijing and New Delhi are developing with other key global actors, particularly the United States and Russia. Two sets of triangular relationships are in evidence (India-Russia-China and India-United States-China) since India declared itself to be a nuclear weapon state in May 1998. Although the potentially more cooperative India-Russia-China strategic triangle first proposed by Russian prime minister Evgeny Primakov in December 1998 and reiterated during Russian president Vladimir Putin's visit to China and India in December 2002 is more interest-driven and less a zero-sum game, it is of lesser significance than the more competitive India—United States—China triangle, which has tended not only to be more unpredictable in its evolution but also has the potential of becoming a zero-sum game in reality. This is primarily because in a classic ménage a trois setting, both Beijing and New Delhi prize their relationship with Washington more than they do that with each other or even Moscow.

### 2nc india relations good

Strong US-India relations key to peace in Asia and global economic growth

Goswami 6/14/16

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Third, the new security challenges, like defending the freedom of Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs), especially given China’s growing assertiveness with regard to its maritime space, have provided the much needed urgency for both the United States and India to deepen their security relationship. While Washington is visibly concerned about growing Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea, India is equally anxious with Chinese territorial aggression in its land borders. China claims about 120,000 square kilometers of claimed Indian territory as its own.

Fourth, the issue of terrorism is a common concern shared by the United States and India. Both countries have been affected deeply by terrorist attacks; in India’s case, some of the attacks were engineered by the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) from Karachi, Pakistan, while Osama bin-Laden, the leader of al-Qaeda was discovered by the United States living in Abbottabad, a Pakistani military town. In his speech to Congress, Modi reiterated the significance of security cooperation between the U.S and India to fight terrorism, especially to deter the goals of groups like ISIS to spread their extremist ideology.

From the U.S. perspective, to have India as a trusted partner and ally is advantageous to its overall grand strategy. First, India with a population of 1.2 billion, living within a democratic set up, is politically structured to resonate with American values of democracy, individual liberty, and freedom. Henceforth, if America hopes to see a world with democratic values spreading, having India as a partner is definitely a force multiplier.

Second, India is fast emerging as an economic powerhouse and a military power. By 2030, India is projected to be the third largest economy in the world, with a projected GDP of $10 trillion, behind the United States’ GDP ($33 trillion) and China’s GDP ($34 trillion). India will become the largest economy in the Commonwealth, overtaking Britain. Hence, a deeper U.S.-India relationship will bolster trade, create jobs, and further enhance economic investments and growth in both countries.

Third, the United States needs to share the burdens of regulating the “global commons” based on international norms and rules. This is especially critical in the Asia-Pacific region. Who could provide a better partnership in this aspect but India, with a growing military capability and fast-emerging naval power? India’s defense budget for the year 2015-2016 was $40 billion, ranking it amongst the top militaries in the world. Significantly, the U.S-India military relationship is on the upswing. George Holding, a Republican from North Carolina, introduced the U.S.-Defense Technology and Partnership Act legislation in the House of Representatives, which elevates India to the same level as Washington’s NATO allies as well as treaty partners for defense sales notifications. In 2015, the Department of Defense (DoD) established the India Rapid Reaction Cell (IRRC) geared toward removing obstacles for technology sharing with India. Military exercises between the United States and India have increased exponentially over the last few years, aimed at creating interoperability between the two militaries, especially in the advent of responding to conflicts in the Asia-Pacific, piracy, and humanitarian disaster relief. There are talks for joint U.S.-India naval patrols in the Indian Ocean as well as the disputed South China Sea. In January 2015, during President Barack Obama’s visit to India, both countries signed a strategic vision statement for the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean in which freedom of Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs), including in the South China Sea was identified as of priority.

Strong relations solve inevitable Asian war

Richard L. **Armitage et al 10**, Deputy Secretary of State from March 2001 to February 2005, “Natural Allies”, October, <http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Natural%20Allies_ArmitageBurnsFontaine.pdf>

The U.S. relationship with India should be rooted in shared interests and values and should not be simply transactional or limited to occasional collaboration. India’s rise to global power is**, we believe,** in America’s strategic interest. As a result, the United States should not only seek a closer relationship with India, but actively assist its further emergence as a great power. U.S. interests in a closer relationship with India include: Ensuring a stable Asian and global balance of power. • Strengthening an open global trading system. • Protecting and preserving access to the global commons (air, sea, space, and cyber realms). • Countering terrorism and violent extremism. • Ensuring access to secure global energy resources. • Bolstering the international nonproliferation regime. • Promoting democracy and human rights. • Fostering greater stability, security and economic prosperity in South Asia, including in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. A strong U.S.-India strategic partnership will prove indispensable to the region’s continued peace and prosperity. Both India and the United States have a vital interest in maintaining a stable balance of power in Asia. Neither seeks containment of China, but the likelihood of a peaceful Chinese rise increases if it ascends in a region where the great democratic powers are also strong. Growing U.S.-India strategic ties will ensure that Asia will not have a vacuum of power and will make it easier for both Washington and New Delhi to have productive relations with Beijing. In addition, a strengthened relationship with India, a natural democratic partner, will signal that the United States remains committed to a strong and enduring presence in Asia. The need for closer U.S.-India cooperation goes well beyond regional concerns. In light of its rise, India will play an increasingly vital role in addressing virtually all major global challenges. Now is the time to transform a series of bilateral achievements into a lasting regional and global partnership.

### Internal link to climate, green impacts

Cooperation with India key to solve climate change

Goswami 6/14/16

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Fourth, India is fast becoming a champion of renewables as its economy becomes more and more energy dependent. It is heavily investing in building its solar infrastructure. The aim is to support the Paris climate agreement and work toward a limited carbon footprint and a cleaner earth. It has also enacted a National Offshore Wind Energy policy, while at the same time aiming to achieve renewable energy goals by 2022. Both Modi and Obama pledged to ratify the Paris agreement by the end of this year, an urgent need that has risen to ensure that the treaty enters force quickly, given that the Republican presumptive presidential candidate for president, Donald Trump, has threatened to renegotiate the Treaty if he becomes president next year. If India ratifies the treaty, this will ensure that the requirement of ratification by at least 55 parties of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) with 55 percent of global emissions, mandatory for the treaty to enter force, is met. Nuclear energy for renewables has also been bolstered by an agreement between the United States and India that facilitates Westinghouse to build six commercial nuclear reactors in India by June 2017. This boosts profits for Westinghouse, while at the same time, bringing about closer nuclear energy cooperation, put in place by the 2005 Indo-U.S. nuclear deal signed by former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and former President George W. Bush.

## Internet Censorship Module

### Internet Censorship Module – 1NC

Enhancing relations with China gives the US leverage to end domestic internet censorship

Eades 13

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Combating internet censorship in China and helping Chinese internet users evade government censorship and surveillance has been identified as an important goal for U.S. foreign policy. The Congressional Research Service published detailed reports on this matter in 2010 and 2012. In 2010 a group of five U.S. senators publicly urged the State Department to step up support of organizations working to help users in China and other countries circumvent internet restrictions.

In 2013 the Broadcasting Board of Governors published an anti-censorship fact sheet outlining various tools for circumventing internet censorship, Freedom House published a report on methods of internet control used by the Chinese government and a review of censorship circumvention tools available to users in China and other countries, and the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs published an evaluation of U.S. government initiatives on Chinese censorship. Further information on internet censorship, counter-censorship efforts, and censorship circumvention tools for Chinese users may be found at the OpenNet Initiative, Electronic Frontier Foundation, China Digital Times, Radio Free Asia and Floss Manuals.

Netroots cyberactivist groups have also made efforts to help Chinese internet users break through the Great Firewall. Prominent among these is GreatFire, which monitors and provides updates on Chinese government censorship, and creates cloud-hosted mirror sites for those blocked in China. GreatFire’s sister site, FreeWeibo, allows users to search for terms blocked on Chinese microblog site Weibo, the government-censored equivalent of Twitter in China. Global hacktivist group Anonymous has also made efforts to extend its reach into China, pledging to take down the Great Firewall, hacking hundreds of Chinese government websites, and even helping to expose Chinese military hackers who had penetrated U.S. computer systems.

GreatFire, FreeWeibo, and the Anonymous China page at Twitter are, of course, all blocked in China. The latter has seen no activity in over a year. Groups like this also operate on a volunteer basis with limited resources, which limits their impact in China.

Official U.S. efforts to help Chinese internet users circumvent government censorship have also had limited impact, perhaps because they haven’t been pursued aggressively enough or with sufficient resources, or perhaps because America’s own democracy promotion efforts have been harmed by revelations of U.S. global surveillance activities and other recent blows to America’s image around the world. Chinese internet users might be reticent about using censorship circumvention tools provided by a government they also fear might be spying on them.

America’s global image is hardly beyond repair, however, and there are many non-governmental groups such as those mentioned above with which the U.S. government could coordinate democracy promotion and internet freedom efforts in China and other countries. America possesses soft-power resources that, if fully employed, the Great Firewall of China would find difficult to withstand.

Internet censorship is key to CCP stability

MacKinnon 09

REBECCA MacKINNON, FELLOW, OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE, AND ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, JOURNALISM AND MEDIA STUDIES CENTRE, THE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA, February 27, 2009, "DOES CHINA HAVE A STABILITY PROBLEM?", http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg48223/html/CHRG-111hhrg48223.htm

As with everything in China, positives and negatives tend to exist simultaneously, which makes studying China particularly interesting. That is certainly the case with the Internet and sociopolitical change in China. I think in the West we tend to focus on the relationship between the Internet and China as sort of more as the negative side, that it's a challenge to the regime, that it enables a platform--a very new platform--for the airing of grievances, for exposing official abuse and protest.

But the Chinese Government has so far managed, through censorship and manipulation, to stop localized incidents from metastasizing into national movements. This is in part due to the Chinese Government's success--while technically censorship is not perfect, it works well enough when combined with surveillance and law enforcement that dissent that is expressed on the Internet and is expressed every day does not get turned into nationwide political movements, for the most part, or they are nipped in the bud before they can turn into specific action.

Another point is that, although the economic crisis, as Charlotte mentioned, poses a particular challenge to China this year, and we have this anniversary year with the 20th anniversary of the 1989 crackdown, and many other anniversaries coming up, the Chinese Communist Party has really displayed an ability to learn and adapt to the Internet age and has been experimenting with innovative new approaches to using the Internet as a tool for maintaining legitimacy.

Party instability causes nuclear lash-out

Bremmer 14

Ian Bremmer is President of Eurasia Group, David Gordon, a former director of policy planning in the US State Department, is Chairman and Head of Research at Eurasia Group, Project Syndicate, February 14, 2014, "China’s Risky Reforms", http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ian-bremmer-and-david-gordon-caution-that-the-leadership-s-proposed-reforms-heighten-the-risk-of-instability-at-home-and-abroad

These scenarios are highly unlikely in 2014. But early signals suggest that if trouble develops, the party will choose a crackdown over concessions, and there is no guarantee that party unity will hold in such a scenario.

For outsiders, the reform process also poses risks that extend well beyond the global economic fallout of a sharp Chinese slowdown. The country’s neighbors, particularly Japan, have the most to fear. If reforms become broadly unpopular or expose dangerous divisions within the leadership, the government will have good reason to divert public attention from controversies at home by picking fights abroad. Frictions between China and the Philippines, Vietnam, and others in the South China Sea persist, but confrontations with Japan, including over territorial disputes in the East China Sea, are more likely to cause the most damage.

No one in power in either country wants a war, but diplomatic dust-ups between China and Japan, the world’s second and third largest economies, respectively, have already taken a toll on their commercial relations. In particular, Japanese companies operating in China have sustained significant reputational and financial damage during recent episodes of trouble between the two governments.

Conflict with the United States is unlikely for the moment. At such a delicate time internally, China would gain nothing from antagonizing the US. But trouble with US allies, particularly Japan, could draw the US into a fight that it would strongly prefer to avoid.

### 2nc link – US-Sino relations end censorship

The advantage means that the US successfully convinces China tear down the firewall

Smith 15

Charlie Smith, pseudonymous spokesman for GreatFire.org, an organization which monitors and circumvents Chinese censorship, Foreign Policy, September 24, 2015, “Can the United States and China Make Peace in Cyberspace?”, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/24/can-the-united-states-and-china-make-peace-in-cyberspace/

If Washington plays its cards right during Xi’s visit, it could secure China’s promise in working together to deter cyber attacks while finally making the decision to ramp up their efforts to tear down the great firewall. The U.S. government has invested in many Internet freedom projects — now is the time to make sure they have what they need to bring down the world’s most sophisticated censorship apparatus. Beat online censorship in China and you can beat it anywhere. As an added benefit, this would also open the market for the thousands of global Internet and media companies who have seen their websites blocked by the Chinese authorities.

Relations are leveraged to weaken Chinese internet censorship

Tsai 11

Katherine Tsai, Duke University School of Law, J.D./LL.M. cum laude, Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, 2011, “HOW TO CREATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CASE OF INTERNET FREEDOM IN CHINA”, Vol 21:401

State actors can also choose retaliatory actions subtler than outright economic or military sanction. “Subtle” retaliation takes advantage of a symbiotic relationship between China and the United States. The United States must condition an attractive benefit upon the implementation of internet freedom within Chinese borders. This method is desirable, because China has already expressed interest in maintaining cooperation with the United States.128 Arvind Ganesan of Human Rights Watch has noted that the challenge of promoting internet freedom as a key human rights issue “will be to . . . incorporat[e] internet freedom into diplomacy, trade policy, and meaningful pressure on companies to act responsibly.”129 In other words, if the United States can tie internet freedom to issues important to China, then the United States may convince China that internet freedom is crucial to the success of China’s other goals.130

### A-to “china won’t change”

Pressure now fails BUT renewed US soft power with China will be sufficient

James Zimmerman, Junior Fellow at the Institute of the Study of Diplomacy, supported by Georgetown’s Yahoo! International Values, Communications, Technology and Global Internet Fellowship Fund, 2/6/2013, Evaluating US Government Initiatives on Chinese Censorship, journal.georgetown.edu/evaluating-us-government-initiatives-on-chinese-censorship-james-zimmerman/

A second conclusion is that there are limits to the effectiveness of US policies that attempt to alter Chinese domestic policies. In the case of potential WTO action, it is unlikely that China would change its censorship regime even if it were found to be in violation of its WTO commitments. The concern for domestic political stability overrides any potential costs due to noncompliance with a panel ruling. Such attempts by the US to alter Chinese censorship policies will likely be met with strong resistance, as China balks at any actions that attempt to challenge its sovereignty.

While these three censorship initiatives demonstrate the limits of US Government effectiveness on this issue, there are also opportunities. The US Government can be an effective agent of soft power if its actions are aligned with its words. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton presented a vision of “one Internet, one global community, and a common body of knowledge that benefits and unites us all.”[31] While US policies are not always consistent with this vision, this message may resonate with netizens around the world who use the Internet as a tool for collaboration. Perhaps the best Internet freedom policy for the United States is to serve as a role model for online freedom and netizens’ rights. In this way, the United States may inspire Internet users in China to advocate for increased freedoms, as ultimately, any impetus to change Chinese policies will likely come from within their system.

High US credibility with China causes effective pressure on censorship

Richard Fontaine, President of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), September 2014, Bringing Liberty Online: Reenergizing the Internet Freedom Agenda in a Post-Snowden Era, http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS\_BringingLibertyOnline\_Fontaine.pdf

A glance at the past 12 months reveals a disturbing trend. In Turkey, for example, after its high court overturned a ban on Twitter, the government began demanding that the company quickly implement orders to block specific users. Ankara also blocked YouTube after a surreptitious recording of the country’s foreign minister surfaced, and it has dramatically increased its takedown requests to both Twitter and Google.43 Russia has begun directly censoring the Internet with a growing blacklist of websites, and under a new law its government can block websites that encourage people to participate in unauthorized protests.44 Chinese social media censorship has become so pervasive that it constitutes, according to one study, “the largest selective suppression of human communication in the history of the world.”45 China has also begun assisting foreign countries, including Iran and Zambia, in their efforts to monitor and censor the Internet.46 Vietnam has enacted a new law making it illegal to distribute digital content that opposes the government.47 Venezuela has blocked access to certain websites and limited Internet access in parts of the country.48 A robust, energetic American Internet freedom agenda is most needed at the very moment that that agenda has come under the greatest attack. Reenergizing the Agenda Precisely because the Internet is today such a contested space, it is vitally important that the United States be actively involved in promoting online freedom. America’s Internet freedom efforts accord with the country’s longstanding tradition of promoting human rights, including freedoms of expression, association and assembly. And it represents a bet: that access to an open Internet can foster elements of democracy in autocratic states by empowering those who are pressing for liberal change at home. While the outcome of that bet remains uncertain, there should be no doubt about which side the United States has chosen. Reenergizing the Internet freedom agenda begins with acknowledging that the United States must promote that agenda even as it continues to engage in electronic surveillance aimed at protecting national security. The U.S. government will simply have to endure some significant amount of continuing criticism and opposition. At the same time, it should continue to draw a sharp distinction between surveillance for national security purposes (in which all governments engage) and monitoring as a means of political repression (which democracies oppose). To those who see no distinction between American surveillance and that of autocracies, government officials should point out that key legal guarantees matter: the U.S. Constitution’s first amendment protects against censorship and political repression at home, while in autocratic systems such safeguards are nonexistent or not enforceable.49 As the United States continues its significant efforts, described above, to further the Internet freedom agenda, there are additional steps it should take to refocus and reenergize the effort: CALL ON FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS TO EMBRACE SURVEILLANCE PRINCIPLES While an international convention regulating electronic spying is nearly inconceivable, the principles already articulated by U.S. government officials represent an important effort to distinguish between American surveillance and the efforts of repressive governments. Given the active surveillance programs of democracies and autocracies alike, the United States should call on other governments to embrace similar principles, or to explain why they are unwilling to do so. ENSURE THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CONDUCTS COMPREHENSIVE COST/BENEFIT ANALYSES OF SURVEILLANCE DECISIONS It is now clear that decisions made in the intelligence community about surveillance can have profound implications for the Internet freedom agenda as executed by other agencies. Government officials should ensure that all costs – including the costs if clandestine efforts are discovered – are considered when making surveillance decisions, with input from all relevant stakeholders. Given the linkages between surveillance and Internet freedom, a more unified interagency deliberation process is required. ENHANCE THE TRANSPARENCY OF U.S. GOVERNMENT DATA REQUESTS The United States should provide more publiclyaccessible information on its requests for user data, whether via requests to U.S. or multinational companies, or abroad through mutual legal assistance treaties. Making more hard information available about the true scope of U.S. government data requests may help reduce the degree of political distrust that currently prevails. SEEK CORPORATE TRANSPARENCY The flip side to increased transparency by the U.S. government is greater provision of information by the corporate recipients of data requests. Transparency reports now voluntarily offered by companies such as Facebook, Verizon, Comcast, Google, Microsoft and Vodafone on the scope of government demands for users’ data could provide a model for other companies. As companies seek greater transparency from governments, they should provide it as well, including information on their sales to repressive countries of Internet-related products and services. ARTICULATE THE CONNECTION BETWEEN INTERNET FREEDOM AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY Online commerce requires a basic level of security and free flow of online information in order to operate properly. U.S. officials should weave the economic argument into all of their appeals for greater Internet freedom and should present evidence that Internet repression imposes an economic cost. EMPLOY TRADE AGREEMENTS The Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership represent two key opportunities to further the Internet freedom agenda. Some of America’s negotiating partners will seek to use privacy concerns to block access by U.S. technology companies to foreign markets. The United States should oppose such moves and insist on provisions guaranteeing the free flow of online information across borders. USE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY While perhaps the last thing American policymakers wish to do in the wake of the Snowden scandal is to contest Internet freedom before foreign publics, they might be surprised at receptiveness to the message, if not the messenger. A recent poll, for instance, revealed widespread opposition to online censorship in developing countries; majorities in nearly all of those surveyed said that it is important for people to access the Internet without government censorship.50 U.S. officials and diplomatic personnel overseas should engage in public diplomacy to help bolster the constituency that understands the importance of a free Internet. The International Telecommunication Union Plenipotentiary scheduled for fall 2014 in Busan, South Korea, represents an important moment in the fight for Internet freedom. At this meeting, the first ITU treaty-writing conference since the Snowden revelations became public, the world’s democracies and autocracies will once again con- test who – if anyone – should control the online space. China, Russia, Iran and others will call for “Internet sovereignty,” claiming the right of govern- ments to determine the content of Internet flows within their territories.51 Democracies may be divided; it remains unclear whether countries such as Brazil and Germany will embrace the Internet governance status quo or will realign with states opposing American positions. Now, then, is a crucial time for the United States to reenergize its approach to Internet freedom. As technology entrepreneur Marc Andreessen recently said, given the loss of trust in the United States following the Snowden disclosures, it remains an open question whether in five years the Internet will operate as it does today.52 Such concerns may turn out to be overdrawn. But with the future of online freedom at stake in decisions made by governments, corporations and individuals today, it is vital for the United States, despite all of the complications and difficulties of the past year, once again to take the lead in defense of Internet freedom.

Even if censorship is in China’s interest, good relations create a reputational cost that changes their censorship policies

Jaclyn Kerr, Georgetown University Ph.D. Candidate, Stanford University Predoctoral Fellow, 10/16/14, The Digital Dictator’s Dilemma: Internet Regulation and Political Control in Non-Democratic States, http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/kerr\_-\_cisac\_seminar\_-\_oct\_2014\_-\_digital\_dictators\_dilemma.pdf

This paper uses a mixed-method approach to analyze global patterns of Internet policy adoption across hybrid and authoritarian regimes, and to offer a preliminary model of key causal factors and processes influencing policy choice. Large-N analysis identifies global patterns of Internet policies, demonstrating that regime-type alone is an important but by itself inadequate indicator of policy choice. While policies regulating or restricting online freedoms of speech, media, access to information, or association often parallel their “offline” equivalents, such “online-offline policy-linkage” is only part of the picture. Even among nondemocratic regimes with similar levels of Internet penetration, we see fairly dramatic variation in how these technologies are regulated. Examining factors which could make states of similar non-democratic regime types more or less likely to protect or restrict freedom of the Internet and networked technologies, I argue that regimes approach these policy decisions as a sort of “dictator’s dilemma,” in which they must balance between the domestic and international reputation-costs and lost economic opportunities related to restricting their Internet and their perception of the potential stability risks they face by allowing it to continue to grow unfettered. Noting patterns of policy clustering within regions and amongst states sharing similar cultural values, I suggest that several diffusion and learning mechanisms are also playing significant roles in the spread of particular regulatory approaches.

### 2nc censorship good – promotes Chinese stability

Chinese Internet policy allows dissent, while eliminating mass mobilization tools that cause CCP collapse

Elisabetta Meconcelli, Int'l Center for Southern Europe, 10/22/14, Political Impact of Censorship in China, www.icse-co.org/political-impact-of-censorship-in-china/

China’s attitude towards strengthening control of Internet has come a long way that lasted twenty years and the main reasons for this kind of policy measures are widely ascribed to the Communist administration’s quest of consolidation of national sovereignty, improvement of economic prosperity and minimization of negative political impacts. The agency in charge of controlling the cyberspace is the Bureau of Internet Affairs, which in turn is regulated by the most powerful monitoring body of the People’s Republic of China: the Communist Party’s Central Propaganda Department (CPD), which releases specific guidelines and directives covering politically sensitive topics – such as protests, like in Tibet and Taiwan. Chinese law in fact includes media regulations with unspecified references to State Secrets concept that authorities use to claim as infringements to those contents considered harmful to the stability of the government. Hence the definition of State Secrets in China remains ambiguous. Moreover many international reports in the last years show how China is undergoing a process of growing demand for information that is testing the tight government’s control over the media, but the lack of private news agencies – only state agencies can own media in China – shall ensure that this demand is kept under control. Indeed Xinhua, the state news agency is considered a propaganda tool by press freedom organizations. Although the fear of the Chinese Government is related to the country opening to the type of freedoms that could lead to the Communist Party of China’s downfall, the purpose of social media censorship, regardless of content, does not aim to delete total Web dissent, but only to eliminate the elements with the greatest potential for collective mobilization of citizens. What the Chinese Government decided is to leave a minimum threshold of freedom for its people, in order to immobilize collective action by cutting social ties. Starting from these assumptions the investigation on the political impact of censorship in China can be divided into two types of analysis: one related to the domestic policy impact and one related to the foreign policy impact, or rather to the external point of view about Chinese Government’s media censorship policy. The impact on domestic policy is actually very low, and this is not due to the lack of Internet access – China has more online population than North America and Europe combined – but to the Party skills in bending technologies to its own purposes and adapting the Web to the necessities of its own people. The national Government also works closely with trusted domestic private Internet companies. Most of them are clones of Western ones, in order to create an online closed system, or a “giant cage” called the Great Firewall. “Undesirable” foreign websites such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube are replaced by their Chinese counterpart such as the search engine Baidu, the internet-services portal Tencent, the Chinese Facebook Renren, and the Twitter-like micro-blogging service Weibo. As many other times in the history of the Asian Nation, China decided to rely on its own internal consumer base: regardless of the partial online isolation from the rest of the world, the Chinese Communist Party uses this kind of constraint so that the population become discouraged to try and find sources of information other than the official or allowed ones. The Chinese Government employs a vast range of methods to induce journalists and bloggers to censor themselves rather than risk punishment: they could face reprisals in the workplace, such as dismissals and demotion, or prison terms. Even if China seems to have reached a balance point with its internal centrifugal forces, the asymmetric power given by Internet, which dilutes the might of the State and acts as a force for democracy, is still able to erode all the efforts lavished by the authoritarian state. A lot of news reports of so-called dissidents show how censorship is still an open issue for many people: Tan Zuoren was sentenced to five years in prison for drawing attention to government corruption and poor construction of school buildings that collapsed and killed thousands of children during the 2008 earthquake in Sichuan province. Publicizing the CPD guidelines also entails punishment, because they are classified as “State Secrets”. Indeed an evident example is the case of Shi Tao, a journalist released after eight years of jail for posting an online summary describing the CPD‘s instructions for how to report the fifteen-year anniversary of Tiananmen Square events. Specific material deemed a threat to political stability such as controversial photos, search terms, or particular mobile applications are also banned.

Internet freedom threatens regime stability—online repression neutralizes that

Jaclyn Kerr, Georgetown University Ph.D. Candidate, Stanford University Predoctoral Fellow, 10/16/14, The Digital Dictator’s Dilemma: Internet Regulation and Political Control in Non-Democratic States, http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/kerr\_-\_cisac\_seminar\_-\_oct\_2014\_-\_digital\_dictators\_dilemma.pdf

Today a growing number of observers stress the extent to which the “liberation” argument must be leavened with a fair consideration of the varieties of levels, forms, and agents of control now present to regulate the use of cyberspace. Contrary to the early web idealists who believed the Internet could not be regulated, contemporary Internet scholars point to a growing list of “[ever-more] sophisticated cyberspace controls” (Deibert and Rohozinski 2010). Plotting the course from the early laissez-faire days of the 1990s “‘dot-com’ boom,” Deibert and Rohozinski have explained how “growing recognition of serious risks in cyberspace” – ranging from malicious software and cyber warfare to copyright and intellectual property infringement concerns – has “led to a wave of securitization efforts” that have in-turn given greater legitimacy to “government intervention in cyberspace more generally—including in countries whose regimes may be more interested in self-preservation than in property protections.” While “more than forty countries, including many democracies, now engage in Internet-content filtering,” the authors explain that many “nextgeneration controls” go beyond filtering, aiming more at “inculcating norms, inducing compliant behavior, and imposing rules of the road” (Deibert and Rohozinski 2010, 49). As Daniel Drezner, Evgeny Morozov and other “cyber-realists” have suggested, today, in some settings, it is unclear which is more empowered by the Internet: the power of civil society and protest movements to stand up to the state or the coercive control abilities of governments (Drezner 2010, Morozov 2011). Clearly much depends on the particular regulatory and restriction environment. The approaches employed by governments to restrict or control Internet access and content have greatly expanded over the last decade. While both democracies and non-democracies have moved towards greater regulation, different types of non-democratic regimes have particularly cultivating a wide variety of technical and regulatory approaches in their efforts to control the influence of the Internet within their societies. These restrictions are not limited to the most closed authoritarian regimes, and they are not limited to keyword filtering or site blocking. While some of the most closed authoritarian regimes have attempted to completely cut their citizens off from the global Internet (e.g. North Korea), and others have implemented strict filtering and blocking regimes aimed to prevent their citizens from accessing content concerning any sensitive political or social issues and in some cases blocking their use of internationally popular social media sites (e.g. China, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Ethiopia, Thailand, Singapore), other countries have employed a variety of different approaches – some of them less obvious – to control content or access to particular materials or at particular moments. These include, for example, cutting off the Internet or other ICT networks entirely at critical moments (e.g. Egypt in January 2011), slowing Internet traffic (e.g. Iran in 2009), ensuring high costs for Internet access to limit the number of users, or the use of what Deibert, Rohozinski, and their OpenNet Initiative colleagues have called “second-generation” or “next-generation controls” (Deibert and Rohozinski 2010; Deibert et al. 2008, 2010, 2011; Murdoch and Roberts 2013; Crete-Nishihata et al. 2013; Pearce and Kendzior 2012; Howard et al. 2011; Milner 2006; Drezner 2010). In his discussion of the influence of ICTs on the relative power of states and civil society, Dan Drezner details some of the specific innovations that have enabled “repressive states ... to control information technologies more effectively than previously thought [,]” in spite of the growth of the technological tools available to citizens. Here, he points to the new “[t]echnical measures” that have emerged “to regulate the internet[,] include[ing] the creation of firewalls and proxy servers, routers, and software filters to block content labeled as undesirable.” He also points out the employment of “[n]on-technical measures” such as “the imprisonment of relevant individuals, active policing, high taxation of internet access, and pressuring internet service providers (ISPs).” Another issue seems to be the relative willingness (or unwillingness) of authoritarian governments to make the Internet widely available to their citizens. Controlling for economic development levels, a number of studies have shown that more repressive regimes have lower Internet usage rates. Beilock and Dimitrova, for example, “found that countries with lower Freedom House scores for civil liberties had significantly lower internet usage[,]” and Helen Milner’s 2006 study of Internet diffusion shows that “ceteris paribus, democracies permit much greater online access, both in terms of internet users per capita and internet hosts per capita” (Drezner 35, citing Beilock and Dimitrova 2003). This would seem to support the notion that some authoritarian regimes limit Internet infrastructure growth in order to retain control over their segment of the web. As Jack Goldsmith and Timothy Wu have argued, keeping Internet transaction costs high for users is another effective, if imperfect way of limiting the spread of inconvenient information (Goldsmith and Wu 2006; Drezner 2010). But, as Drezner points out, the control over the Internet is not just about minimizing Internet use or “crude” content filtering. Legal restrictions on web content, voluntary pledges administered to ISPs and web portal companies concerning what material they will disseminate, re-routing from foreign web service sites (such as search engines) to equivalent services provided by government owned companies, and the outright blocking of certain troublesome Web 2.0 social media applications all have permitted governments to retain a large amount of control over Internet content and uses, while simultaneously reaping the gains of foreign investment in information technologies. He points to Singapore as an example of a “nondemocratic state” that has “succeeded in restricting political content on the internet without sacrificing commercial possibilities” (Drezner 2010). This is the path of regimes “with a greater interest in maximizing economic growth” by avoiding crippling their ICT sectors, and it “has become the model for many East Asian governments,” he argues, “including China.” Authoritarian approaches to the Internet also appear to have grown increasingly pro-active and aggressive, with “coercive governments ... learning how to turn Web 2.0 technologies to their advantage.” This includes the growing use of: surveillance (the “monitoring of networking sites like LiveJournal” in Belarus that has prompted Evgeny Morozov to refer to social media as “a digital panopticon”), the use of online information to target activists or their families for persecution, and the use of “hackers [to] engage in cyber-attacks” (such as those that prompted Google’s 2010 departure from China – seeking supposedly to steal information about both intellectual property and the identities of Chinese rights activists) (Drezner 2010; Morozov 2011). Like Drezner, Deibert and Rohozinski and their collaborators also particularly stress the importance of the so-called “next-generation controls” – that go beyond more obvious approaches such as continuous siteblocking. The OpenNet Initiative’s 2010 book, Access Controlled: The Shaping of Power Rights and Rule in Cyberspace, analyzed Internet regulations in over three dozen countries to indicate growing levels of restrictiveness and growing use of next-generation controls (Deibert and Rohozinski 2010; Deibert et al. 2010). These include “legal measures,” “informal requests,” “outsourcing,” “just-in-time blocking,” “patriotic hacking,” and “targeted surveillance and social-malware attacks” (Deibert and Rohozinski 2010; Deibert et al. 2010). Table 1 (on the following page) provides a brief description of each of these types of measures. The existence of such a variety of “first” and “next” generation approaches clearly raises a question as to why different regimes have adopted different policy options and what is likely to influence these decisions further in the future. So far this question has attracted more theoretical discussion than empirical research. Most research that does exist so far on the subject of authoritarian Internet policy is more focused on examining and cataloguing the different approaches regimes are using to control the Internet, as opposed to seeking to explain the causal processes influencing regime adoption of these policies. One theme that comes up frequently in the existing literature discussing authoritarian and hybrid regime Internet policy is the constraint imposed on some – if not all – states by a “dictator’s dilemma” situation that rulers face in determining whether or not to restrict Internet access or control its content. While these regimes might worry about the impact of new networked technologies on their control over society, they might also face significant costs in opting to restrict the use of these technologies. In non-democratic settings, growing Internet use is often thought to have significant impacts on patterns of communication, informationsharing, and civil organizing that can in turn impact state-society relations. It can potentially, for example, facilitate more rapid spread of information, increase preference revelation and shared awareness of grievance amongst citizens, heighten the ease and flexibility of protest mobilization, allow activists to bypass state media reaching new audiences, permit the development of new online protest tactics, and strengthen antiregime organizational capacity. All of these changes might indeed appear to strengthen the hand of society and threaten the regime’s stability. But regimes must weigh such concerns against the economic and legitimacy costs of restricting the new technologies. Economically, the costs of curtailing Internet use or content can be potentially significant, reducing a country’s ICT sector development and cutting it off from many of the benefits of participation in the global economy. Depending how visible and widely noted such policies are, they can also reflect quite negatively on a regime’s international reputation; what is more, they can also actually further reduce a regime’s support at home. While existing literature addresses such dilemmas and their potential influence on Internet policy decisions, it tends to gloss over how these trade-offs and their results might differ in particular contexts. Rather, the observation of such trade-offs has led different authors to reach opposite general conclusions concerning the likely resulting policy trends. While some suggest that the potential for economically viable high-control environments such as Singapore or China has shepherded the way for future global developments, others suggest that the associated economic and legitimacy prices will ultimately avert or undermine the most draconian policy choices. While I agree with these authors that a “dictator’s dilemma” model can play an important role in the conceptualization of state policy choices, such variation in expected outcomes suggests the limits of a universal application of such a model without consideration of differences across states and over time. The costs and benefits of adoption will vary across states due to their specific characteristics, values, and international relationships. They will also vary across time, depending on changes in domestic and global context and policy trends.

Unfettered internet protests cause political and economic collapse - Internet control ensures slow and controlled reform

Economou 11

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It is 2 P.M., and a group of young, would-be protesters are being led away by Beijing police from the local McDonalds. Inspired by the Jasmine Revolutions taking place across the Middle East, these protesters were less fortunate than their Arab counterparts. Their efforts, planned largely through the Internet, were swiftly curtailed when they were discovered by the Beijing authorities. On Sunday, February 20, the protests planned to unfold across China never occurred—the “revolution” was over before it began. To China’s leaders, however, the problem remains, because as long as the Internet flourishes in their country the threat of political reform will persist.

A vocal proponent of Internet freedom, President Barack Obama has consistently stressed its importance in China. In a 2010 trip to China, Obama stated that access to information helps citizens hold their own governments accountable, generates new ideas, and encourages creativity and entrepreneurship. China’s leaders are not wholly averse to political reform and, in some instances, welcome it as a means to aid economic and political stability. In a 2010 speech, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao warned that China’s economy and national modernization process would be jeopardized if the country failed to undertake systemic political reform.

The Internet, however, presents a problem for China’s leaders as it encourages reform faster than the government prefers or has the time to adjust to. When the Internet was first introduced to China in 1994, it had 10,000 users. Today, that number has jumped to 210 million users and counting.

In confronting the Internet, China’s government has used both repression and compliance. One of the largest and most controversial methods of Internet repression used by the Chinese authorities is a government-sponsored program, aptly named the “Great Firewall of China.” The “Great Firewall” consists of an estimated 50,000 people, employed just to monitor and censor any websites deemed controversial. China’s government also relies on physical repression. At the annual National People’s Congress (NPC) in March, it was revealed that the new budget would include 624 billion yuan ($95 billion) for items related to law and order, a 13.8% increase from 2010. In the wake of the February 20 crackdown, this suggests that China’s leaders comprehend the impact the Internet is having on their society and are adjusting their security services accordingly.

Yet Beijing is also aware that repression alone will not solve the problem and has yielded small political concessions to stem public unrest. In 2003, for example, Chinese authorities responded to rising Internet chatter regarding an increase in rural poverty and issued a new administrative regulation entitled “Relief Methods for Vagrants and Beggars.” This repealed regulations that restricted migration to China’s cities as well as controversial police powers. Additionally, China’s current leaders, Wen Jiabao and President Hu Jintao,, have held a number of online dialogue sessions throughout the country as a means to speak to the people directly.

How China’s next leaders handle the Internet’s impact remains to be seen. The political ideology of both Xi Jinping, China’s next assumed president, and Li Keqiang, China’s next assumed prime minister, are largely opaque. Given the secretive nature of Chinese politics, analysts can only assume and search for clues in each leader’s past to predict how they will address the Internet and political reform. Regardless of the individual views they hold, China’s next leaders will still be stifled by a political system that neither welcomes nor is structured to handle significant change. China’s highest decision-making body, the nine-member Standing Politburo, and the 370-strong Central Committee are dominated by hard-line communists who are more concerned with maintaining stability than political reform.

Many of China’s leaders understand the value and necessity of reforms, but this initiative must come gradually and from the top, not the bottom, so as to maintain their country’s economic and political stability. And for good reason—according to a 2010 spring survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, 87 percent of Chinese said they were satisfied with the way things were going in their country. The same project also found that 74 percent believed their lives would be better in five years. China’s leaders want to maintain this optimistic sentiment among their people. Therefore, Americans should neither expect nor demand significant political or Internet reforms in China in the near future. Instead, the value of the Internet and the role it can play in Chinese society should continue to be gently advocated with the hope that one day China’s leaders will respond to the needs of their people and bring true reform to the government.

### 2nc china stability uniqueness

China censorship effective now—regime is durable

Emma Woollacott, Forbes, 9/29/14, Can China's Social Media Censorship Keep The Lid on Hong Kong Protests?, www.forbes.com/sites/emmawoollacott/2014/09/29/can-chinas-social-media-censorship-keep-the-lid-on-hong-kong-protests/

China is ramping up its internet censorship program, as pro-democracy protests sweep Hong Kong. It’s blocked Instagram for the first time, and is censoring results on the country’s largest search engine, Baidu, more than ever before. Demonstrators in the former British territory are calling for free elections, rather than being forced to pick from an approved list of candidates. But the protests are being pitched by the government as counter to mainstream public opinion, and the actions of a small number of extremists – and this spin appears to be working. Until now, Facebook-owned Instagram has managed to stay on the right side of the censors, having been seen as relatively harmless. Now, though, the thousands of photos of police using tear gas on peaceful protesters have apparently been too much for the government to take. While it’s still possible for Hong Kong users to post to the site, images are blocked in China and only viewable abroad. A message simply reads: “Can’t refresh feed.” Central to the block is the rallying cry “Occupy Central”, which has been used as a tag on Instagram and was also blocked as a search term on Weibo yesterday. Indeed, according to Weiboscope, a censorship monitoring project at the University of Hong Kong’s Journalism and Media Studies Center, the number of censored posts on Weibo rocketed five-fold over the weekend, so that over 150 per 10,000 posts are currently being deleted. “Hong Kong” is now the most widely-deleted search term on the site. It’s still possible to search for terms such as “Hong Kong protest” – indeed, stats indicate that such searches are some of the most popular in the country – it’s just that only pro-government results will be returned. As usual, the Chinese are finding ways round the social media bans, most notably through the use of FireChat, an app that uses Bluetooth connections to allow users to connect to each other directly over short distances. It’s put on more than 100,000 users in the last 24 hours, with protesters using it to coordinate their actions. Unfortunately, though, it has little take-up in the rest of the country. Meanwhile, and unsurprisingly, the mainstream Chinese press is toeing the party line, again keeping the mainland in the dark. More controversially, even the Wall Street Journal and Reuters have been accused of censoring their reports. Greatfire.org calls out both publications for failing to report on the protests in their local editions, while running stories as headline items in their US versions. The WSJ has strenuously denied the accusation. As a result of the increase in censorship, many mainland Chinese people are apparently unaware of the protests in Hong Kong. One Chinese newspaper has even run a photo of the demonstration with a caption suggesting it was a show of support for the electoral rules. Instead of sympathy, there’s a rising tide of nationalism, centered around the country’s 65th National Day on Wednesday. “Selfies with the Chinese flag” is a top trending topic on Weibo. China frequently tightens up its censorship when political tensions rise, most recently during the 25th anniversary of the Tianmen Square uprising in June. It usually succeeds in quelling discussion. “Opposition groups know well it’s impossible to alter the decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Hong Kong’s political reform plan,” asserts an editorial in the Communist party publication Global Times today. Unfortunately, that seems to be true, even when protest is widespread. In this case, where the cause of discontent is irrelevant to most of the population, that’s likely to be all the more true. We’re unlikely to see a Chinese Spring any time soon.

China contained now—Internet risks spark nationalist escalation and broad instability

Jessica Chen Weiss, The Flame of Chinese Nationalism, 9/17/14, The Flame of Chinese Nationalism, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/09/17/China\_nationalist\_protests\_control\_communist\_party\_japan\_powerful\_patriots

September 18 will mark 83 years since Japanese troops crossed into northeastern China, beginning the last chapter in China's self-described "national humiliation" at the hands of foreign powers. Memories of war with Japan remain raw in China. More than half of Chinese expect another conflict with their neighbor to the East. Since February, the Chinese government has announced three new annual memorial days to commemorate China's struggle against Japanese militarism. Meanwhile, China's propaganda machine has been operating at full speed since August, when TV networks were instructed to feature more patriotic content to celebrate China's resistance against Japan in World War II. So why haven't there been any major nationalist protests in China since 2012, when the largest wave of anti-Japanese protests to date flooded Chinese cities to commemorate the Sept. 18 anniversary? It's because explosions of popular nationalist anger are only selectively allowed. In May 2013, protesters who condemned Japanese proposals to revise the peace clause in its constitution were dispersed before they could reach the Japanese embassy. In December 2013, after Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited Yasukuni Shrine, which commemorates 14 A-class war criminals among Japanese war dead, protests in China were reportedly aborted due to government pressure. Even when Vietnamese protests against China's activities in the South China Sea escalated to violence in May 2014, killing several Chinese workers, Chinese media coverage was relatively muted and anti-Vietnamese protests failed to materialize. This isn't an innovation of recent vintage. After Japan arrested a Chinese trawler captain near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in Sept. 2010, Chinese authorities prevented large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations from taking place on the charged Sept. 18 anniversary days later. And popular demonstrations have never been allowed over the issue of Taiwan, which Beijing considers a rogue province and is perhaps the issue of greatest concern to Chinese nationalists. There can be tangible benefits to letting protests go forward. Just as the U.S. president sometimes blames Congress for tying his hands, so too do Chinese leaders point to nationalist sentiment and popular protests to justify their tough stance and refusal to compromise. Claims about the pressure of public opinion on Chinese foreign policy are more credible when the streets of Chinese cities are filled with demonstrators demanding that their government take a tougher stance. Examples abound of street protests enabling the Chinese government to show resolve. After U.S. planes bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during NATO airstrikes in 1999 -which U.S. authorities insist was unintentional -anti-U.S. demonstrations across China conveyed domestic outrage, substantiating the government's determination to stand up to the United States.\* (The Chinese gov­ernment stepped in to control the demonstrations on the second day, but only after the U.S. embassy was nearly overrun and the consul general's residence in the western city of Chengdu was set afire.) When Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council gained momentum in 2005, anti-Japanese demonstrations helped strengthen Chinese opposition to Japan's candidacy by showcasing popular anger over then-Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. In September 2012, popular anger over Japan's purchase of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea resulted in widespread demonstrations and online commentary calling for tougher measures -even war -to kick Japan out of the islands, reinforcing Beijing's opposition to the sale. Yet it is not easy for the Chinese government to turn nationalist anger on and off without real cost to its own legitimacy. Every time Chinese authorities step in to nip a protest in the bud, they do so at substantial cost and risk to the government's patriotic credentials. It is often unclear which is the lesser hazard: the danger to stability of allowing nationalist protest, or the legitimacy cost of stifling it. Even when the size of a potential protest appears small, the government faces a dilemma, knowing that repression can alienate nationalists and drive mobilization underground, while unchecked protests can escalate into broader unrest. Absent other avenues for political participation, "a single spark can start a prairie fire," as Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong famously noted. But Chinese authorities have themselves created the conditions that make the prairie particularly flammable. Collective memories of Japanese wartime atrocities in China, coupled with the Chinese education curriculum's focus on Japan, have helped nurture patriotism and nationalist convictions among new generations of Chinese youth. As a result, even without the aid of new propaganda, real anti-Japanese sentiments exist that leave the government vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy when it tamps down on protests while also claiming to defend the nation's interests. The more the Chinese government appears responsible for seeding nationalist sentiment, the less believably it can play the good cop in resisting extremist popular opinion. And while the marketplace for ideas in China has become more pluralistic and commercialized over the last three decades, censorship remains prevalent. Given limited chan­nels for political mobilization, citizens may seize the opportunity presented by nationalist protests to advance other objectives. The hazards created by these protests aren't limited to Beijing. Nationalist protests could destabilize China or force authorities to freeze on a hardline position. These are both shared risks, ones that outside actors have an incentive to mitigate -perhaps by tempering their public stance on sensitive questions and helping Beijing save face on high-profile issues. As former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger notes: "A prudent American leadership should balance the risks of stoking Chinese nationalism against the gains from short-term pressures." After the 2001 collision between a Chinese fighter jet and American EP-3 reconnaissance plane, for example, the Bush administration agreed on a face-saving compromise by conveying American remorse without admitting responsibility. So far, the Chinese government has managed to ride the proverbial tiger of nationalism without being thrown. But the global community should not be fooled by the recent calm. With several hundred million Internet and cell phone users and the rapid growth of social media, which often spreads nationalist sentiment far and fast, it's becoming more difficult for China to say "no" to nationalist protests. A public reared on patriotic education and determined to restore China's standing in the world -whether under this government or another one -is not as predictable or firmly under party control as outsiders might imagine.

### A-to “ccp structure fails”

CCP structure is solid

Li 13

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In November 2012, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held its 18th National Congress, setting in motion a once-in-a-decade transfer of power to a new generation of leaders. As expected, Xi Jinping took over as general secretary and will become the president of the People's Republic this March. The turnover was a smooth and well-orchestrated demonstration by a confidently rising superpower. That didn't stop international media and even some Chinese intellectuals, however, from portraying it as a moment of crisis. In an issue that was published before the beginning of the congress, for example, The Economist quoted unnamed scholars at a recent conference as saying that China is "unstable at the grass roots, dejected at the middle strata and out of control at the top." To be sure, months before the handover, the scandal surrounding Bo Xilai, the former party boss of the Chongqing municipality, had shattered the CCP's long-held facade of unity, which had underwritten domestic political stability since the Tiananmen Square upheavals in 1989. To make matters worse, the Chinese economy, which had sustained double-digit GDP growth for two decades, slowed, decelerating for seven straight quarters. China's economic model of rapid industrialization, labor-intensive manufacturing, large-scale government investments in infrastructure, and export growth seemed to have nearly run its course. Some in China and the West have gone so far as to predict the demise of the one-party state, which they allege cannot survive if leading politicians stop delivering economic miracles.

Such pessimism, however, is misplaced. There is no doubt that daunting challenges await Xi. But those who suggest that the CCP will not be able to deal with them fundamentally misread China's politics and the resilience of its governing institutions. Beijing will be able to meet the country's ills with dynamism and resilience, thanks to the CCP's adaptability, system of meritocracy, and legitimacy with the Chinese people. In the next decade, China will continue to rise, not fade. The country's leaders will consolidate the one party model and, in the process, challenge the West's conventional wisdom about political development and the inevitable march toward electoral democracy. In the capital of the Middle Kingdom, the world might witness the birth of a post-democratic future.

ON-THE-JOB LEARNING

The assertion that one-party rule is inherently incapable of self-correction does not reflect the historical record. During its 63 years in power, the CCP has shown extraordinary adaptability. Since its founding in 1949, the People's Republic has pursued a broad range of economic policies. First, the CCP initiated radical land collectivization in the early 1950s. This was followed by the policies of the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s and the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s to mid-1970s. After them came the quasi-privatization of farmland in the early 1960s, Deng Xiaoping's market reforms in the late 1970s, and Jiang Zemin's opening up of the CCP's membership to private businesspeople in the 1990s. The underlying goal has always been economic health, and when a policy did not work-for example, the disastrous Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution-China was able to find something that did: for example, Deng's reforms, which catapulted the Chinese economy into the position of second largest in the world.

On the institutional front as well, the CCP has not shied away from reform. One example is the introduction in the 1980s and 1990s of term limits for most political positions (and even of age limits, of 68–70, for the party's most senior leadership). Before this, political leaders had been able to use their positions to accumulate power and perpetuate their rules. Mao Zedong was a case in point. He had ended the civil wars that had plagued China and repelled foreign invasions to become the father of modern China. Yet his prolonged rule led to disastrous mistakes, such as the Cultural Revolution. Now, it is nearly impossible for the few at the top to consolidate long-term power. Upward mobility within the party has also increased.

In terms of foreign policy, China has also changed course many times to achieve national greatness. It moved from a close alliance with Moscow in the 1950s to a virtual alliance with the United States in the 1970s and 1980s as it sought to contain the Soviet Union. Today, its pursuit of a more independent foreign policy has once more put it at odds with the United States. But in its ongoing quest for greatness, China is seeking to defy recent historical precedents and rise peacefully, avoiding the militarism that plagued Germany and Japan in the first half of the last century.

As China undergoes its ten-year transition, calls at home and abroad for another round of political reform have increased. One radical camp in China and abroad is urging the party to allow multiparty elections or at least accept formal intraparty factions. In this view, only full-scale adversarial politics can ensure that China gets the leadership it needs. However sincere, these demands all miss a basic fact: the CCP has arguably been one of the most self-reforming political organizations in recent world history. There is no doubt that China's new leaders face a different world than Hu Jintao did when he took over in 2002, but chances are good that Xi's CCP will be able to adapt to and meet whatever new challenges the rapidly changing domestic and international environments pose. In part, that is because the CCP is heavily meritocratic and promotes those with proven experience and capabilities.

Meritocracy solves

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MAKING THE GRADE

China watchers in the West have used reports of corruption-compounded by sensational political scandals such as the Bo Xilai affair-to portray the ruling party as incurably diseased. The disease exists, to be sure, but the most important treatment is the party itself. As counterintuitive as it might seem to Westerners, the CCP, whose political preeminence is enshrined in the Chinese constitution, is one of the most meritocratic political institutions in the world.

Of the 25 members that made up the pre-18th-Congress Politburo, the highest ruling body of the CCP, only five (the so-called princelings) came from privileged backgrounds. The other 20, including the president, Hu, and the premier, Wen Jiabao, came from middle- or lower-class backgrounds. In the CCP's larger Central Committee, which was made up of more than 300 people, the percentage of people born into wealth and power was even smaller. The vast majority of those in government worked and competed their way through the ranks to the top. Admittedly, the new general secretary, Xi, is the son of a previous party leader. However, an overwhelming number of those who moved up the ranks this past fall had humbler beginnings.

So how does China ensure meritocracy? At the heart of the story is a powerful institution that is seldom studied in the West, the Organization Department of the CCP. This department carries out an elaborate process of bureaucratic selection, evaluation, and promotion that would be the envy of any corporation. Patronage continues to play a role, but by and large, merit determines who will rise through the ranks.

Every year, the government and its affiliated organizations recruit university graduates into entry-level positions in one of the three state-controlled systems: the civil service, state-owned enterprises, and government-affiliated social organizations such as universities or community programs. Most new recruits enter at the lowest level, or ke yuan. After a few years, the Organization Department reviews their performance and can promote them up through four increasingly elite managerial ranks: fu ke, ke, fu chu, and chu. The range of positions at these levels is wide, covering anything from running the health-care system in a poor village to attracting commercial investment in a city district. Once a year, the Organization Department reviews quantitative performance records for each official in each of these grades; carries out interviews with superiors, peers, and subordinates; and vets personal conduct. Extensive and frequent public opinion surveys are also conducted on questions ranging from satisfaction with the country's general direction to opinions about more mundane and specific local policies. Once the department has gathered a complete dossier on all the candidates, and has confirmed the public's general satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their performances, committees discuss the data and promote winners.

After this stage, public employees' paths diverge, and individuals can be rotated through and out of all three tracks (the civil service, state-owned enterprises, and social organizations). An official might start out working on economic policy and then move to a job dealing with political or social issues. He or she could go from a traditional government position to a managerial role in a state-owned enterprise or a university. In many cases, the Organization Department will also send a large number of promising officials abroad to learn best practices around the world. The likes of Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government and the National University of Singapore regularly host Chinese officials in their training programs.

Over time, the most successful workers are promoted again, to what are known as the fu ju and ju levels, at which point a typical assignment is to manage districts with populations in the millions or companies with hundreds of millions of dollars in revenues. To get a sense of how rigorous the selection process is, in 2012, there were 900,000 officials at the fu ke and ke levels and 600,000 at the fu chu and chu levels. There were only 40,000 at the fu ju and ju levels.

After the ju level, a very talented few move up several more ranks and eventually make it to the party's Central Committee. The entire process could take two to three decades, and most of those who make it to the top have had managerial experience in just about every sector of Chinese society. Indeed, of the 25 Politburo members before the 18th Party Congress, 19 had run provinces larger than most countries in the world and ministries with budgets higher than that of the average nation's government. A person with Barack Obama's pre-presidential professional experience would not even be the manager of a small county in China's system.

Xi's career path is illustrative. Over the course of 30 years, Xi rose from being a fu ke level deputy county chief in a poor village to party secretary of Shanghai and a member of the Politburo. By the time he made it to the top, Xi had already managed areas with total populations of over 150 million and combined GDPs of more than $1.5 trillion. His career demonstrates that meritocracy drives Chinese politics and that those who end up leading the country have proven records.

### 2nc ccp collapse bad

Prolonged internal crisis triggers CCP lash-out

Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs – Princeton, Asia Expert – CFR, ‘10

(Aaron, “Implications of the Financial Crisis for the US-China Rivalry,” *Survival*, Volume 52, Issue 4, August, p. 31 – 54)

Despite its magnitude, Beijing's stimulus programme was insufficient to forestall a sizeable spike in unemployment. The regime acknowledges that upwards of 20 million migrant workers lost their jobs in the first year of the crisis, with many returning to their villages, and 7m recent college graduates are reportedly on the streets in search of work.9 Not surprisingly, tough times have been accompanied by increased social turmoil. Even before the crisis hit, the number of so-called 'mass incidents' (such as riots or strikes) reported each year in China had been rising. Perhaps because it feared that the steep upward trend might be unnerving to foreign investors, Beijing stopped publishing aggregate, national statistics in 2005.10 Nevertheless, there is ample, if fragmentary, evidence that things got worse as the economy slowed. In Beijing, for example, salary cuts, layoffs, factory closures and the failure of business owners to pay back wages resulted in an almost 100% increase in the number of labour disputes brought before the courts.11 Since the early days of the current crisis, the regime has clearly been bracing itself for trouble. Thus, at the start of 2009, an official news-agency story candidly warned Chinese readers that the country was, 'without a doubt … entering a peak period of mass incidents'.12 In anticipation of an expected increase in unrest, the regime for the first time summoned all 3,080 county-level police chiefs to the capital to learn the latest riot-control tactics, and over 200 intermediate and lower-level judges were also called in for special training.13 Beijing's stimulus was insufficient At least for the moment, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) appears to be weathering the storm. But if in the next several years the economy slumps again or simply fails to return to its previous pace, Beijing's troubles will mount. The regime probably has enough repressive capacity to cope with a good deal more turbulence than it has thus far encountered, but a protracted crisis could eventually pose a challenge to the solidarity of the party's leadership and thus to its continued grip on political power. Sinologist Minxin Pei points out that the greatest danger to CCP rule comes not from below but from above. Rising societal discontent 'might be sufficient to tempt some members of the elite to exploit the situation to their own political advantage' using 'populist appeals to weaken their rivals and, in the process, open[ing] up divisions within the party's seemingly unified upper ranks'.14 If this happens, all bets will be off and a very wide range of outcomes, from a democratic transition to a bloody civil war, will suddenly become plausible. Precisely because it is aware of this danger, the regime has been very careful to keep whatever differences exist over how to deal with the current crisis within bounds and out of view. If there are significant rifts they could become apparent in the run-up to the pending change in leadership scheduled for 2012. Short of causing the regime to unravel, a sustained economic crisis could induce it to abandon its current, cautious policy of avoiding conflict with other countries while patiently accumulating all the elements of 'comprehensive national power'. If they believe that their backs are to the wall, China's leaders might even be tempted to lash out, perhaps provoking a confrontation with a foreign power in the hopes of rallying domestic support and deflecting public attention from their day-to-day troubles. Beijing might also choose to implement a policy of 'military Keynesianism', further accelerating its already ambitious plans for military construction in the hopes of pumping up aggregate demand and resuscitating a sagging domestic economy.15 In sum, despite its impressive initial performance, Beijing is by no means on solid ground. The reverberations from the 2008-09 financial crisis may yet shake the regime to its foundations, and could induce it to behave in unexpected, and perhaps unexpectedly aggressive, ways.

CCP responds to mass protest with diversionary wars

Bremmer 14

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If— or perhaps, when— there are bumps in the road, Beijing will try to divert public anger toward foreign targets. Xi Jinping’s first substantial foreign-policy move was to announce an Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea; that caters to widespread anti-Japanese sentiment within China. Should trouble emerge domestically, the Xi government might be willing to deflect attention by playing up this antagonism. On the other hand, in the longer run, if China implements its reform agenda successfully, it could empower the regime to project its regional influence still further.

# PROTECTIONISM + ECONOMY + HEGEMONY – NEG ANSWERS

## Protectionism Answers

### 1NC Frontline – Protectionism

#### Poor US practices won’t spark global protectionism– multilateral systems resilient

Drezner ‘12

(Professor International Politics Tufts University, ’12 (Daniel, October, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked” Council on Foreign Relations International Institutions and Global Governance)

Despite weaker U.S. power and leadership, the **global trade** regime **has remained resilient**— particularly when compared to the 1930s. This highlights another significant factor: the thicker institutional environment. There were very few multilateral economic institutions of relevance during the Great Depression. No multilateral trade regime existed, and international financial structures remained nascent. The last major effort to rewrite the global rules—the 1933 London Monetary and Economic Conference—ended in acrimony.60 Newly inaugurated president Franklin D. Roosevelt unilaterally took the United States off the gold standard, signaling an end to any attempt at multilateral cooperation. In contrast, the current institutional environment is much thicker, with status-quo policies focused on promoting greater economic openness. A panoply of preexisting informal and formal regimes was able to supply needed services during a time of global economic crisis. At a minimum, institutions like the G20 functioned as useful focal points for the major economies to coordinate policy responses. International institutions like the Bank of International Settlements further provided crucial expertise to rewrite the global rules of the game. Even if the Doha round petered out, the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism remained in place to coordinate and adjudicate monitoring and enforcement. Furthermore, the status-quo preference for each element of these regimes was to promote greater cross-border exchange within the rule of law. It is easier for international institutions to reinforce existing global economic norms than to devise new ones. Even if these structures were operating on autopilot, they had already been pointed in the right direction.

#### Singular protectionist actions would cascade across the globe

Ikenson ‘9

(Daniel, associate director for the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, “A Protectionism Fling: Why Tariff Hikes and Other Trade Barriers Will Be Short-Lived,” 3/12, http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/FTBs/FTB-037.html

A Little Perspective, Please Although some governments will dabble in some degree of protectionism, the combination of a sturdy rules-based system of trade and the economic self interest in being open to participation in the global economy will limit the risk of a protectionist pandemic. According to recent estimates from the International Food Policy Research Institute, if all WTO members were to raise all of their applied tariffs to the maximum bound rates, the average global rate of duty would double and the value of global trade would decline by 7.7 percent over five years.8 That would be a substantial decline relative to the 5.5 percent annual rate of trade growth experienced this decade.9 But, to put that 7.7 percent decline in historical perspective, the value of global trade declined by 66 percent between 1929 and 1934, a period mostly in the wake of Smoot Hawley's passage in 1930.10 So the potential downside today from what Bergsten calls "legal protectionism" is actually not that "massive," even if all WTO members raised all of their tariffs to the highest permissible rates. If most developing countries raised their tariffs to their bound rates, there would be an adverse impact on the countries that raise barriers and on their most important trade partners. But most developing countries that have room to backslide (i.e., not China) are not major importers, and thus the impact on global trade flows would not be that significant. OECD countries and China account for the top twothirds of global import value.11 Backsliding from India, Indonesia, and Argentina (who collectively account for 2.4 percent of global imports) is not going to be the spark that ignites a global trade war. Nevertheless, governments are keenly aware of the events that transpired in the 1930s, and have made various pledges to avoid protectionist measures in combating the current economic situation. In the United States, after President Obama publicly registered his concern that the "Buy American" provision in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act might be perceived as protectionist or could incite a trade war, Congress agreed to revise the legislation to stipulate that the Buy American provision "be applied in a manner consistent with United States obligations under international agreements." In early February, China's vice commerce minister, Jiang Zengwei, announced that China would not include "Buy China" provisions in its own $586 billion stimulus bill.12 But even more promising than pledges to avoid trade provocations are actions taken to reduce existing trade barriers. In an effort to "reduce business operating costs, attract and retain foreign investment, raise business productivity, and provide consumers a greater variety and better quality of goods and services at competitive prices," the Mexican government initiated a plan in January to unilaterally reduce tariffs on about 70 percent of the items on its tariff schedule. Those 8,000 items, comprising 20 different industrial sectors, accounted for about half of all Mexican import value in 2007. When the final phase of the plan is implemented on January 1, 2013, the average industrial tariff rate in Mexico will have fallen from 10.4 percent to 4.3 percent.13 And Mexico is not alone. In February, the Brazilian government suspended tariffs entirely on some capital goods imports and reduced to 2 percent duties on a wide variety of machinery and other capital equipment, and on communications and information technology products.14 That decision came on the heels of late-January decision in Brazil to scrap plans for an import licensing program that would have affected 60 percent of the county's imports.15 Meanwhile, on February 27, a new free trade agreement was signed between Australia, New Zealand, and the 10 member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to reduce and ultimately eliminate tariffs on 96 percent of all goods by 2020. While the media and members of the trade policy community fixate on how various protectionist measures around the world might foreshadow a plunge into the abyss, there is plenty of evidence that governments remain interested in removing barriers to trade. Despite the occasional temptation to indulge discredited policies, there is a growing body of institutional knowledge that when people are free to engage in commerce with one another as they choose, regardless of the nationality or location of the other parties, they can leverage that freedom to accomplish economic outcomes far more impressive than when governments attempt to limit choices through policy constraints.

#### Protectionism unlikely in the status quo

**Siles ‘14**

Gabriel Siles-Brügge, Lecturer in Politics at the University of Manchester, “Explaining the Resilience of Free Trade: The Smoot–Hawley Myth and the Crisis”, Review of International Political Economy, 21(3), Taylor & Francis

Despite the onset of the current economic crisis there has been **no significant move towards protectionism** amongst **most** of the world's economies. Although rational institutionalist explanations point to the role played by the constraining rules of the **W**orld **T**rade **O**rganisation, countries have largely remained open in areas where they have **not legally bound** their liberalisation. While accounts emphasising the increasing interdependence of global supply chains have some merit, I show that such explanations do not tell the full story, as integration into the global economy is not always associated with support for free trade during the crisis. In response, I develop a constructivist argument which highlights how particular ideas about the global trading system have become **rooted** in policy-making discourse, **mediating** the response of policy elites to protectionist pressures and temptations. Trade policy-makers and a group of leading economists have constructed an ideational imperative for continued openness (and for concluding the Doha Round, albeit less successfully) by drawing on a questionable reading of economic history (the Smoot–Hawley myth); by continually stressing protectionism's role as one of the causes of the Great Depression non-liberal responses to the current crisis have been all but ruled out by all except those willing to question the received wisdom.

#### Trade doesn’t solve war

Martin ‘8

(et. al. Phillipe, University of Paris 1 Pantheon—Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics, and Centre for Economic Policy Research; Thierry MAYER, University of Paris 1 Pantheon—Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics, CEPII, and Centre for Economic Policy Research, Mathias THOENIG, University of Geneva and Paris School of Economics, The Review of Economic Studies 75)

Does globalization pacify international relations? The “liberal” view in political science argues that increasing trade flows and the spread of free markets and democracy should limit the incentive to use military force in interstate relations. This vision, which can partly be traced back to Kant’s Essay on Perpetual Peace (1795), has been very influential: The main objective of the European trade integration process was to prevent the killing and destruction of the two World Wars from ever happening again.1 Figure 1 suggests2 however, that during the 1870–2001 period, the correlation between trade openness and military conflicts is not a clear cut one. The first era of globalization, at the end of the 19th century, was a period of rising trade openness and multiple military conflicts, culminating with World War I. Then, the interwar period was characterized by a simultaneous collapse of world trade and conflicts. After World War II, world trade increased rapidly, while the number of conflicts decreased (although the risk of a global conflict was obviously high). There is no clear evidence that the 1990s, during which trade flows increased dramatically, was a period of lower prevalence of military conflicts, even taking into account the increase in the number of sovereign states.

### Extensions - Singular protectionist acts won’t cascade across the globe

#### No constituency for protectionism

Rodrik ‘9

[Dani, Rafiq Hariri Professor of International Political Economy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. “ The Myth of Rising Protectionism,” http://relooney.fatcow.com/0\_New\_5973.pdf]

The reality is that the international trade regime has passed its greatest test since the Great Depression with flying colors. Trade economists who complain about minor instances of protectionism sound like a child whining about a damaged toy in the wake of an earthquake that killed thousands. Three things explain this remarkable resilience : ideas, politics , and institutions . Economists have been extraordinarily successful in conveying their message to policymakers – even if ordinary people still regard imports with considerable suspicion. Nothing reflects this better than how “protection” and “protectionists” have become terms of derision. After all, governments are generally expected to provide protection to its citizens. But if you say that you favor protection from imports , you are painted into a corner with Reed Smoot and Willis C. Hawley, authors of the infamous 1930 US tariff bill. But economists’ ideas would not have gone very far without significant changes in the underlying configuration of political interests in favor of open trade. For every worker and firm affected adversely by import competition, there is one or more worker and firm expecting to reap the benefits of access to markets abroad. The latter have become increasingly vocal and powerful, often represented by large multinational corporations. In his latest book, Paul Blustein recounts how a former Indian trade minister once asked his American counterpart to bring him a picture of an American farmer: “I have never actually seen one,” the minister quipped. “I have only seen US conglomerates masquerading as farmers.” But the relative docility of rank-and-file workers on trade issues must ultimately be attributed to something else altogether: the safety nets erected by the welfare state. Modern industrial societies now have a wide array of social protections – unemployment compensation, adjustment assistance, and other labor-market tools, as well as health insurance and family support – that mitigate demand for cruder forms of protection. The welfare state is the flip side of the open economy. If the world has not fallen off the protectionist precipice during the crisis, as it did during the 1930’s, much of the credit must go the social programs that conservatives and market fundamentalists would like to see scrapped. The battle against trade protection has been won – so far. But, before we relax, let’s remember that we still have not addressed the central challenge the world economy will face as the crisis eases: the inevitable clash between China’s need to produce an ever-growing quantity of manufactured goods and America’s need to maintain a smaller current-account deficit. Unfortunately, there is little to suggest that policymakers are yet ready to confront this genuine threat.

#### Leaders won’t cave to pressure

Baoying 9,

Ng - Channel NewsAsia, “Mounting pressure on governments to support local economy, but protectionism unlikely”, <http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporebusinessnews/view/421521/1/.html>

As the world deals with a global recession, there are concerns that some countries will turn to protectionist measures to shield their domestic economies. But observers have said that so far, most governments remain committed to free trade and that global trade flows are not likely to suffer for now. China exports cheap toys to many parts of the world. And should countries restrict imports on its toys, experts said China can easily retaliate. For example, it can block hard disk drives from Thailand, which are sent to China for assembly into computers. And this could lead to a downward spiral. But analysts said this is unlikely, as supply chains are extremely interlinked on a global scale. David Cohen, Director of Asian Economic Forecasting, Action Economics, said: "The fact that at these international gatherings they still feel obliged to include a statement opposing broad protectionism in their communique from their summits, that should help allow them to resist any domestic pressure for further protectionism. "In the current environment, I think the leaders are aware that they would only make things worse if they were to start adopting increases in tariffs; that would choke off world trade more than it has fallen off in the global downturn. "I think they do realise that when people look back (to) the 1930s, they identify the protectionist tariffs as having aggravated the downturn, and I think the leaders are intent that they are not going to go down that route again."

### Extensions - Protectionism unlikely in the status quo

#### Risk of protectionism is low – Aff authors exaggerate.

Ahearn ‘9

Raymond, CRS Specialist in International Trade and Finance, “The Global Economic Downturn and Protectionism,” March 23, 2009, http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/19395.pdf

There are a number of reasons why the threat of a return to protectionist, beggar-thy-neighbor policies could be vastly overstated. Unlike the 1930s, today’s global economy has several strong firewalls to prevent governments from raising trade barriers that result in a cycle of retaliation and counter-retaliation. These firewalls include more institutionalized obstacles to protectionism built into the WTO system, more policy instruments to address the economic slowdown, and a more interdependent and open world economy than existed in the 1930s. In addition, some in today’s media may tend to overstate the threat of protectionism by not always distinguishing between protectionist actions and protectionist pressures and/or by equating legitimate forms of protection with protectionism. The fact that there is ample room for increases in trade measures and barriers that are consistent with the rules and obligations of the WTO often may go unappreciated in some press coverage. These trade measures and barriers include increases in applied tariffs to bound rates, and imposition of countervailing and antidumping duties, so-called ‘defensive’ trade measures.4 Protection for limited periods of time and under prescribed conditions is built into the rules of the WTO as a political safety valve and as a recognition of the human and social costs that are associated with the often wrenching adjustments that accompany increased trade competition. Firewalls Against Protectionism WTO rules today serve to keep a lid on trade barriers of its 153 members through an elaborate set of mutual obligations and dispute settlement procedures. Unlike the 1930s when countries could impose higher trade barriers unilaterally without violating any international agreements or anticipating a foreign reaction, under today’s rules members can take their disputes to the WTO for settlement rather than engaging in reciprocal retaliatory actions. The fact that countries violating WTO obligations can face WTO-sanctioned retaliation helps constrain outbreaks of unilateral actions that could be mutually harmful.5 Pressures for protection are also dampened by a world economy that is much more interdependent and integrated than in the 1930s.6 Leading producers have become so international in their production operations and supply chains that they have developed a vested interest in resisting protectionism.7 Many industries that have faced import competition in the past – such as televisions and semiconductors—have found that international diversification or joint ventures with foreign partners are a more profitable way of coping with global competition than blocking goods at the border. In addition, many domestic industries have less incentive to ask for import restrictions because foreign rivals now produce in the domestic market, eliminating the benefits of trade barriers for domestic firms.8 Unlike the early 1930s, when governments took little responsibility for propping up financial institutions and were unable to pursue expansionary monetary policies due to fixed exchange rates under the gold standard, policymakers around the world today are adopting expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. These expansionary policies, in turn, have the capability of dampening protectionist pressures and demands that stem from job losses and related economic hardship with lower interest rates and increased expenditures on unemployment benefits and health care benefits.9 A related consideration is that today’s world economy is much more open than the world economy of the 1930s. Average tariffs on world trade have come down from the 50% range in the 1930s, to the 25% range in the 1980s, and to less than 10% today.10 Under these circumstances, it would require tremendous increases in protection to get the world back to anywhere near the conditions of the 1930s, although a major increase in tariffs (e.g. a doubling) would be disruptive even if it left tariffs well below the 1930s levels. Scorecard of Protective Measures To Date Empirical support exists for the view that existing legal, economic, and political firewalls are restraining today’s protectionist pressures. Most importantly, Pascal Lamy, the WTO’s Director General, reported in January 2009 that most WTO members have successfully kept domestic protectionist pressures under control “with only limited evidence of increases in trade restricting or trade distorting measures” taken during the last six months of 2008. This assessment was based on the first report of the WTO secretariat on the trade effects of the global economic crisis. The report found only “limited evidence” of an increase in tariffs, non-tariff barriers or trade-remedy actions by member countries, but noted that the most significant actions taken in response to the global crisis have involved “financial support of one kind or another to banks and other financial institutions and to certain industries, notably the automobile industry.”11 The WTO report notes tariff increases on selected products being implemented by India, Russia, Ecuador, and Ukraine. Countries adopting non-tariff measures include Indonesia (port of entry barriers) and Argentina (import licensing requirements). Argentina was cited for measures that attempt to boost exports of selected products. But the report indicates that there has been “no dramatic increase” in antidumping investigations in the second half of 2008 compared to first half of 2008, but raised the possibility of increased trade remedy actions in 2009.12 The World Bank, which has also been monitoring trade restrictions proposed and adopted since the beginning of the financial crisis, reached a conclusion similar to that of the WTO. Its initial report determined that there have been 47 trade restrictive measures imposed since the financial crisis began last summer, including 17 from G-20 countries, but that “these measures have probably had only marginal effects on trade flows to date.” In addition to the measures cited by the WTO, the World Bank report cited China’s import ban on various food products from the EU, and export subsidies provided by the EU, China, and India. Contrary to the WTO report, the World Bank report determined that “the number of antidumping cases (both investigations initiated and imposition of duties) surged in 2008.”13

## Global Economy Answers

**Econ---No Impact---Data**

**No impact to economic decline – prefer new data**

**Drezner 14** – Daniel W. Drezner, IR Professor at Tufts University, “The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession,” World Politics, Volume 66. Number 1, January 2014, pp. 123-164

The final significant outcome addresses a dog that hasn't barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder. **The aggregate data suggest otherwise**, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has concluded that "the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007."43 **Interstate violence** in particular has **declined** since the start of the financial crisis, as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other **studies confirm** that **the** Great **Recession has not triggered** any increase in **violent conflict**, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 The secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes that "the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected."43

### Econ---No Impact---Empirics

**Countries are too stable or it’s empirically denied**

**Bazzi et al., UCSD economics department, 2011**

(Samuel “Economic Shocks and Conflict: The (Absence of?) Evidence from Commodity Prices”, November, <http://www.chrisblattman.com/documents/research/2011.EconomicShocksAndConflict.pdf?9d7bd4>, ldg)

VI. Discussion and conclusions A. Implications for our theories of political instability and conflict The state is not a prize?—Warlord politics and the state prize logic lie at the center of the most influential models of conflict, state development, and political transitions in economics and political science. Yet we see no evidence for this idea in economic shocks, even when looking at the friendliest cases: fragile and unconstrained states dominated by extractive commodity revenues. Indeed, we see the opposite correlation: if anything, **higher rents from commodity prices** weakly 22 **lower the risk and length of conflict.** Perhaps shocks are the wrong test. Stocks of resources could matter more than price shocks (especially if shocks are transitory). But combined with emerging evidence that war onset is no more likely even with rapid increases in known oil reserves (Humphreys 2005; Cotet and Tsui 2010) we regard the state prize logic of war with skepticism.17 Our main political economy models may need a new engine. Naturally, an absence of evidence cannot be taken for evidence of absence. Many of our conflict onset and ending results include sizeable positive and negative effects.18 Even so, commodity price shocks are highly influential in income and should provide a rich source of identifiable variation in instability. It is difficult to find a better-measured, more abundant, and plausibly exogenous independent variable than price volatility. Moreover, other time-varying variables, like rainfall and foreign aid, exhibit robust correlations with conflict in spite of suffering similar empirical drawbacks and generally smaller sample sizes (Miguel et al. 2004; Nielsen et al. 2011). Thus we take the absence of evidence seriously. Do resource revenues drive state capacity?—State prize models assume that rising revenues raise the value of the capturing the state, but have ignored or downplayed the effect of revenues on self-defense. We saw that a growing empirical political science literature takes just such a revenue-centered approach, illustrating that resource boom times permit both payoffs and repression, and that stocks of lootable or extractive resources can bring political order and stability. This countervailing effect is most likely with transitory shocks, as current revenues are affected while long term value is not. Our findings are partly consistent with this state capacity effect. For example, conflict intensity is most sensitive to changes in the extractive commodities rather than the annual agricultural crops that affect household incomes more directly. The relationship only holds for conflict intensity, however, and is somewhat fragile. We do not see a large, consistent or robust decline in conflict or coup risk when prices fall. A reasonable interpretation is that the state prize and state capacity effects are either small or tend to cancel one another out. Opportunity cost: Victory by default?—Finally, the inverse relationship between prices and war intensity is consistent with opportunity cost accounts, but not exclusively so. As we noted above, the relationship between intensity and extractive commodity prices is more consistent with the state capacity view. Moreover, we shouldn’t mistake an inverse relation between individual aggression and incomes as evidence for the opportunity cost mechanism. The same correlation is consistent with psychological theories of stress and aggression (Berkowitz 1993) and sociological and political theories of relative deprivation and anomie (Merton 1938; Gurr 1971). Microempirical work will be needed to distinguish between these mechanisms. Other reasons for a null result.—Ultimately, however, the fact that commodity **price shocks have no discernible effect on new conflict onsets**, but some effect on ongoing conflict, suggests that political stability **might be less sensitive** to income or temporary shocks than generally believed. One possibility is that successfully mounting an insurgency is no easy task. It comes with considerable risk, costs, and coordination challenges. Another possibility is that the counterfactual is still conflict onset. In poor and fragile nations, income shocks of one type or another are ubiquitous. **If a nation is so fragile that a change in prices could lead to war, then other shocks may trigger war even in the absence of a price shock.** The same argument has been made in debunking the myth that price shocks led to fiscal collapse and low growth in developing nations in the 1980s.19 B. A general problem of publication bias? More generally, these findings should heighten our concern with publication bias in the conflict literature. Our results run against a number of published results on commodity shocks and conflict, mainly because of select samples, misspecification, and sensitivity to model assumptions, and, most importantly, alternative measures of instability. Across the social and hard sciences, there is a concern that the majority of published research findings are false (e.g. Gerber et al. 2001). Ioannidis (2005) demonstrates that a published finding is less likely to be true when there is a greater number and lesser pre-selection of tested relationships; there is greater flexibility in designs, definitions, outcomes, and models; and when more teams are involved in the chase of statistical significance. The cross-national study of conflict is an extreme case of all these. Most worryingly, almost no paper looks at alternative dependent variables or publishes systematic robustness checks. Hegre and Sambanis (2006) have shown that the majority of published conflict results are fragile, though they focus on timeinvariant regressors and not the time-varying shocks that have grown in popularity. We are also concerned there is a “file drawer problem” (Rosenthal 1979). Consider this decision rule: scholars that discover robust results that fit a theoretical intuition pursue the results; but if results are not robust the scholar (or referees) worry about problems with the data or empirical strategy, and identify additional work to be done. If further analysis produces a robust result, it is published. If not, back to the file drawer. In the aggregate, the consequences are dire: a lower threshold of evidence for initially significant results than ambiguous ones.20

**2008 disproves conflict**

**Barnett**, columnist for World Politics Review, 200**9**

(Thomas P.M. “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” World Politics Review, 8/252009, <http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx>, 9-26-11, zml)

So, to sum up: No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis **did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes**, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets**, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead.** Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order. Do I expect to read any analyses along those lines in the blogosphere any time soon? Absolutely not. I expect the fantastic fear-mongering to proceed apace. That's what the Internet is for.

**Econ---No Impact---General**

**Even massive economic decline has zero chance of war**

**Jervis 11** – Robert, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, **it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough** to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that **even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited**, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen **such a sharp economic down-turn** without **anyone** suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that **even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict**, **it will not make war thinkable**.

### Econ---No Impact---No Escalation

**Conflict won’t escalate – instructions are robust**

**Drezner**, Tufts international politics professor, 20**11**

(Daniel, “Please come down off the ledge, dear readers”, 8-12, <http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/12/please_come_down_off_the_ledge_dear_readers>, ldg)

So, when we last left off this debate, things were looking grim. My concern in the last post was that the persistence of hard times would cause governments to take actions that would lead to a collapse of the open global economy, a spike in general riots and disturbances, and eerie echoes of the Great Depression. Let's assume that the global economy persists in sputtering for a while, because that's what happens after major financial shocks. Why won't these other bad things happen? Why isn't it 1931? Let's start with the obvious -- it's not gonna be 1931 because there's some passing familiarity with how 1931 played out. The Chairman of the Federal Reserve has devoted much of his academic career to studying the Great Depression. I'm gonna go out on a limb therefore and assert that if the world plunges into a another severe downturn, it's not gonna be because central bank heads replay the same set of mistakes. The legacy of the Great Depression has also affected public attitudes and institutions that provide much stronger cement for the current system. In terms of publuc attitudes, compare the results of this mid-2007 poll with this mid-2010 poll about which economic system is best. I'll just reproduce the key charts below: The headline of the 2010 results is that there's eroding U.S. support for the global economy, but a few other things stand out. U.S. support has declined, but it's declined from a very high level. In contrast, support for free markets has increased in other major powers, such as Germany and China. On the whole, despite the worst global economic crisis since the Great Depression, public attitudes have not changed all that much. While there might be populist demands to "do something," that something is not a return to autarky or anything so drastc. Another big difference is that multilateral economic institutions are much more robust now than they were in 1931. On trade matters, even if the Doha round is dead, the rest of the World Trade Organization's corpus of trade-liberalizing measures are still working quite well. Even beyond the WTO, the complaint about trade is not the deficit of free-trade agreements but the surfeit of them. The IMF's resources have been strengthened as a result of the 2008 financial crisis. The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision has already promulgated a plan to strengthen capital requirements for banks. True, it's a slow, weak-assed plan, but it would be an improvement over the status quo. As for the G-20, I've been pretty skeptical about that group's abilities to collectively address serious macroeconomic problems. That is setting the bar rather high, however. One could argue that the G-20's most useful function is reassurance. Even if there are disagreements, communication can prevent them from growing into anything worse. Finally, a note about the possibility of riots and other general social unrest. The working papercited in my previous post noted the links between austerity measures and increases in disturbances. However, that paper contains the following important paragraph on page 19: [I]n countries with better institutions, the responsiveness of unrest to budget cuts is generally lower. Where constraints on the executive are minimal, the coefficient on expenditure changes is strongly negative -- more spending buys a lot of social peace. In countries with Polity-2 scores above zero, the coefficient is about half in size, and less significant. As we limit the sample to ever more democratic countries, the size of the coefficient declines. For full democracies with a complete range of civil rights, the coefficient is still negative, but no longer significant. This is good news!! The world has a hell of a lot more democratic governments now than it did in 1931. What happened in London, in other words, might prove to be the exception more than the rule. So yes, the recent economic news might seem grim. Unless political institutions and public attitudes buckle, however, we're unlikely to repeat the mistakes of the 1930's. And, based on the data we've got, that's not going to happen.

### Econ---No Impact---Studies

**Best studies prove – no conflict**

**Brandt et al., Indiana political science PhD, 2011**

(Patrick, “Economic Growth and Political Instability”, April, SSRN, ldg)

These statements anticipating political fallout from the global economic crisis of 2008–2010 reflect a widely held view that economic growth has rapid and profound effects on countries’ political stability. When economies grow at a healthy clip, citizens are presumed to be too busy and too content to engage in protest or rebellion, and governments are thought to be flush with revenues they can use to enhance their own stability by producing public goods or rewarding cronies, depending on the type of regime they inhabit. When growth slows, however, citizens and cronies alike are presumed to grow frustrated with their governments, and the leaders at the receiving end of that frustration are thought to lack the financial resources to respond effectively. The expected result is an increase in the risks of social unrest, civil war, coup attempts, and regime breakdown. Although it is pervasive, the assumption that countries’ economic growth rates strongly affect their political stability has not been subjected to a great deal of careful empirical analysis, and evidence from social science research to date does not unambiguously support it. Theoretical models of civil wars, coups d’etat, and transitions to and from democracy often specify slow economic growth as an important cause or catalyst of those events, but empirical studies on the effects of economic growth on these phenomena have produced mixed results. Meanwhile, the effects of economic growth on the occurrence or incidence of social unrest seem to have **hardly been studied in recent years**, as empirical analysis of contentious collective action has concentrated on political opportunity structures and dynamics of protest and repression. This paper helps fill that gap by rigorously re-examining the effects of short-term variations in economic growth on the occurrence of several forms of political instability in countries worldwide over the past few decades. In this paper, we do not seek to develop and test new theories of political instability. Instead, we aim to subject a hypothesis common to many prior theories of political instability to more careful empirical scrutiny. The goal is to provide a detailed empirical characterization of the relationship between economic growth and political instability in a broad sense. In effect, we describe the conventional wisdom as seen in the data. We do so with statistical models that use smoothing splines and multiple lags to allow for nonlinear and dynamic effects from economic growth on political stability. We also do so with an instrumented measure of growth that explicitly accounts for endogeneity in the relationship between political instability and economic growth. To our knowledge, ours is the first statistical study of this relationship to simultaneously address the possibility of nonlinearity and problems of endogeneity. As such, we believe this paper offers what is probably the most rigorous general evaluation of this argument to date. As the results show, some of our findings are surprising. Consistent with conventional assumptions, we find that social unrest and civil violence are more likely to occur and democratic regimes are more susceptible to coup attempts around periods of slow economic growth. At the same time, our analysis shows no significant relationship between variation in growth and the risk of civil-war onset, and results from our analysis of regime changes contradict the widely accepted claim that economic crises cause transitions from autocracy to democracy. While we would hardly pretend to have the last word on any of these relationships, our findings do suggest that the relationship between economic growth and political stability is neither as uniform nor as strong as the conventional wisdom(s) presume(s). We think these findings also help explain why the global recession of 2008–2010 has failed thus far to produce the wave of coups and regime failures that some observers had anticipated, in spite of the expected and apparent uptick in social unrest associated with the crisis.

**Econ---No Impact---A2: Diversionary Theory**

**Diversionary war is wrong—qualitative AND quantitative studies go neg—decline facilitates coop**

**Fravel 10**—M Taylor, Associate Professor of Political Science and member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. “The Limits of Diversion: Rethinking Internal and External Conflict,” Security Studies.

The diversionary hypothesis offers one of the most powerful alternatives to rationalist explanations of war based on the state as a unitary actor. Strong empirical support for diversion would identify a more complete set of causal mechanisms underlying international conflict. The cases investigated in this article, however, raise doubts about the strength of the diversionary hypothesis as well as the **empirical validity** of arguments based on **diversionary mechanisms**, such as Mansfield and Snyder’s theory about democratization and war.126 In Argentina and Turkey, the hypothesis fails to pass two most likely tests. In neither case was domestic unrest a necessary condition for the use of force as proponents of diversionary theory must demonstrate. Instead, **external security challenges** and **bargaining** over disputed territory better explain Argentine and Turkish decision making. The **historical record**, including leadership statements and reasoning, offers stronger evidence for a standard **realist model** and the dynamics of coercive diplomacy.

Drawing definitive conclusions about diversion from just two cases is impossible. Nevertheless, the modified most likely research design used in this article weakens confidence in the strength of diversionary arguments. Diversion as a principal or primary source of some conflicts may be much less frequent than scholars assert. These two episodes should be among the easiest cases for diversion to explain. Not only did embattled leaders escalate disputes into crises and then use force, but scholars have also viewed these cases as being best explained by diversionary mechanisms. If diversion cannot account for these decisions, it is unclear what the hypothesis can in fact explain.

My findings have several implications for the literature on diversionary war theory. At the most general level of analysis, the lack of support for the diversion hypothesis in Argentina and Turkey **complements** those quantitative studies of diversion that do not identify a systematic and significant relationship between domestic politics and aggressive foreign policies, including the use of force.127 In addition, the modified most likely research design used in this article raises questions about those **quantitative studies that do provide empirical support** for diversion because it demonstrates that **despite** the presence of domestic unrest, the underlying causal mechanisms of diversion **may not account for the decisions to use force.**

The lack of support for diversion raises a simple but important question: why is diversion less frequent than commonly believed, despite its plausible intuition? Although further research is required, several factors should be considered. First, the rally effect that leaders enjoy from an international crisis is generally brief in duration and unlikely to change permanently a public’s overall satisfaction with its leaders.128 George H. W. Bush, for example, lost his reelection bid after successful prosecution of the 1991 Gulf War. Winston Churchill fared no better after the Allied victory in World War II.129 Leaders have little reason to conclude that a short-term rally will address what are usually structural sources of domestic dissatisfaction.

Second, a selection effect may prevent embattled leaders from choosing diversion. Diversionary action should produce the largest rally effect against the most powerful target because such action would reflect a leader’s skills through coercing a superior opponent. At the same time, leaders should often be **deterred from challenging stronger targets**, as the imbalance of military forces increases the risk of defeat and thus the probability of losing office at home. Although the odds of victory increase when targeting weaker states, success should have a much more muted effect on domestic support, if any, because victory would have been expected.130

Third, weak or embattled leaders can choose from a wide range of policy options to strengthen their standing at home. Although scholars such as Oakes and Gelpi have noted that embattled leaders can choose repression or economic development in addition to diversionary action, the range of options is even greater and carries **less risk than the failure of diversion**. Weak leaders can also seek to **deepen cooperation** with other states if they believe it will strengthen their position at home. Other studies, for example, have demonstrated that **political unrest facilitated détente** among the superpowers in the early 1970s, China’s concessions in its **many territorial disputes**, support for international financial liberalization, and the formation of regional organizations such as the **A**ssociation of **S**outheast **A**sian **S**tates and the **G**ulf **C**ooperation **C**ouncil.131

### Econ---Econ Not k2 Heg

**Not logical – absolute weakness doesn’t translate into comparative terms – collapse would make others suffer and unable to challenge the US**

**Economic decline doesn’t kill heg—American leadership is unique and their predictions have been denied for decades**

**Blackwill 9** – Robert Blackwill, former associate dean of the Kennedy School of Government and Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Planning, RAND, “The Geopolitical Consequences of the World Economic Recession—A Caution”, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP275.pdf>

First, the United States, five years from today. Did the global recession weaken the political will of the United States to, over the long term, defend its external interests? Many analysts are already forecasting a “yes” to this question. As a result of what they see as the international loss of faith in the American market economy model and in U.S. leadership, they assert that Washington’s influence in international affairs is bound to recede, indeed is already diminishing. For some, the wish is the father of this thought. But where is the empirical evidence? From South Asia, through relations with China and Russia through the Middle East peace process, through dealing with Iran’s nuclear ambitions and North Korea’s nuclear weaponization and missile activities, through confronting humanitarian crises in Africa and instability in Latin America, the United States has the unchallenged diplomatic lead. Who could charge the Obama Administration with diplomatic passivity since taking office? Indeed, one could instead conclude that the current global economic turbulence is causing countries to seek the familiar and to rely more and not less on their American connection. In any event, foreigners (and some Americans) often underestimate the existential resilience of the United States. In this respect, George Friedman’s new book, The Next Hundred Years,14 and his view that the United States will be as dominant a force in the 21st century as it was in the last half of the 20th century, is worth considering. So once again, those who now predict, as they have in every decade since 1945, American decay and withdrawal will be wrong 15— from John Flynn’s 1955 The Decline of the American Republic and How to Rebuild It,16 to Paul Kennedy’s 1987 The Rise and Fall of Great Powers,17 to Andrew Bacevich’s 2008 The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism,18 to Godfrey Hodgson’s 2009 The Myth of American Exceptionalism19 and many dozens of similar books in between. Indeed, the policies of the Obama Administration, for better or worse, are likely to be far more influential and lasting regarding America’s longer-term geopolitical power projection than the present economic decline. To sum up regarding the United States and the global economic worsening, former Council on Foreign Relations President Les Gelb, in his new book, Power Rules: How Common Sense Can Rescue American Foreign Policy,20 insists that a nation’s power is what it always was—essentially the capacity to get people to do what they don’t want to do, by pressure and coercion, using one’s resources and position. . . . The world is not flat. . . . The shape of global power is decidedly pyramidal—with the United States alone at the top, a second tier of major countries (China, Japan, India, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Brazil), and several tiers descending below. . . . Among all nations, only the United States is a true global power with global reach. Lee Kuan Yew, former Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore, agrees: “After the crisis, the US is most likely to remain at the top of every key index of national power for decades. It will remain the dominant global player for the next few decades. No major issue concerning international peace and stability can be resolved without US leadership, and no country or grouping can yet replace America as the dominant global power.”21 The current global economic crisis will not alter this reality. And the capitalist market model will continue to dominate international economics, not least because China and India have adopted their own versions of it.

**No internal link to collapse of heg – if decline was uneven, this wouldn’t cause conflict or damage US leadership**

**Deudney 99** – Daniel Deudney, Assistant Prof of Poli Sci at Johns Hopkins, Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics

Alterations in the relative power of states are unlikely to lead to war as readily as the lessons of history suggest because economic power and military power are not as tightly coupled as in the past. The relative economic power position of major states such as Germany and Japan has changed greatly since the end of World War II. But these changes, while requiring many complex adjustments in interstate relations, have not been accompanied by war or the threat of war. In the contemporary world, whole industries rise, fall, and relocate, often causing quite substantial fluctuations in the economic well-being of regions and peoples, without producing wars. There is no reason to believe that changes in relative wealth and power positions caused by the uneven impact of environmental degradation would be different in their effects.

### Econ---Resilient

**Econ resilient**

**Kohn 15** – Donald Kohn, Senior Fellow in Economic Studies at Brookings, 1/30/15, U.S. Monetary Policy: Moving Toward the Exit in an Interconnected Global Economy, www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2015/01/30-us-monetary-policy-global-economy-kohn

The global financial authorities have made **major strides in making their systems more resilient** to unexpected developments, in particular with **higher capital and greater liquidity** for banks and bank holding companies. In several jurisdictions, banks have been **stress tested** with scenarios that included rising rates. Moreover, we’ve seen several episodes in which volatility and risk spreads have risen, including the summer of 2013 during the so-called taper tantrum, and in the past few months amid mounting uncertainty about global economic prospects, plunging oil prices, growing political and economic tensions in the euro area, and strong monetary policy responses. Although there’s been some fallout from these financial market developments, **none has threatened financial stability.**

**Global econ’s resilient and shocks don’t spill over**

**Posen, 3-04** – Adam S. Posen, president of the Peterson Institute for International Economics and external voting member of the Bank of England’s rate-setting Monetary Policy Committee, “Chapter 1: Why We Need a Reality Check”, REALITY CHECK FOR THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, Peterson Institute for International Economics, PIIE Briefing 16-3, March 2016

A combination of public policies and decentralized private-sector responses to the crisis have **increased** our **economic resilience**, diminished the **systemic spillovers between economies**, and even created some room for **additional stimulus** if needed. Large parts of the global financial system are better capitalized, monitored, and frankly more risk averse than they were a decade ago, with less leverage. The riskier parts of today’s global economy are less directly linked to the center’s growth and financing than when the troubles were within the United States and most of Europe in 2008. Trade imbalances of many key economies are smaller, though growing, and thus accumulations of foreign debt vulnerabilities are also smaller than a decade ago. Most central banks are now **so committed to stabilization** that they are attacked for being too loose or supportive of markets, making them at least unlikely to repeat some policy errors from 2007–10 of delaying loosening or even excessive tightening. Finally, corporate and household balance sheets are far more solid in the US and some other major economies than they were a decade ago (though not universally), and even in China the perceptions of balance sheet weakness exceed the reality in scope and scale.

**Economy resilient – multiple economic crashes prove no risk of violence**

**Zakaria 9** – Fareed Zakaria, Newsweek International editor, “The Secrets of Stability”, 12-12-09, http://www.newsweek.com/id/226425

One year ago, the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The global financial system, which had fueled a great expansion of capitalism and trade across the world, was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of globalization—about the virtues of free markets, trade, and technology—were being called into question. Faith in the American model had collapsed. The financial industry had crumbled. Once-roaring emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil were sinking. Worldwide trade was shrinking to a degree not seen since the 1930s. Pundits whose bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to a long, painful bust, with cascading failures in sector after sector, country after country. In a widely cited essay that appeared in The Atlantic this May, Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: "The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump 'cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.' This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression." Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets. Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization. One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all. A key measure of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstable countries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but it does reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' " says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?" This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were **determined** not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the economy—through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage. (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies. It's true that the massive state interventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit. Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. **The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think**. The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature.

## Hegemony Answers

**Heg---No Impact---General**

**Hegemony isn’t key to peace**

**Fettweis 11** – Christopher Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is **no evidence** to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and **international stability**. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the U**nited** S**tates** cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. **No militaries were enhanced** to address power vacuums, **no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races**, and **no regional balancing occurred** once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The **incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined** while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

**Heg---No Impact---Resilence**

**U.S. primacy isn’t key to peace – their data is flawed**

**Preble 10** – Christopher Preble, director of Foreign Policy Studies at the CATO Institute, August 3, 2010, “U.S. Military Power: Preeminence for What Purpose?,” online: <http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/>

Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, **questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory** from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power; the international economy is complex and **resilient**. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. Islamic extremists are scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. **Many factors** have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nation-states; it is **unrealistic** to expect that a new **spasm of global conflict** would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts, **draw down its military power**, and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense, and in the security of their respective regions. But while there are **credible alternatives** to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker, the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth, and indeed, of the universe. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab.

**No data suggests a causal link between unipolarity and peace**

**Fettweis 10** – Christopher Fettweis, Professor of Political Science at Tulane University, 2010, Dangerous Times? The International Politics of Great Power Peace, p. 172-174

The primary attack on restraint, or justification for internationalism, posits that **if the U**nited **S**tates **were to withdraw** from the world, a variety of ills would sweep over key regions and eventually pose threats to U.S. security and/or prosperity. These problems might take three forms (besides the obvious, if remarkably unlikely, direct threats to the homeland): generalized chaos, hostile imbalances in Eurasia, and/or failed states. Historian Arthur Schlesinger was typical when he worried that restraint would mean "a chaotic, violent, and ever more dangerous planet."69 All of these concerns either implicitly or explicitly assume that the presence of the United States is the primary reason for international stability, and if that presence were withdrawn chaos would ensue. In other words, they depend upon hegemonic-stability logic. Simply stated, the hegemonic stability theory proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules. At the height of Pax Romana between 27 BC and 180 AD, for example, Rome was able to bring unprecedented peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stability to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana where no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that are generally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemon, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe.70 Unchecked conflicts could cause humanitarian disaster and, in today's interconnected world, economic turmoil that would ripple throughout global financial markets. If the United States were to abandon its commitments abroad, argued Art, the world would "become a more dangerous place" and, sooner or later, that would "redound to Americas detriment."71 If the massive spending that the United States engages in actually provides stability in the international political and economic systems, then perhaps internationalism is worthwhile. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, to believe that **U.S hegemony is not the primary cause of** the current era of **stability**. First of all, the hegemonic-stability argument **overstates** the role that the United States plays in the system. No country is strong enough to police the world on its own. **The only way there can be stability** in the community of great powers is if **self-policing occurs**, if states have decided that their interests are served by peace. If no pacific normative shift had occurred among the great powers that was filtering down through the system, then **no amount of international constabulary work** by the United States could maintain stability. Likewise, if it is true that such a shift has occurred, then most of what the hegemon spends to bring stability would be **wasted**. The 5 percent of the worlds population that live in the United States simply could not force peace upon an unwilling 95. At the risk of beating the metaphor to death, the United States maybe patrolling a neighborhood that has already rid itself of crime. **Stability and unipolarity may be simply coincidental**. In order for U.S. hegemony to be the reason for global stability, the rest of the world would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment for bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not always proven to be especially eager to engage in humanitarian interventions abroad. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been sufficient to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can **only take credit** for influencing those decisions that **would have ended in war without the presence**, whether physical or psychological, **of the U**nited **S**tates. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to war without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention. Since most of the world today is **free to fight without U.S. involvement**, something else must be at work. Stability exists in many places **where no hegemony is present**. Second, the limited **empirical evidence** we have suggests that there is **little connection between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability**. During the 1990s the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998 the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in I990.72 To internationalists, defense hawks, and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible "peace dividend" endangered both national and global security. "No serious analyst of American military capabilities," argued Kristol and Kagan, "doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace."7' If the pacific trends were due not to U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, however, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence.

**Unipolarity causes policy failure – they can’t access any impact**

Charles L. **Glaser 11**, professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at the George Washington University and the director of the Elliott School’s Institute for Security and Conﬂict Studies, June 2011, “Why unipolarity doesn’t matter (much),” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2, p. 135-147

A still different type of argument holds that unipolar powers tend to adopt expanded interests and associated goals that unipolarity then enables them to achieve. To the extent that these goals are actually in the unipole’s true interest, unipolarity is good for the unipole. In broad terms, this argument follows the claim that states’ interests and goals grow with their power. 19 These expanded goals can be attributed to three different types of factors. 20 The ﬁrst is a permissive structure, which allows the state to pursue more ambitious goals. The state’s interests do not change, but its increased ability to pursue them results in a redeﬁnition of its goals. A state could have goals that were previously unachievable at acceptable cost; by lowering the costs, unipolarity places these goals within reach, enabling the state to make itself better off. A unipole’s desire for a higher degree of security can be an example of this type of expanded goal, reﬂecting the means that it can wield. Second, the state can acquire new interests, which are generated by the unipole’s greater territorial and institutional reach. For example, a state that controls more territory may face new threats and, as a result, conclude that it needs to control still more territory, acquire still more power, and/or restructure international institutions to further protect its interests. Third, the unipole’s goals can be inﬂuenced by what is commonly described as human nature and by psychology. A unipolar state will be inclined to lose track of how secure it is and consequently **pursue inappropriate policies** that are **designed to increase its security** but **turn out to be too costly** and/or to **have a high probability of backﬁring.** One variant of this type of argument expects unipolar powers to conclude that **they need to spread their type of governance** or political ideology to be secure. These dangers can be reinforced by a tendency for a unipolar power to see its new interests, which are optional, as necessary ones. The ﬁrst two types of expanded interests and goals can make the unipole better off. The question here is whether the interests the United States might ﬁnd within its reach due to its unipolar position are very valuable. With respect to security, **the answer is ‘no’**. For the reasons summarized above, the United States can be very secure in bipolarity, and unipolarity is important only in an extreme and unlikely case. Other US goals, for example, spreading democracy and free markets, **do not depend on unipolarity**, at least not its military dimension. Instead, whether these liberal systems spread will depend most heavily on their own effectiveness. Regarding the down side, there does not appear to be an overwhelming reason that the United States cannot avoid the dangers of unipolar overreach. The Bush administration certainly proved itself vulnerable to these dangers and the United States is continuing to pay for its ﬂawed judgments. Arguably, strands of overreach can be traced back to the Clinton administration’s emphasis on democratic enlargement, although the means that it chose were much more in line with US interests. 21 And the Obama administration’s decision to escalate the war in Afghanistan may well be an example of striving for too much security. Nevertheless, none of the basic arguments about unipolarity explain why these errors are unavoidable. The overreach claim is more an observation about the past than a well-supported prediction about the future. We do not have strong reasons for concluding that the United States will be unable to beneﬁt from analyses of its grand strategy options, learning to both appreciate how very secure it is and at the same time to respect the limits of its power. In sum, then, under current conditions, unipolarity does little to enable the United States to increase its security. **Given the limited beneﬁts of unipolarity** and the not insigniﬁcant **dangers of unipolar overreach**, the United States will have to choose its policies wisely if it is going to be better off in a unipolar world than a bipolar one.

**Heg---No Impact---A2: Quick Collapse**

**Our evidence assumes a massive, short-term internal link**

Paul K. **MacDonald 11**, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph M. Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, Spring 2011, “Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, p. 7-44

In theory, states should retrench whenever they experience declines in their relative power. In practice, some periods of relative decline are of more analytical interest than others. For the purposes of this article, we focus on periods of what we call "**acute relative decline**." These are periods characterized by two features. First, a great power suffers a decline in relative power that **decreases its ordinal ranking** among the great powers. Second, this decrease in relative power **remains evident** for at least a five-year period. In making this argument, we are assuming that states are most likely to retrench when they have **lost their position** in the rank order and **that loss does not appear to be temporary**.

**Heg---No Impact---A2: US Lashout**

**No U.S. lashout – retrenchment causes caution and restraint – reduces the risk of war**

Paul K. **MacDonald 11**, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph M. Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, Spring 2011, “Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, p. 7-44

With regard to militarized disputes, **declining great powers** demonstrate **more caution and restraint** in the use of force: they were involved in an average of 1.7 fewer militarized disputes in the five years following ordinal change compared with other great powers over similar periods.67 Declining great powers also **initiated fewer militarized disputes**, and their disputes tended to **escalate to lower levels of hostility** than the baseline category (see figure 2).68 These findings suggest the need for a **fundamental revision** to the pessimist's argument regarding the war proneness of declining powers.69 **Far from being more likely to lash out** aggressively, **declining states refrain from initiating and escalating military disputes**. Nor do declining great powers appear more vulnerable to external predation than other great powers. This may be because external predators have great difficulty assessing the vulnerability of potential victims, or because retrenchment allows vulnerable powers to effectively recover from decline and **still deter potential challengers**.

**Heg---No Impact---A2: Rising Powers**

**Rising powers will be cooperative and integrated into the liberal international order**

**Ikenberry 11** – (May/June issue of Foreign Affairs, G. John, PhD, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, “The Future of the Liberal World Order,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67730/g-john-ikenberry/the-future-of-the-liberal-world-order?page=show)

For all these reasons, many observers have concluded that world politics is experiencing not just a changing of the guard but also a transition in the ideas and principles that underlie the global order. The journalist Gideon Rachman, for example, says that a cluster of liberal internationalist ideas -- such as faith in democratization, confidence in free markets, and the acceptability of U.S. military power -- are all being called into question. According to this worldview, the future of international order will be shaped above all by China, which will use its growing power and wealth to push world politics in an illiberal direction. Pointing out that China and other non-Western states have weathered the recent financial crisis better than their Western counterparts, pessimists argue that an authoritarian capitalist alternative to Western neoliberal ideas has already emerged. According to the scholar Stefan Halper, emerging-market states "are learning to combine market economics with traditional autocratic or semiautocratic politics in a process that signals an intellectual rejection of the Western economic model." Today's international order is not really American or Western--even if it initially appeared that way. **But this panicked narrative misses a deeper reality: although the United States' position in the global system is changing, the liberal international order is alive and well.** The struggle over international order today is not about fundamental principles. China and other emerging great powers do not want to contest the basic rules and principles of the liberal international order; **they wish to gain more authority and leadership within it.** Indeed, today's power transition represents not the defeat of the liberal order but its ultimate ascendance. Brazil, China, and India have all become more prosperous and capable by operating inside the existing international order -- benefiting from its rules, practices, and institutions, including the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the newly organized G-20. Their economic success and growing influence are tied to the liberal internationalist organization of world politics, and they have **deep interests in preserving that system**. In the meantime, alternatives to an open and rule-based order have yet to crystallize. Even though the last decade has brought remarkable upheavals in the global system -- the emergence of new powers, bitter disputes among Western allies over the United States' unipolar ambitions, and a global financial crisis and recession -- **the liberal international order has no competitors**. On the contrary, the rise of non-Western powers and the growth of economic and security interdependence are creating new constituencies for it. To be sure, as wealth and power become less concentrated in the United States' hands, the country will be less able to shape world politics. **But the underlying foundations of the liberal international order will survive and thrive.** Indeed, now may be the best time for the United States and its democratic partners to update the liberal order for a new era, ensuring that it continues to provide the benefits of security and prosperity that it has provided since the middle of the twentieth century.

**Cooperation is more likely**

**Ikenberry 8 –** Milbank politics prof and International Affairs, Princeton. Co-faculty director of the Princeton Project on National Security. Former Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund. Former fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Former member of an advisory group at the State Department. Former member of the Council on Foreign Relations’. Senior Fellow at Brookings, former prof at Georgetown and U Penn. PhD from U Chicago (John, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West,” 28 January 2 008, http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/world/20080101faessay\_v87n1\_ikenberry.html)

First, unlike the imperial systems of the past, the Western order is built around rules and norms of nondiscrimination and market openness, creating conditions for rising states to advance their expanding economic and political goals within it. Across history, international orders have varied widely in terms of whether the material benefits that are generated accrue disproportionately to the leading state or are widely shared. In the Western system, the barriers to economic participation are low, and the potential benefits are high. China has already discovered the massive economic returns that are possible by operating within this open-market system. Second is the coalition-based character of its leadership. Past orders have tended to be dominated by one state. The stakeholders of the current Western order include a coalition of powers arrayed around the United States -- an important distinction. These leading states, most of them advanced liberal democracies, do not always agree, but they are engaged in a continuous process of give-and-take over economics, politics, and security. Power transitions are typically seen as being played out between two countries, a rising state and a declining hegemon, and the order falls as soon as the power balance shifts. But in the current order, the larger aggregation of democratic capitalist states -- and the resulting accumulation of geopolitical power -- shifts the balance in the order's favor. Third, the postwar Western order has an unusually dense, encompassing, and broadly endorsed system of rules and institutions. Whatever its shortcomings, it is more open and rule-based than any previous order. State sovereignty and the rule of law are not just norms enshrined in the United Nations Charter. They are part of the deep operating logic of the order. To be sure, these norms are evolving, and the United States itself has historically been ambivalent about binding itself to international law and institutions -- and at no time more so than today. But the overall system is dense with multilateral rules and institutions -- global and regional, economic, political, and security-related. These represent one of the great breakthroughs of the postwar era. They have laid the basis for **unprecedented levels of cooperation** and shared authority over the global system. The incentives these features create for China to integrate into the liberal international order are reinforced by the changed nature of the international economic environment -- especially the new interdependence driven by technology. The most farsighted Chinese leaders understand that globalization has changed the game and that China accordingly needs strong, prosperous partners around the world. From the United States' perspective, a healthy Chinese economy is vital to the United States and the rest of the world. Technology and the global economic revolution have created a logic of economic relations that is different from the past -- making the political and institutional logic of the current order all the more powerful. Accommodating the Rise The most important benefit of these features today is that they give the Western order a remarkable capacity to accommodate rising powers. New entrants into the system have ways of gaining status and authority and opportunities to play a role in governing the order. The fact that the United States, China, and other great powers have nuclear weapons also limits the ability of a rising power to overturn the existing order. In the age of nuclear deterrence, great-power war is, thankfully, no longer a mechanism of historical change. **War-driven change has been abolished as a historical process**.

### Heg---A2: BIW

**Best data concludes no impact to heg**

Benjamin H. **Friedman et al 13**, research fellow in defense and homeland security studies; Brendan Rittenhouse Green, the Stanley Kaplan Postdoctoral Fellow in Political Science and Leadership Studies at Williams College; Justin Logan, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute Fall 2013, “Correspondence: Debating American Engagement: The Future of U.S. Grand Strategy,” International Security, Vol. 38, No. 2, p. 181-199

Brooks et al. argue that the specter of U.S. power eliminates some of the most baleful consequences of anarchy, producing a more peaceful world. U.S. security guarantees deter aggressors, reassure allies, and dampen security dilemmas (p. 34). “By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management,” Brooks et al. write, primacy “reduces security competition and does so in a way that slows the diffusion of power away from the United States” (pp. 39–40). There are three reasons to reject this logic: security competition is declining anyway; if competition increases, primacy will have difficulty stopping it; and even if competition occurred, it would pose little threat to the United States.¶ an increasingly peaceful world. An array of research, some of which Brooks et al. cite, indicates that factors other than U.S. power are diminishing interstate war and security competition.2 These factors combine to make the costs of military aggression very high, and its benefits low.3¶ A major reason for peace is that conquest has grown more costly. Nuclear weapons make it nearly suicidal in some cases.4 Asia, the region where future great power competition is most likely, has a “geography of peace”: its maritime and mountainous regions are formidable barriers to conflict.5¶ Conquest also yields lower economic returns than in the past. Post-industrial economies that rely heavily on human capital and information are more difficult to exploit.6 Communications and transport technologies aid nationalism and other identity politics that make foreigners harder to manage. The lowering of trade barriers limits the returns from their forcible opening.7¶ Although states are slow learners, they increasingly appreciate these trends. That should not surprise structural realists. Through two world wars, the international system "selected against" hyperaggressive states and demonstrated even to victors the costs of major war. Others adapt to the changed calculus of military aggression through socialization.8¶ managing revisionist states. Brooks et al. caution against betting on these positive trends. They worry that if states behave the way offensive realism predicts, then security competition will be fierce even if its costs are high. Or, if nonsecurity preferences such as prestige, status, or glory motivate states, even secure states may become aggressive (pp. 36-37).9¶ These scenarios, however, are a bigger problem for primacy than for restraint. Offensive realist security paranoia stems from states' uncertainty about intentions; such states see alliances as temporary expedients of last resort, and U.S. military commitments are unlikely to comfort or deter them.10 Nonsecurity preferences are, by definition, resistant to the security blandishments that the United States can offer under primacy Brooks et al.'s revisionist actors are unlikely to find additional costs sufficient reason to hold back, or the threat of those costs to be particularly credible.¶ The literature that Brooks et al. cite in arguing that the United States restrains allies actually suggests that offensive realist and prestige-oriented states will be the most resistant to the restraining effects of U.S. power. These studies suggest that it is most difficult for strong states to prevent conflict between weaker allies and their rivals when the restraining state is defending nonvital interests; when potential adversaries and allies have other alignment options;11 when the stronger state struggles to mobilize power domestically12; when the stronger state perceives reputational costs for non-involvement;13 and when allies have hawkish interests and the stronger state has only moderately dovish interests.14¶ In other words, the cases where it would be most important to restrain U.S. allies are those in which Washington's efforts at restraint would be least effective. Highly motivated actors, by definition, have strong hawkish interests. Primacy puts limits on U.S. dovishness, lest its commitments lack the credibility to deter or reassure. Such credibility concerns create perceived reputational costs for restraining or not bailing out allies. The United States will be defending secondary interests, which will create domestic obstacles to mobilizing power. U.S. allies have other alliance options, especially in Asia. In short, if states are insensitive to the factors incentivizing peace, then the United States' ability to manage global security will be doubtful. Third-party security competition will likely ensue anyway.¶ costs for whom? Fortunately, foreign security competition poses little risk to the United States. Its wealth and geography create natural security. Historically, the only threats to U.S. sovereignty, territorial integrity, safety, or power position have been potential regional hegemons that could mobilize their resources to project political and military power into the Western Hemisphere. Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union arguably posed such threats. None exist today.¶ Brooks et al. argue that "China's rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term" (p. 38). That possibility is remote, even assuming that China sustains its rapid wealth creation. Regional hegemony requires China to develop the capacity to conquer Asia's other regional powers. India lies across the Himalayas and has nuclear weapons. Japan is across a sea and has the wealth to quickly build up its military and develop nuclear weapons. A disengaged United States would have ample warning and time to form alliances or regenerate forces before China realizes such vast ambitions.

**Heg---A2: Brzezinski**

**Brzezinski’s wrong – decline will be stable and other powers will fill in**

**Xijin 12** Hu is the Editor in Chief of the Global Times. “Decline Just Doesn’t Translate,” Published in Foreign Policy, March/April, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/decline\_just\_doesn\_t\_translate

Zbigniew Brzezinski ("After America," January/February 2012) thinks the decline of the United States will pose huge risks to the world and seems to assume that it will occur suddenly, when other powers are unprepared. This is unlikely. The so-called "decline" of the United States, after all, is a relative concept. America is still at the forefront of technological development, and its national wealth is growing, as is its population, unlike in many European countries. The present economic crisis is temporary. The United States still has opportunities for adjustment. The American sense of crisis comes from comparing the United States with emerging countries such as China and India in terms of the speed of development. However rapidly China develops, though, it will take at least half a century for it to surpass the United States. The rise of emerging powers will be closely connected with the shrinking of U.S. power, and the process will leave no power vacuum. **Countries will easily be able to bear the** psychological **burden of adjustment**.

# \*\*OFFCASE ARGS START HERE

# PRESSURE CPLAN

## PRESSURE CPLAN – David Dollar

### 1NC

#### Text:

#### The United States should amend CFIUS legislation to limit acquisitions by State-Owned-Enterprises from countries with which the United States does not have a bilateral investment treaty.

#### The cplan pressures China to accede to current US demands in BIT negotiations. This solves the Aff without boosting the economic growth of China’s State-Owned Enterprises.

Dollar ‘16

David Dollar is a senior fellow with the Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development programs at The Brookings Institute. He is based within the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings. Dollar is a leading expert on China's economy and U.S.-China economic relations. From 2009 to 2013, Dollar was the U.S. Treasury Department's economic and financial emissary to China. Brookings – May 18th - http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2016/05/18-china-global-investment-dollar

This lack of reciprocity creates problems for China’s partners. China has the second largest market in the world. In these protected sectors, Chinese firms can grow unfettered by competition, and then use their domestic financial strength to develop overseas operations. In finance, for example, China’s four state-owned commercial banks operate in a domestic market in which foreign investors have been restricted to about 1 percent of the market. The four banks are now among the largest in the world and are expanding overseas. China’s monopoly credit card company, Union Pay, is similarly a world leader based on its protected domestic market. A similar strategy applies in mining and telecommunications. This lack of reciprocity creates an unlevel playing field. A concrete example is the acquisition of the U.S. firm Smithfield by the Chinese firm Shuanghui. In a truly open market, Smithfield, with its superior technology and food-safety procedures, may well have taken over Shuanghui and expanded into the rapidly growing Chinese pork market. However, investment restrictions prevented such an option, so the best way for Smithfield to expand into China was to be acquired by the Chinese firm. Smithfield CEO Larry Pope stated the deal would preserve "the same old Smithfield, only with more opportunities and new markets and new frontiers." No Chinese pork would be imported to the United States, he stated, but rather Shuanghui desired to export American pork to take advantage of growing demand for foreign food products in China due to recent food scandals. Smithfield's existing management team is expected to remain intact, as is its U.S. workforce. The United States does not have much leverage to level the playing field. It does have a review process for acquisitions of U.S. firms by foreign ones. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is chaired by Treasury and includes economic agencies (Commerce, Trade Representative) as well as the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. By statute, CFIUS can only examine national security issues involved in an acquisition. It reviewed the Smithfield deal and let it proceed because there was no obvious national security issue. CFIUS only reviews about 100 transactions per year and the vast majority of them proceed. This system reflects the U.S. philosophy of being very open to foreign investment. Chinese policies create a dilemma for its partners. Taking those policies as given, it would be irrational for economies such as the United States to limit Chinese investments. In the Shuanghui-Smithfield example, the access to the Chinese market gained through the takeover makes the assets of the U.S. firm more valuable and benefits its shareholders. Assuming that the firm really does expand into China, the deal will benefit the workers of the firm as well. It would be even better, however, if China opened up its protected markets so that such expansions could take place in the most efficient way possible. In some cases, that will be Chinese firms acquiring U.S. ones, but in many other cases it would involve U.S. firms expanding into China. This issue of getting China to open up its protected markets is high on the policy agenda of the United States and other major economies. The United States has been negotiating with China over a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) that would be based on a small negative list; that is, there would be a small number of agreed sectors that remain closed on each side, but otherwise investment would be open in both directions. So far, however, negotiations on the BIT have been slow. It is difficult for China to come up with an offer that includes only a small number of protected sectors. And there are questions as to whether the U.S. Congress would approve an investment treaty with China in the current political environment, even if a good one were negotiated. The issue of lack of reciprocity between China’s investment openness and the U.S. system is one of the thorniest issues in the bilateral relationship. A new president will have to take a serious look at the CFIUS process and the enabling legislation and consider what combination of carrots and sticks would accelerate the opening of China’s markets. In terms of sticks, the United States could consider an amendment to the CFIUS legislation that would limit acquisitions by state enterprises from countries with which the United States does not have a bilateral investment treaty. In terms of carrots, the best move for the United States is to approve the Trans-Pacific Partnership and implement it well so that there is deeper integration among like-minded countries in Asia-Pacific. Success in this will encourage China to open up further and eventually meet the high standards set by TPP. Greater investment openness is part of China’s own reform plan but it clearly needs incentives to make real progress.

# CHINESE ECON GROWTH BAD - DISAD

## 1NC

### 1NC

#### Uniqueness and Link – US hegemony is preeminent now, but avoiding *strong SOE’s* and *investment growth in China* and will prove key.

Tellis ‘14

(Ashley J., senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues, “Balancing Without Containment: An American Strategy for Managing China,” <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/balancing_without_containment.pdf>)

All these realities—being a continental-sized power, possessing a gigantic and technologically improving economy, enjoying superior rates of relative economic growth, having a strategically advantageous location, and rapidly acquiring formidable military capabili - ties—add up quickly to make China a far more consequential rival to the United States than any Washington has faced in the past. Although U.S. officials are bashful about describing China plainly as a geopolitical threat, there is little doubt that they recognize the possibility of a coming power transition, with all its attendant dangers. Because of the perennial arguments among liberals, realists, and neoconservatives, there is no agree - ment in Washington about what the implications of this transition might be. Yet it is precisely this contingency that U.S. grand strategy should aim to thwart because American primacy has been beneficial for the international system and, even more importantly, for the United States itself. Preserving this preeminence, accordingly, remains the central task for U.S. policymakers today. Devising a strategy that is equal to this responsibility must begin with an acknowledgment of both the significance and the complexity of the challenge given China's deep enmeshment with the world. There is no better way to begin this assessment than by recognizing that globalization in the postwar period has spawned uneven gains that have produced in China a new competitor to the United States. This most recent bout of international integration has been reinvigorated and nurtured by American hegemony, understood simply as possessing more comprehensive power than any other state and being willing to use that power to structure the global order in certain ways. Beijing's continuing ascent in these circumstances creates a difficult dilemma for Washington: unlike previous great powers that rose largely through autarkic means, China has grown rapidly because it has benefited disproportionately from American investments in sustaining a liberal international economic order. China, admittedly, is not alone in this regard. Many other European and Asian states have enjoyed economic Devitalization in the postwar period because of their integration into the multilateral trading system underwritten by American power. But China has experienced disproportionately greater gains than the United States and others because its native comparative advantages have been magnified through three distinctive poli - cies. First, Beijing has opted to maintain a domestic economy characterized by significant protectionist components even as it has pursued an investment-driven, export-led growth strategy that exploits the free access available to the more open economies of the developed world. 22 Second, the dominant role of the Chinese state in economic decisionmaking has permitted the government to control critical factors of production, such as land and capital, maintain advantageous exchange rates, and sustain huge state-owned enterprises, which in their totality have enabled China to advance nationalist aims beyond simply allocative efficiency and the increased welfare of its population. 23 And third, the consistent and systematic targeting of foreign intellectual property on a gigantic scale has advanced China’s industrial policy goals, which emphasize the speedy acquisition of advanced technologies by both legitimate and illegitimate means in order to accelerate Chinese growth vis-à-vis other rivals in the international system. 24 All these elements operating in unison have raised China’s level of development, which in turn has helped increase American welfare through trade—but at the cost of embodying a rising challenge to U.S. power. However, it is by no means inevitable that China will continue to rise to the point where it becomes a genuine peer competitor of the United States. Although China has experienced meteoric economic growth in recent decades, the Chinese state has manifold weaknesses. It grapples with the prospect of adverse demographic transitions, contradictions between Beijing’s command polity and pseudo-liberal economy, and an unbalanced growth strategy that emphasizes overinvestment at the cost of domestic consumption. These weaknesses may yet take their toll, leading to either a collapse of China’s hitherto relentless expansion or its severe moderation.

(Note: “SOE’s” are “State-Owned Enterprises”.

#### US review blocks Chinese SOE’s now. Post-plan, China will be positioned to expand their State-run interests.

Chow ‘15

Daniel C.K. Chow - Professor of Law at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. “WHY CHINA WANTS A BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY WITH THE UNITED STATES” - BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Volume 33 – available at: https://www.bu.edu/ilj/files/2015/04/Chow-Why-China-Wants-a-Bilateral-Investment-Treaty.pdf

First, a BIT may allow China to expand the reach and influence of China's SOEs, which are likely to benefit most from the BIT. China has a national policy of promoting SOEs to become "national champions" that can compete with the world's largest multinational companies. Three of the ten largest companies by revenue in Fortune's Global 500 are from China.33 Furthermore, China leads the list of newcomers to the Global 500 in 2014 with seven of the twenty-three new companies.34 U.S. federal laws subject FDI by Chinese SOEs to scrutiny and allow the United States to block such investments unilaterally to protect U.S. national interests.35 In addition. U.S. politicians can informally pressure U.S. and Chinese companies to abandon various FDI projects. For example, in 2005, the U.S. Congress, citing national security concerns, pressured a Chinese state-owned oil company to withdraw its bid to purchase Unocal, a U.S. energy company.36 The United States' concern is that SOEs, as instruments of the State and the Communist Party, make their decisions in accordance with policy goals of the State-Party, which may threaten the economic viability of U.S. firms at home and abroad. China asserts, on the other hand, that SOEs make decisions based solely on commercial considerations.38 Part LB will examine this issue in further detail.39 For now, it is important to emphasize that once China enters into a BIT with the United States, it could become more difficult for the U.S. government to block FDI by Chinese SOEs in the United States. Under the 2012 Model BIT, used by the United States in negotiating all of its BITs, China will acquire rights and protections not currently enjoyed under U.S. law.40 These new rights and protections could prevent the United States from unilaterally blocking FDI projects by Chinese SOEs.41 Moreover, not only does the Model BIT contain important new rights and protections for foreign investors, but it also offers a dispute resolution mechanism in which the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID"), an international tribunal, resolves investment disputes through binding arbitration.42 In other words, while the United States currently has the final say on whether to approve a Chinese investment (just as the Chinese government has the final say over FDI in China), once a U.S.-China BIT is effectuated, the final determination could be in the hands of a neutral international tribunal.

(Note: “SOE’s” are “State-Owned Enterprises”. “FDI” is “Foreign Direct Investment”)

#### Economic growth allows China to leverage power against the US. That erodes US hegemony and turns the Aff by increasing tensions.

Tellis ‘14

(Ashley J., senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues, “Balancing Without Containment: An American Strategy for Managing China,” <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/balancing_without_containment.pdf>)

Although American mistrust of China is perhaps not as acute—at least right now, given the U.S. advantages in relative power—there is little doubt that significant anxieties persist because of challenges in diverse areas ranging from economic relations to military operations to alliances and geopolitics. As China’s power continues to grow, the discordance between Washington and Beijing in these and many other areas will likely be aggravated, thus intensifying the competition between the two countries. As Aaron Friedberg summarized it succinctly, “the United States and the People’s Republic of China are today **locked in a quiet but increasingly intense struggle for power** and influence, not only in Asia but around the world.”5 When all is said and done, this deepening Sino-American power-political competition derives fundamentally from the fact that both nations find themselves trapped in inescapable opposition. The United States seeks to protect its global hegemony—as it must, if it is to advance its varied national interests—while rising Chinese power is oriented toward eroding that U.S. primacy, which remains the most dangerous external constraint on Beijing’s ability to use its steadily accumulating power to reshape the extant political order to serve its own interests. This rivalry is manifested in diverse ways, from contests over control of the Asian rimlands and the Indo-Pacific to ideological competition over different models of state-society relations. It is ultimately rooted, however, in material factors, namely what Robert Gilpin has called “the uneven growth of power among the dominant states in the [international] system.”6 Power, in this context, is a multidimensional phenomenon. It refers to the ability of a state to protect its freedom of action through the possession of superior economic capabilities that in turn **enable the production of requisite military strength**. These twin foundations allow a state to acquire the other trappings of power, such as the ability to attract and protect friends and allies, secure a seat at the high tables of international governance, and popularize ideologies that help to secure international acceptance of its standing. China’s expanding economy, which has grown at an average of some 10 percent of gross national product (GNP) annually during the past thirty-odd years, has enabled it to become the new global power most capable of challenging U.S. primacy. Shorn of all subtlety, Beijing’s rise poses a special problem for U.S. interests because it threatens a possible power transition at the core of the global system. If China continues to grow at higher rates than the United States well into the future, it could in time displace Washington as the most important entity worldwide and threaten the postwar international order that has been built and maintained by preeminent American power.7

US hegemony prevents escalating global wars

Keck, ‘14

(Zachary, Managing Editor of the Diplomat, “America’s Relative Decline: Should We Panic?” <http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/americas-relative-decline-should-we-panic/>)

Still, on balance, the U.S. has been a positive force in the world, especially for a unipolar power. Certainly, it’s hard to imagine many other countries acting as benignly if they possessed the amount of relative power America had at the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the British were not nearly as powerful as the U.S. in the 19th Century and they incorporated most of the globe in their colonial empire. Even when it had to contend with another superpower, Russia occupied half a continent by brutally suppressing its populace. Had the U.S. collapsed and the Soviet Union emerged as the Cold War victor, Western Europe would likely be speaking Russian by now. It’s difficult to imagine China defending a rule-based, open international order if it were a unipolar power, much less making an effort to uphold a minimum level of human rights in the world. Regardless of your opinion on U.S. global leadership over the last two decades, however, there is good reason to fear its relative decline compared with China and other emerging nations. To begin with, hegemonic transition periods have historically been the most destabilizing eras in history. This is not only because of the malign intentions of the rising and established power(s). Even if all the parties have benign, peaceful intentions, the rise of new global powers necessitates revisions to the “rules of the road.” This is nearly impossible to do in any organized fashion given the anarchic nature of the international system, where there is no central authority that can govern interactions between states. We are already starting to see the potential dangers of hegemonic transition periods in the Asia-Pacific (and arguably the Middle East). As China grows more economically and militarily powerful, it has unsurprisingly sought to expand its influence in East Asia. This necessarily has to come at the expense of other powers, which so far has primarily meant the U.S., Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Naturally, these powers have sought to resist Chinese encroachments on their territory and influence, and the situation grows more tense with each passing day. Should China eventually emerge as a global power, or should nations in other regions enjoy a similar rise as Kenny suggests, this situation will play itself out elsewhere in the years and decades ahead. All of this highlights some of the advantages of a unipolar system. Namely, although the U.S. has asserted military force quite frequently in the post-Cold War era, it has only fought weak powers and thus its wars have been fairly limited in terms of the number of casualties involved. At the same time, America’s preponderance of power has prevented a great power war, and even restrained major regional powers from coming to blows. For instance, the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par with the Israeli-Arab or Iran-Iraq wars of the Cold War. As the unipolar era comes to a close, the possibility of great power conflict and especially major regional wars rises dramatically. The world will also have to contend with conventionally inferior powers like Japan acquiring nuclear weapons to protect their interests against their newly empowered rivals. But even if the transitions caused by China’s and potentially other nations’ rises are managed successfully, there are still likely to be significant negative effects on international relations. In today’s “globalized” world, it is commonly asserted that many of the defining challenges of our era can only be solved through multilateral cooperation. Examples of this include climate change, health pandemics, organized crime and terrorism, global financial crises, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, among many others. A unipolar system, for all its limitations, is uniquely suited for organizing effective global action on these transnational issues. This is because there is a clear global leader who can take the initiative and, to some degree, compel others to fall in line. In addition, the unipole’s preponderance of power lessens the intensity of competition among the global players involved. Thus, while there are no shortages of complaints about the limitations of global governance today, there is no question that global governance has been many times more effective in the last 25 years than it was during the Cold War.

## Alternate 1NC Impact Module

### Global Ecology – Impact Module

Western growth efforts – like the Aff – are key anti-green Chinese economic growth.

Li, ‘14

(Minqi, Professor of Economics @ the University of Utah, *Peak Oil, Climate Change, and the Limits to China’s Economic Growth,* pg. 169, Routledge)

Without fundamental changes, the most likely scenario is for China to continue on the current path of capitalist accumulation. The Chinese government will undertake further "economic reforms." The remaining state-owned enterprises will be privatized. Without serious adjustment of economic and social policies, inequality in income and wealth distribution will keep rising. **Environmental conditions will continue to deteriorate.** With mass consumption depressed**, the economy will depend on** excessively high levels of investment **to sustain growth.** In Chapter 7, it is argued that these tendencies are likely to result in a general economic, social, and environmental crisis in the 2020s, leading to the collapse of the Chinese economy. Given China's central position in the global division of labor, a collapse of the Chinese economy may lead to the collapse of the global economy**.**

China is key to the global ecology – the impact’s massive death tolls.

Li, ‘16

(Minqi, Professor of Economics @ the University of Utah, *China and the 21st Century Crisis*, Pluto Press, Pg. 11-12)

The pursuit of infinite economic growth is the defining feature of modern capitalism. But the exponential growth of material production and consumption has depleted natural resources and degraded the environment. Much of the global environmental space was used up by the global capitalist expansion during the second half of the twentieth century. In the early twenty-first century, **various global ecological systems are** on the verge of collapse**.** In particular, impending climate catastrophes threaten to undermine the foundation of human civilization. These developments suggest that the various conditions, which historically have underpinned the normal operation of the capitalist world system, are being fundamentally transformed and the basic laws of motion of capitalism can no longer be sustained. China is set to overtake the United States to become the world's largest economy. The Chinese working class is the worlds largest. In a few years, a militant working class movement is likely to emerge in China. **China is also the world's largest energy consumer and greenhouse gas emitter. Therefore, China is** at the center **of the contemporary global economic, social, and** ecological contradictions.

## Extensions – Uniqueness, Link, and Internal link

### BIT – Uniqueness, Link

#### Chinese economy will decline in the status quo – a BIT is key to reversing that trend.

Schneider ‘13

Howard Schneider covers international economics at the Post. He has been at the paper for 20 years in a variety of reporting and editing roles, and served abroad as bureau chief in Jerusalem, Cairo and Toronto. The author also holds a Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) in Economics from the University of Maryland College Park - “China agrees to broad investment talks” – Washington Post - July 11, 2013 - <https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/china-agrees-to-broad-investment-talks/2013/07/11/2d535930-ea63-11e2-a301-ea5a8116d211_story.html>

China and the United States have agreed to restart negotiations over a possible investment treaty that could substantially open the Chinese economy to more American companies. During high-level talks over the past two days, Chinese officials agreed to drop a longstanding demand that negotiations over a Bilateral Investment Treaty would have to exclude sensitive or developing sectors of the economy that it wanted to protect. Although many American companies have businesses in China, investment there is governed by a strict set of rules that often limits foreign ownership — a policy, U.S. officials argue, that will crimp China’s growth in the long term and which limits the benefits American companies and workers can gain from China’s economic expansion. American officials characterized the change in negotiating policy as a major concession and a sign that the new Chinese government wants to speed economic opening. The concession is no guarantee that a treaty will ever be signed, or that any future pact will be as comprehensive as U.S. officials and business executives hope. Indeed, BIT talks have technically been underway for five years but have been stalled for much of that time. Still, “the commitment made today stands to be a significant breakthrough,” Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew said in a statement. It marks the first time China has agreed to talks that “include all sectors and stages of investment.” The United States has BITs with 41 developing countries, from economic successes such as Poland to strategic allies such as Egypt and small countries such as Albania. While the world’s industrial countries are generally open to foreign investors and have trustworthy courts and political institutions, BITs are used to open up developing markets, encourage the flow of capital across borders and protect it once it gets there. In China’s case, U.S. officials say they hope such a treaty would mark a turning point in U.S.-China economic relations — allowing American companies, particularly in services and other areas where they hold a competitive advantage, to benefit from China’s large population and growing wealth. The announcement of the investment talks was the most prominent outcome of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue held over the last two days. Although it may signal the reformist intentions of new President Xi Jinping, it also reflects China’s anxiety over the economic constraints it is starting to feel. Foreign investment has been key to the country’s growth over the last 20 years, for example, but in the case of capital from the U.S. that has begun to flag.

### BIT – Specific Links

#### A BIT would cause a unique boost in profits for Chinese SOE’s

Chow ‘15

Daniel C.K. Chow - Professor of Law at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. “WHY CHINA WANTS A BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY WITH THE UNITED STATES” - BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Volume 33 – available at: https://www.bu.edu/ilj/files/2015/04/Chow-Why-China-Wants-a-Bilateral-Investment-Treaty.pdf

After the conclusion of a BIT with China, the MFN and NT principles would provide additional significant protections to the admission of FDI into the United States. The United States would then be subjected to basic principles of international trade law concerning how the United States treats FDI from China. A BIT would increase the admission of Chinese FDI into the United States. As SOEs or state-favored companies, such as Huawei, would be the major beneficiaries of a new BIT regime, China may be able to expand the power and reach of SOEs (and state-favored enterprises) in the United States. FDI inflows from China would increase without a BIT; however, that increase would be marginal in comparison to the inflows with the BIT, as inflows are a BIT's primary objective. Chinese investors would likely be state-owned or state-favored enterprises, as they have the support of the State-Party and access to financial resources to make significant investments. In 2011, the Chinese government reported the existence of 144,700 state-owned or state-controlled enterprises, excluding financial institutions, with assets worth $13.6 trillion.16 SOEs are likely to receive state support because they generally carry out the policies of the State-Party.

(Note: “SOE’s” are “State-Owned Enterprises”. “FDI” is “Foreign Direct Investment”)

### BIT = boosts China’s strategic interests

#### China will use to a BIT to advance strategic – and not just economic – interests.

Chow ‘15

Daniel C.K. Chow - Professor of Law at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. “WHY CHINA WANTS A BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY WITH THE UNITED STATES” - BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Volume 33 – available at: https://www.bu.edu/ilj/files/2015/04/Chow-Why-China-Wants-a-Bilateral-Investment-Treaty.pdf

While the economic benefits of a BIT for the United States are often touted, less attention in the media or commentary has been given to a BIT's potential benefits for China. Benefits for the United States include additional business opportunities; however, an analysis of the benefits of a BIT for China requires going beyond an examination of commercial advantages alone. China is governed by the Communist Party; thus, an analysis of the benefits that a BIT may provide for China must examine the strategic political advantages that a BIT could create for the State-Party. No significant national commitment, such as entering into a BIT with the United States, may occur without the State-Party's consent and, of course, the State-Party will not agree to a BIT unless it believes that the BIT will further the State-Party's long-term political interests. This Article attempts to identify some of the key political and strategic objectives that a BIT may serve for the State-Party. This Article's purpose is not, however, to debate or analyze whether a U.S.-China BIT is in the best interests of either country. That is a complex subject, which requires separate and extensive treatment. However, it is important to realize that the State-Party in China would not agree to enter into a BIT with the United States for new business opportunities alone. Although the State-Party is concerned with new business opportunities, the State-Party will also consider overriding objectives that will help strengthen China's global economic position and enhance China's status as a world power. While the economic benefits of a BIT to the United States and China, such as increased trade, may be apparent, the strategic and political benefits of a BIT to China may not be. This Article articulates the strategic and political advantages of a BIT for China. These important strategic and political advantages, not just economic motives, underlie China's desire to enter into a BIT with the United States.

### Import Tariffs – Links Module

#### Unique-Link – a BIT allows China to avoid import tariffs.

Chow ‘15

Daniel C.K. Chow - Professor of Law at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. “WHY CHINA WANTS A BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY WITH THE UNITED STATES” - BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Volume 33 – available at: <https://www.bu.edu/ilj/files/2015/04/Chow-Why-China-Wants-a-Bilateral-Investment-Treaty.pdf>

Third, a BIT could allow China to accomplish an increasingly important objective: to evade or mitigate the effects of border measures imposed by the United States on imported goods from China. Currently, the United States aggressively pursues a wide array of trade sanctions against imports from China, including anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties, quantitative restrictions (quotas), and safeguards.51 Moreover, the increasing use of border measures, including double remedies, to prevent the growth of the expanding U.S. trade deficit with China52 evinces a general reluctance on the part of the U.S. government towards China's trade practices.53 There are even bills pending in Congress that threaten to subject every import from China to punitive trade sanctions.3'\* Trade measures are imposed on imports from China at the border and are administered by U.S. Customs authorities.55 While trade sanctions are authorized by the agreements of the World Trade Organization ("WTO"),56 any particular U.S. action may be challenged both in the United States and before the WTO. A BIT would allow China to establish or acquire U.S. business entities that will manufacture some of the goods that are now the target of U.S. trade sanctions imposed at the border. Of course, goods that are manufactured in the United States are not subject to border measures imposed on imports.59 In the 1980s and 1990s, Japan followed a similar strategy, successfully shifting manufacturing operations to the United States to avoid the effect of U.S. quotas on imports of automobiles from Japan.60 Under a U.S.-China BIT, China may be able to emulate this strategy.

#### Avoiding border tariffs would significantly increase growth of Chinese SOE’s

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How would a BIT help China evade or mitigate the effects of these border measures? Anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties, and quotas are imposed on imports at the border and do not apply to goods produced domestically in the United States. An example of the use of FDI to evade the effect of a border measure is the case of the 1981 quota on imported automobiles from Japan.202 After negotiations, Japan "voluntarily" agreed to limit its exports to 1.68 million passenger vehicles to the United States203—a Voluntary Export Restraint ("VER") under which the exporting country, usually as a result of political pressure or threats from the importing country, "voluntarily" agrees to limit exports, which has the same effect as a quota imposed by the importing country.204 Soon after the 1981 quota went into effect, Honda, a Japanese car manufacturer, opened its first manufacturing plant in Marysville, Ohio.205 By 1991, the economic impact of the quota was zero because the number of cars imported from Japan was well below the quota limit.206 In fact. Japan had shifted manufacturing to plants hi the United States and was able to supply the U.S. market in part with domestically manufactured automobiles, which were, of course, not subject to the quota. Since the 1990s, Japanese and other foreign car manufacturers have opened several new manufacturing plants in the United States to meet the high U.S. demand for their products.207 Can China follow a similar strategy to avoid the effect of border measures, and would it be a savvy business decision for China to shift some of its manufacturing to the United States? Shifting the manufacturing of low-value, labor intensive products, such as toys, games, and apparel to the United States, might not be a shrewd business decision because China enjoys a comparative advantage in low labor costs. However, China has been shifting its focus from manufacturing low-value, labor intensive products to exporting more high-value, technologically advanced products, for which low labor costs are not essential to generate profits. Locating some of the manufacturing of advanced technology products in the United States may allow China to avoid the imposition of anti-dumping duties on these products. The United States has an anti-circumvention measure.209 which is designed to prevent foreign companies subject to anti-dumping duties from shipping paits to the United States where simple assembly operations occur. The foreign company might thereby be able to avoid the imposition of an anti-dumping order because the goods are produced domestically by a U.S. company and are not subject to anti-dumping duties imposed at the border. If the foreign company is deemed to have engaged in circumvention, the product, although manufactured in the United States, will be subject to the anti-dumping duty.210 However, there are several reasons why an anti-circumvention measure will likely have a limited impact on China's ability to avoid border measures. The anti-circumvention measure applies only under the following conditions: 1. The merchandise sold in the United States must be made from parts or components produced in the country subject to the antidumping duty order; 2. The value of the parts or components imported from the country subject to the order must be "a significant portion of the total value of the [completed] merchandise;" and 3. The process of assembly or completion in the United States must be "minor or insignificant."211 These factors suggest that the statute's purpose is not to deter genuine FDI but to preclude the use of simple assembly operations in the United States and evade the imposition of anti-dumping duties. Moreover, if China did set up a manufacturing facility in the United States, then China may in fact gam a favorable political foothold in the United States. A manufacturing facility creates jobs for the local economy, tax revenue, and support for related local industries (such as the automotive parts manufacturers in the Honda case above). American workers at the Chinese-owned manufacturing facility are likely to oppose additional tariffs on their products, and they could pressure U.S. politicians to fight against such measures. Establishing manufacturing operations in the United States could also help China evade countervailing duties. Moreover, although there is an anti-circumvention measure that applies to anti-dumping duties, no similar anti-circumvention measure exists for subsidies and countervailing duties. A current heated controversy between China and the United States (as well as other countries) concerns China's provision of subsidies for green technologies, i.e., solar panels. The United States and the European Union claim that government subsidies are providing competitive advantages to Chinese companies that manufacture solar panels and other green technologies, and that the financial benefit of these subsidies creates a competitive advantage for Chinese exports.213 The EU recently settled a dispute with China over low-priced solar panels that almost erupted into a trade war after the EU threatened to impose punitive tariffs on imported solar panels from China.214 Suppose, however, that China had invested in a manufacturing facility in the United States to produce solar panels that had been sold directly from the U.S. plant. Suppose further that intra-corporate transfers between the Chinese parent company and the U.S. manufacturing subsidiary had allowed the parent company to pass through government financial contributions to the Chinese-owned U.S. manufacturer. This arrangement might have allowed China to avoid the effect of any countervailing duties that may have been imposed on its solar panels because the panels were manufactured domestically in the United States, and. as of the present, no anti-circumvention measure would have applied to subsidies unlike anti-dumping duties. In fact, in 2010, Suntech Power Holdings, the world's largest manufacturer of solar panels, opened a manufacturing facility in Goodyear, Arizona, to produce solar panels in the United States.215 Other Chinese companies in industries ranging from automotive parts, steel pipes, construction equipment, household appliances, and electronics have made major investments in manufacturing facilities in the United States. These major investments216 might be a preemptive move to avoid the effect of anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties, quotas, or a combination of these measures imposed on imports at the border. Finally, establishing manufacturing operations in the United States could help Chinese companies avoid quotas or quantitative restrictions on 111 imports. Although quotas are generally prohibited under the GATT, quotas may be permitted as a "safeguard," a temporary trade remedy permitted to last for up to four years in the case of a putative trade emergency, such as a sudden surge in exports to the United States that results in disruptions to certain U.S. industries.219 Because the goods would be manufactured in the United States, the goods would, of course, not be subject to import quotas. Moreover, any effort by the United States to pressure, persuade, or influence China into voluntarily limiting its exports,220 as in the Japan auto case of 1981,221 would be ineffective if the goods were manufactured in the United States. Manufacturing products in the United States may also allow Chinese companies to avoid the effects of federal laws that currently prohibit the U.S. government from buying products and services from countries, such as China, which are not members of the WTO Government Procurement Agreement of 2011 ("GPA"). Government procurement is exempt from the NT principle under the GATT223 and GATS.224 This allows WTO members to discriminate freely against foreign goods and services in favor of domestically produced goods and services in government procurement. Some countries, however, have voluntarily joined the GPA, which requires its members to extend NT to the goods and services of other GPA members in government procurement. Under this requirement, the United States, as a GPA member, cannot give preferential treatment hi buying goods and services to U.S. companies over companies from other GPA member countries, such as the EU countries. Rather, the U.S. government must treat all bids from U.S. and GPA member companies on an equal basis. China is currently not a member of the GPA; thus, China is free to discriminate against U.S. goods and services in its government procurement, and, in turn, the U.S. government is prohibited by federal law from purchasing goods and services from non-GPA members, such as China (although the GPA countries do purchase substantial amounts of goods and services from China).225 In 2011, the United States spent $537 billion or about fourteen percent of the federal budget on government procurement;226 government procurement is therefore a vast and lucrative market. If China establishes or acquires manufacturing subsidiaries in the United States, the products that those subsidiaries make are considered American-made goods. Despite the Chinese ownership of these subsidiaries, they are formed under U.S. law and are U.S. corporations. As a result, goods produced by these Chinese-owned. U.S. subsidiaries are eligible for U.S. government procurement. Additionally, goods that are manufactured in the United States may have a broader appeal to certain segments of U.S. consumers that wish to purchase American-made products rather than foreign products. China is. of course, aware that Congress is concerned about the massive U.S. trade deficit with China, and that there are several pending bills threatening to impose new unprecedented trade sanctions in the form of countervailing duties on all goods of any kind imported from China.227 Due perhaps to the considerations set forth in this Part of the article, a few Chinese companies have already made sizeable FDI investments in manufacturing facilities in the United States; however, Chinese inflows of FDI into the United States, as noted above, make up $4 billion, which is only a fraction above two percent of the $175 billion total FDI inflows into the United States overall due at least in part to what China perceives to be a negative political climate. By developing new protections for FDI inflows from China, a BIT could create significant opportunities to acquire or establish manufacturing facilities in the United States to avoid the effect of border measures imposed on Chinese imports.

### CFIUS links

#### CFIUS deters and reduces Chinese State-owned FDI.

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Several recent cases indicate that both CFIUS and U.S. policymakers are willing to block investment transactions by Chinese firms, especially when the firms are state-owned or are favored by the State. Note that it is not necessary for CFIUS or the President to issue a formal order to block an investment transaction.103 Concerns raised by CFIUS may be sufficient to deter parties from going forward with a transaction. For example, in February 2010, Emcore Corporation, a manufacturer of components for fiber optics systems, announced that it had agreed to sell sixty percent of its fiber optics business to a Chinese SOE for $27.8 million.104 However, in June 2010, Emcore canceled the transaction due to concerns raised by CFIUS.105 In May 2010, Huawei Technologies purchased IP assets from 3Leaf Systems for $2 million.106 Members of Congress expressed concerns that Huawei's acquisition of U.S. technology would provide access for the Communist Party to core computer technology and threaten U.S. national security interests.107 In February 2011. CFIUS formally notified Huawei that it should terminate its offer to acquire the 3Leaf assets.108 Huawei subsequently withdrew its offer.109 Note that Huawei is not an SOE but a private company.110 Although Huawei is a private company, U.S. officials were concerned that Huawei might be a state-favored enterprise due to its close ties to the Party and the Chinese government.111

#### The link’s unique – CFIUS succeeds at reducing profit for China’s State-owned businesses.

Chow ‘15

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The threat of a possible CFIUS investigation and action by the President means that no formal action of any kind by CFIUS, such as the initiation of an investigation, is necessary to derail an investment transaction. Political opposition alone can lead to the unraveling of a deal. In 2005, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation ("CNOCC") made an $18.5 billion bid 111 to purchase Unocal, a U.S. energy company. Some members of Congress expressed concerns that vital energy assets owned by Unocal would come under the control of a Chinese SOE and that China would acquire Unocal's advanced technologies.113 The political opposition in Congress led CNOCC to withdraw its bid.114 Another notable incident involved Ralls Corporation, a Chinese-owned U.S. firm. On September 28, 2012, President Obama issued an order requiring Ralls to divest its interests in four Oregon wind farm companies that Ralls had already acquired.115 The divestiture order was issued due to national security concerns regarding the proximity of the companies to a naval test facility.116 This action indicates that even investment transactions that have already been completed may be reversed by subsequent divestiture orders by the U.S. government.117 The negative scrutiny that Chinese investment draws from politicians and administrative agencies in the United States appears to create disincentives for China to invest in the United States and may be one reason why Chinese FDI inflows into the United States represent only $4 billion out of the $175 billion total FDI inflows into the United States in 2012.118 Avoiding political controversy in the United States also seems to be the rationale behind the decision by the China Investment Corporation, a sovereign wealth fund with over $200 billion in capital, to keep many of its equity investments in the United States to less than ten percent,119 the threshold that would qualify the investment as FDI under U.S. law120 and might trigger review by U.S. authorities.

#### CFIUS requirement ensure transparent intentions for Chinese SOEs.

Miner ‘15

et al; SEAN MINER is China program manager and research associate at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. The Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE; Peterson Institute) is a private and non-profit think tank focused on international economics, based in Washington, D.C. According to the 2014 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report (Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, University of Pennsylvania), Peterson is number 15 (of 150) in the "Top Think Tanks Worldwide" - From the Chapter “ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED AND THE US-CHINA BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY: CHALLENGES IN MEETING CHINA'S DEMANDS” – From the paper “TOWARD A US-CHINA INVESTMENT TREATY” - PIIE Briefing 15-1 - February 2015 -https://piie.com/publications/briefings/piieb15-1.pdf

The main cause of anxiety from SOEs investing abroad is that their intentions are not transparent. Because of this opaqueness, many US observers expect worst-case scenarios, for example, that SOEs may be acting to fulfill the foreign policy goals of their government. Any host country would object to such behavior, since SOE investments could undermine its national security. Moreover, SOEs could collude in their international business deals, for example, by not bidding against each other when attempting acquisitions abroad. In 2011, China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and SASAC signed a memorandum of collaboration to coordinate when making acquisitions abroad in order to "prevent unhealthy competition."12 Observers also speculate that SOEs don't act fairly in their home business environment, by favoring national firms over foreign firms in their procurement decisions. SASAC's market power abroad raises other issues. The European Commission decided to treat all the enterprises managed by SASAC as a single corporate entity, since the Communist Party is the controlling shareholder of all of them. This makes sense because of SASAC's latent market power: If one entity under SASAC is engaging in business in a foreign country, it seems unlikely that another SASAC entity in the same sector would enter that same market and attempt to compete against its SASAC "cousin." Moreover, SASAC firms acting together can wield significant market power, for example, by refusing to purchase from certain firms or by purchasing only from each other. An underlying issue is the transparency of SOE business dealings. The US government wants to ensure that SOEs operating abroad do so with only commercial considerations in mind. It also wants to guard against collusive and unfair practices. These goals are difficult to achieve when SOE operations are shrouded in mystery. However, SOEs are required to notify the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) of all mergers and acquisitions involving US assets. This requirement ensures a high level of transparency for SOEs doing business in the United States, but it does not ensure transparency for SOE business practices in the Chinese home market.

### Econ Growth – Internal links

#### Chinese Economic growth is vital to Chinese military objectives.

Tellis, ‘14

(Ashley J., senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues, “Balancing Without Containment: An American Strategy for Managing China,” <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/balancing_without_containment.pdf>)

Furthermore, China’s central location within the larger concentration of Asian economic power—the fastest-growing hub in the international system—endows its growth with even greater significance. There is a risk that Beijing might someday exercise choking control over this critical geopolitical space and thereby endanger larger American and global security.13 Today, **even before China has completely risen**, **it is already committed to the objective of enforcing a strict hierarchy in Asia**, meaning that Beijing’s position at the top of the continental order is acknowledged and respected by all its neighbors. As François Godement has pointed out, Chinese strategy for securing such primacy has **revolved around translating the massive economic gains** it has made in recent years into a geopolitical approach that emphasizes “coercion without force.”14 Even more astutely, Christopher Ford has noted that “the ‘thorough submission’ of other countries” that China seeks is meant to be voluntary—that is, these countries “would be expected not to have to be forced to comply, but rather spontaneously to choose to take their place within the status-hierarchy under the benevolent guidance of the virtuous leader.”15 This is the only explanation that does justice to then Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi’s outburst at the 2010 meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations when, staring directly at Singapore’s then foreign minister, George Yeo, he bluntly declared that “China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact.”16

Just in case Beijing’s neighbors do not get the message, however, China has begun to put in place the foundations **for enforcing its own version of the Monroe Doctrine** along its various peripheries. **Beginning with “cartographic aggression”**17 through claims such as its “9-dash line” in the South China Sea and its expansive assertions along the Sino-Indian border to further efforts at “national enclosure”18 through its recently expanded air defense identification zone in the East China Sea to mounting “the world’s biggest military expansion”19 for several years running, China is systematically laying the foundations to ensure that its neighbors **acquiesce to its burgeoning hegemony** while simultaneously ensuring their isolation vis-à-vis their most important external protector, namely the United States. To be sure, China does not yet pose the kind of military threats to Asia that the Soviet Union posed to Europe in its heyday. This condition, however, may not last for long given that China’s relations with its neighbors are troubled in many ways. Disputes over continental and maritime boundaries persist, status rivalries between China and its Asian peers have not disappeared, and Beijing has, at least so far, studiously refused to renounce the use of force in resolving geopolitical disagreements at a time when its own capacity to mount significant standoff attacks on adjacent countries is rapidly growing. Consequently, however remote the prospect may seem at present, the United States could find itself in a conflict with China in the future thanks to its extended deterrence obligations to various Asian nations. Conflicts between China and its neighbors that do not directly involve the United States but nevertheless affect U.S. interests are also possible. On balance, both these contingencies have inevitably impelled China “**to expand and rapidly accelerate improvements in…[its] military and economic capabilities as well as increase its external influence to simultaneously establish political and economic dominance over the periphery**…[in order to] provide leverage against future great power pressure.”20 And these developments, all told, will almost automatically accentuate regional security dilemmas vis-à-vis both China’s neighbors and the United States.

### SOE Internal link – SOE’s profits boost China objectives

#### SOE profits will be used to implement China objectives.

Chow ‘15

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In addition, all SOEs are subject to the supervisory control of the central level State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council ("SASAC").170 The SASAC is a majority and controlling shareholder in almost eveiy leading firm and industry in China.171 Not only is the SASAC a controlling shareholder in all critical SOEs, but the SASAC also routinely exchanges personnel on a rotating basis with the SOEs over which it exercises supervision.172 The purpose of this rotation is to deepen cooperation between SOEs and the PRC government.173 Because almost all high-ranking government officials in China are Party members,174 it is likely that the SASAC and SOE officials that are part of this personnel rotation are also Party members. This exchange of personnel further foments Party control over SOEs. Thus, because it is likely that SOEs are subject in significant part to State-Party control, SOEs are likely to be given the resources and incentives that they need to engage in FDI to promote the State-Party's long-term investment and economic objectives. By giving rotating Party members key management and executive positions in SOEs. the Party is able to control the most important sectors of the economy. By providing resources to Party-controlled SOEs, the Party can then also realize its long-term economic objectives.

## Extensions – Impacts

### Chinese Growth Kills US Hegemony

Chinese growth signals a collapse of US primacy and escalates smaller disputes

Tellis, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues, ‘14

(Ashley J., “Balancing Without Containment: An American Strategy for Managing China,” <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/balancing_without_containment.pdf>)

This transition will not occur automatically if China’s GNP one day exceeds that of the United States. Rather, the threat of supersession will be more gradual as continuing Chinese economic growth—at levels superior to the expansion occurring in the United States— **steadily enables Beijing to acquire all the other accoutrements that make for comprehensive national power**. On current trends, China will consistently accumulate these capabilities over the next two decades. It certainly aims to do so, at the latest, by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China and the date by which Chinese President Xi Jinping has declared China’s intention to become a fully developed nation. Acquiring the appropriate foundations of power will position China to achieve, first, strategic equivalence with the United States, thus transforming the international **system into a meaningfully bipolar order.** Then, depending on Beijing’s own fortunes, China may possibly surpass Washington as the center of gravity in international politics. Irrespective of which outcome occurs—**or when**—either eventuality would **by definition** signal the demise of the primacy that the United States has enjoyed since the end of the Second World War. Even if during this process a power transition in the strict vocabulary of realist international relations theory is avoided—a possibility because China’s per capita income will lag behind that of the United States for a long time even if it acquires the world’s largest GNP—Beijing’s capacity to challenge Washington’s interests in multiple arenas, ranging from geopolitics to trade and from advancing human rights **to protecting the commons**, **will only increase as its power expands**. In other words, China will demonstrate how a rival can, as Thomas J. Christensen phrased it, “[**pose] problems without catching up**.”8 As Avery Goldstein has persuasively argued, these hazards could materialize rather quickly because China is currently pursuing provocative policies on territorial disputes over islands in the East and South China Seas.9

That these disputes, which a former U.S. official described as involving “uninhabited and uninhabitable rocks,”10 do not appear prima facie to implicate a systemic crisis **should not be reassuring** to the United States because every serious contestation that occurs in future Sino-American relations will materialize against the backdrop of a possible power transition **so long as China’s growth rates**—even when diminishing—**continue to exceed those of the United States**. This dynamic, as William R. Thompson has pointed out, can produce extended “crisis slides” in which even “relatively trivial incidents or a string of seemingly minor crises” may suffice to escalate what was up to that point a precarious structural transformation into full-fledged geopolitical polarization and major war.11 Since the relative disparity in Sino-American economic performance is likely to persist for quite some time, even trifling quarrels will push bilateral ties ever more concertedly in the direction of greater abrasion as accumulating Chinese power further constrains U.S. freedom of action.

### US Hegemony – impact – 2nc

US hegemonic decline causes major power wars.

Zhang and Shi 11

Yuhan Zhang, researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., and Lin Shi, from Columbia University. She also serves as an independent consultant for the Eurasia Group and a consultant for the World Bank in Washington, D.C., East Asia Forum, January 22, 2011, “America’s decline: A harbinger of conflict and rivalry”, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-a-harbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry

Over the past two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military. Under these circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear, many actors have bandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US, creating a status quo that has tended to mute great power conflicts. However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers, so will the pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an international order where power is more diffuse, American interests and influence can be more readily challenged, and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid. As history attests, power decline and redistribution result in military confrontation. For example, in the late 19th century America’s emergence as a regional power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the turn of the 20th century, accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the American Navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain ‘rules the waves.’ Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of the Western Hemisphere’s security to become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of law. Defining this US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights, constraints on the actions of powerful individuals and groups and some degree of equal opportunities for broad segments of society. As a result of such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms have appeared. And, with this, many countries have sought opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations. However, what will happen to these advances as America’s influence declines? Given that America’s authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global society in a profoundly detrimental way. Public imagination and academia have anticipated that a post-hegemonic world would return to the problems of the 1930s: regional blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry. Furthermore, multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regional organisations. For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by Washington’s withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders. Free markets would become more politicised — and, well, less free — and major powers would compete for supremacy. Additionally, such power plays have historically possessed a zero-sum element. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded, so did international regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973).

### A-to “reforms solve for anti-green Chinese growth”

Reforms fail

Shaprio, PhD, aculty of the Global Environmental Politics program and directs the Dual Degree in Natural Resources and Sustainable Development (NRSD) with University for Peace in Costa Rica, ‘16

(Judith, *China’s Environmental Challenges*, Wiley, Conclusion)

Officials have **recognized growing levels of environmental harm** - stemming partly from a sense of lawlessness among middle-level officials and industrial leaders - and they have instituted world-class environmental regulations. **However, these laws are** poorly enforced **and the de facto reality remains** woefully behind **the ideal**. **This** implementation gap **stems at least in part from a political and social conflict between Western-style economic growth and a healthy environment**. For example, deforestation is understood as a problem that creates erosion and flooding at home; the government bans logging in sensitive river headwaters **but simultaneously fosters a manufacturing sector that supplies the furniture needs of consumers an ocean away**. Thus, the government essentially looks the other way as domestic forests continue to be cut and as timber enters - often illegally - from ravaged forests in Southeast Asia, Russia, and Africa. Water use is a similar arena where the state appears torn between conflicting goals. The massive South-North water transfer is an example: Intended to relieve water shortages in the Northeast, the project has caused dislocation and hardship for local populations and, activists argue, could create environmental problems and increase tensions with surrounding countries whose major rivers will be affected by the plan if the Western route is built. What is more, beyond its borders, **China has largely** refused to cooperate **in regional, transboundary management schemes such as the Mekong River Commission**.

# TOPICALITY

## Plan cannot be a Quid-Pro-Quo

### Only Positive - 1NC

#### “Engagement” requires the provision of positive incentives

Haass 00 – Richard Haass & Meghan O’Sullivan, Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Studies Program, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, p. 1-2

The term *engagement* was popularized amid the controversial policy of constructive engagement pursued by the United States toward South Africa during the first term of the Reagan administration. However, the term itself remains a source of confusion. To the Chinese, the word appears to mean simply the conduct of normal relations. In German, no comparable translation exists. Even to native English speakers, the concept behind the word is unclear. Except in the few instances in which the United States has sought to isolate a regime or country, America arguably "engages" states and actors all the time in one capacity or another simply by interacting with them. This book, however, employs the term engagement in a much more specific way, one that involves much more than a policy of nonisolation. In our usage, engagement refers to a foreign policy strategy that depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives. Certainly, engagement does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign policy instruments such as sanctions or military force. In practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet the distinguishing feature of engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives to shape the behavior of countries with which the United States has important disagreements.

#### Plan is negative pressure --- voting issue:

#### Limits --- they more than double the topic, making all of foreign policy topical --- also makes the topic bidirectional because the U.S. could increase or decrease sanctions against China --- ruins preparation because every strategy has to be written both ways

#### Ground --- coercive pressure is containment, not “engagement” --- their interpretation destroys ground because it accesses a vastly different and unpredictable literature base

Johnston 99 – Alastair Iain Johnston, Laine Professor of China in World Affairs in the Government Department at Harvard University, et al., Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power, Ed. Johnson and Ross, p. xiv-iv

The volume's comprehensive approach to studying engagement means that the contributors have vastly different research agendas. To encourage a common dialogue among the contributors and to facilitate the generation of a common understanding of engagement with cross-national applications, the contributors have worked within a common definition of engagement. For the purpose of this volume, engagement is defined as follows:

The use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the non-status-quo elements of a rising major power's behavior. The goal is to ensure that this growing power is used in ways that are consistent with peaceful change in regional and global order.

In this approach, amelioration of the rising power's behavior does not include efforts to hinder the accretion of relative power. This is better understood as "containment". We have neither defined nor limited the methods of amelioration, preferring that individual authors characterize the methods used by the respective countries and/or multilateral institutions. "Non-coercive methods" include such strategies as accommodation of legitimate interests, transformation of preferences, and entanglement in bilateral and multilateral institutional constraints.

The contributors clearly differentiate engagement from containment. In contrast to containment, engagement seeks neither to limit, constrain, or delay increases in the target country's power nor prevent the development of influence commensurate with its greater power. Rather, it seeks to "socialize" the rising power by encouraging its satisfaction with the evolving global or regional order. Our definition of engagement specifically excludes coercive policies.

### Plan must be a Quid-Pro-Quo

### QPQ---1NC

#### “Engagement” requires the provision of positive incentives

Haass 00 – Richard Haass & Meghan O’Sullivan, Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Studies Program, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, p. 1-2

The term *engagement* was popularized amid the controversial policy of constructive engagement pursued by the United States toward South Africa during the first term of the Reagan administration. However, the term itself remains a source of confusion. To the Chinese, the word appears to mean simply the conduct of normal relations. In German, no comparable translation exists. Even to native English speakers, the concept behind the word is unclear. Except in the few instances in which the United States has sought to isolate a regime or country, America arguably "engages" states and actors all the time in one capacity or another simply by interacting with them. This book, however, employs the term engagement in a much more specific way, one that involves much more than a policy of nonisolation. In our usage, engagement refers to a foreign policy strategy that depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives. Certainly, engagement does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign policy instruments such as sanctions or military force. In practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet the distinguishing feature of engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives to shape the behavior of countries with which the United States has important disagreements.

#### That means the plan must be a quid-pro-quo

De LaHunt 6 - Assistant Director for Environmental Health & Safety Services in Colorado College's Facilities Services department (John, “Perverse and unintended” Journal of Chemical Health and Safety, July-August, Science direct)

Incentives work on a *quid pro quo* basis – this for that. If you change your behavior, I’ll give you a reward. One could say that coercion is an incentive program – do as I say and I’ll let you live. However, I define an incentive as getting something you didn’t have before in exchange for new behavior, so that pretty much puts coercion in its own box, one separate from incentives. But fundamental problems plague the incentive approach. Like coercion, incentives are poor motivators in the long run, for at least two reasons – unintended consequences and perverse incentives.

#### Plan isn’t --- voting issue:

#### Limits --- it functionally narrows the topic because few cases can defend conditioning --- the alternative is hundreds of single import or export cases that explode the Neg’s research burden

#### Ground --- QPQ locks in core generics like soft power and foreign politics DAs, counterplans to add or remove a condition, and critiques of diplomacy

# POLITICS + ELECTIONS

## ELECTIONS LINKS - BIT-SPECIFIC

Also see the elections core

### Elections Link – BIT specific

#### BIT allows Trump to tap into China-specific Anti-Trade rhetoric. That message will be uniquely powerful in this election cycle.

Ou ‘16

David Ou is a Master of Public Policy candidate at the Luskin School of Public Affairs at UCLA. David is interested in international and regional development and the role of business and trade in creating a common prosperity. Before returning to school to pursue his Master’s at UCLA, David conducted field research projects as a student at Fudan University, completed an independent research project on private enterprises in the Pearl River Delta, and developed business opportunities with a local trading company in Southeast Asia. “Mayhem and Accusations: US-China Investment Politics” – From the Magazine: The Generation - May 17, 2016 - http://the-generation.net/mayhem-and-accusations-us-china-investment-politics/

US-China investments are, not surprisingly, filled with controversy. Business and commerce are becoming an increasing part of the countries’ rivalry. Both countries accuse each other of economic hostilities. China accuses the US of encirclement with the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement and electronic intelligence collection in the country. The US accuses China of intellectual property violations and cyber and industrial espionage. The suspicion has led many in America to become wary of China’s investments, especially in military-sensitive areas like semiconductors. In February, Fairchild Semiconductors rejected a Chinese acquisition offer for an inferior US offer because of possible CFIUS intervention. In 2015, Tsinghua Holdings, a state-owned enterprise (SOE) invested in by Tsinghua University, attempted to purchase a number of semiconductor enterprises including a bid for a unit of Philips. Philips rejected the deal over concerns expressed by CFIUS revolving around gallium nitride, a next-generation microchip material, which US anti-air Patriot Missile systems use. These issues with Chinese investments partly stem from the fundamental economic nature of the Chinese state. The Chinese state is very much an economic state, with the line between politics and business frequently blurred. SOEs consist of over 40 percent of China’s non-agricultural GDP. Even after extensive privatization within the past few decades, SOEs continue to occupy a significant position of power as strategic “pillars” of the economy; economic success is political success. Top executives of key SOEs are privileged with red phones that connect directly with China’s party elite and other SOE executives. The Chinese state frequently promotes “national champions,” companies that not only seek profit but also support national interests. SOEs are normally supported to keep an economic sector Chinese, or secure sectors like steel and telecommunications from failure. For example, UnionPay is considered “the champ of all national champions” by dominating the Chinese credit card industry as a monopoly. Critics attribute UnionPay’s supremacy to state protection with unwarranted foreign entry bans. It is easy to see the incentives for the Chinese to conduct industrial espionage if the state is literally invested in the economy. With an intimate state-business relationship, US concerns will not easily be mollified as Chinese investments continue to increase. Fortunately, a US-China bilateral investment treaty (BIT) that has been under negotiation since 2013 seems to be reaching its conclusion this year. Its details are not yet available to the public but the agreement could potentially offer clarity and protection to investors on both sides of the Pacific with clearer CFIUS determination criteria for foreign investors and proper regulations on SOE investments to alleviate American fears. By working out a proper agreement, legitimate investors will be able to make efficient economic decisions rather than take on suboptimal investments they think will be approved by CFIUS. But, as the Presidential election cycle winds up this year, more anti-trade and anti-treaty sentiments will rise. Donald Trump, the presumptive Republican candidate, has tapped and fomented anti-Chinese sentiments with vitriolic attacks on bilateral trade and economic relations, threatening the BIT’s future. This is a shame. The US stands to benefit the most from foreign direct investment because of its low domestic savings and, in some cases, by allowing investments to resurrect local economies. In setting up mutually agreed upon rules, both countries may reduce the mayhem and accusations that inhibit business and investment as well as a robust US-China relationship. Such stability will allow investors like last month’s waste delegation to first ask how their investment will thrive rather than how it will survive.

### Elections – CFIUS specific A-to Link Turns

#### The Aff’s link turns are only true *if CFIUS review is in place*

Miner ‘15

et al; SEAN MINER is China program manager and research associate at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. The Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE; Peterson Institute) is a private and non-profit think tank focused on international economics, based in Washington, D.C. According to the 2014 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report (Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, University of Pennsylvania), Peterson is number 15 (of 150) in the "Top Think Tanks Worldwide" - From the Chapter “COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UN AND THE US-CHINA BILATERAL INVESTMENTTREA" CHALLENGES IN MEETING CHINA'S DEMANDS” – From the paper “TOWARD A US-CHINA INVESTMENT TREATY” - PIIE Briefing 15-1 - February 2015 -https://piie.com/publications/briefings/piieb15-1.pdf

US sentiment toward growing Chinese investment is becoming more positive, especially at the state level, where governors vie to attract job-creating firms to their economies. However, convincing Americans that Chinese investment does not pose an economic or security threat can be difficult. As a side advantage, the CFIUS process provides reassurance to the public at least with respect to security concerns.

### Elections – Trump will seize on China policy

#### Trump will seize on engagement – his victory turns the case and ruins US-Sino ties.

Harding ‘15

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Significant U.S. policy changes toward China are possible in the next administration. The United States is now immersed in its most intense debate over China policy in decades—certainly since the Tiananmen Crisis of 1989, and possibly since the first serious discussion of normalizing relations with China in the mid-1960s.1 Some aspects of the debate are even reminiscent of the first great debate over U.S. strategy toward China—the “who lost China” controversy of the early 1950s. So far, the current debate has been conducted relatively quietly, primarily among analysts of China, scholars of international politics, and specialists on U.S. foreign policy. However, with the presidential election campaign of 2016 ramping up, one or more of the candidates will almost certainly seize the issue. Depending on what positions the candidates take and which of them wins the election, the possibility exists for significant changes in U.S. policy toward China in the next administration. Present policy is widely believed to have failed, and strong arguments are being presented for a tougher U.S. policy toward Beijing. If those arguments dominate the debate, U.S.–China relations will deteriorate significantly.

## Politics – Agenda Disad

### 1NC link

#### Passing a BIT will drain political capital – liberal and conservative interests are opposed.

Gantz ‘14

David A. Gantz - Samuel M. Fegtly Professor of Law and Director, International Trade and Business Law Program, University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law. “CHALLENGES FOR THE UNITED STATES IN NEGOTIATING A BIT WITH CHINA: RECONCILING RECIPROCAL INVESTMENT PROTECTION WITH POLICY CONCERNS” - Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law - Summer, 2014 – available via lexis

The U.S.-China BIT negotiations are taking place at a time of political friction between the United States and China that is unprecedented in recent years. The Chinese hacking of both commercial and governmental websites in the United States has become a serious national security issue, and U.S. authorities are increasingly direct in accusing the Chinese government of stealing military and other technology. n19 With the Edward Snowden disclosures, Chinese authorities have a reciprocal argument to make. Smoldering Chinese territorial disputes over islands in the East and South China Seas with Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Vietnam threaten to embroil the United States in the event that any of the directly involved nations overreacts. n20 Nor, in the view of the United States, has the Chinese government done enough to quell the aggressiveness of its client state, North Korea. n21 In the past five years, the United States has initiated more than ninety antidumping and countervailing duty investigations against a variety of Chinese products, including various iron and steel goods, solar panels, wind towers, shrimp, and citric acid. n22 These unfair trade actions are viewed by China, rightly or wrongly, as having political as well as economic motivations. Also, China clearly perceives the TPP as an economic and political threat, n23 an important part of the Obama Administration's "pivot" toward a more aggressive role in Asia n24 undeniably designed in significant part to counter-balance Chinese hegemony in the region. These conflicts make Chinese citizens suspicious of the United States and undermine respect for China among many Americans. China is regularly (if today less accurately than in the past) accused of undervaluing its currency, n25 and many, both in Congress and elsewhere, oppose Chinese investment in the United States because of concerns that the enterprises so established, for example in telecommunications, will be used for spying or other forms of espionage. n26 Even those proposed investments that are totally innocuous from a national security point of view, such as the recent purchase of the Smithfield Ham group by Chinese interests, engender objections by some in Congress. n27 U.S. interests worry that serious air quality problems in China, with Chinese-sourced particulate pollution already affecting California, will carry over to the United States should the Chinese invest in resource development in the United States. n28 Other Americans are simply concerned with abysmal working conditions in the electronics industry or in textiles and clothing, n29 or less specific fears of China's overtaking the United States as the world's leading economic power n30 and that nation's emergence as a growing security threat. n31 Further, concerns have been raised regarding the competitive advantage subsidized state-owned Chinese enterprises (SOEs) have over private enterprises in the West when it comes to seeking technology and investments in other countries, n32 as well as within China. Even if the U.S. negotiators are successful in concluding the BIT, they will have to convince U.S. stakeholders, the Senate, and civil society that facilitating Chinese investment in the United States is in the national interest.